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ABSTRACT

Vesely, Laurent W. Doctorate of Philosophy, Purdue University. August 2016. After the
Honeymoon: the Obama Effect on Political Attitudes and Participation. Major Professor:
James McCann.

My dissertation takes a mixed-methods approach to investigating the possibility of a
lasting Obama Effect on the political attitudes and behaviors of 2008 Obama supporters.
Defining the Obama Effect as the extraordinary enthusiasm surrounding the 2008 Obama
campaign, I argue that a short term Obama Effect was clearly present in 2008 based on

         

and ability to inspire volunteerism, as

well as on the historic nature of his candidacy. However, my quantitative analysesbuilt
upon panel survey data from the American National Election Studiessuggest little
evidence of lasting campaign effects that were positive and/or unique to Obama
supporters. With regard to attitudes and behaviors such as political interest, political
efficacy, or attendance of political events, Obama supporters often showed relative
declines or stagnation over time when compared to nonsupporters or supporters of
previous presidents. Conversely, my qualitative analysisbased upon interviews with 30
former campaign volunteersrevealed many different manifestations of a lasting Obama
Effect on campaign volunteers. Many former Obama volunteers remained highly

xii
interested, civically engaged, and continually inspired as a result of their involvement in
the 2008 Obama campaign. In sum, I find little evidence of the transformational Obama
Effect on the broader electorate, but strong evidence of a lasting and positive Obama
Effect on many of his most enthusiastic supporters.

1

CHAPTER    

 

 

     ! ! "##$  %! 

%!%!&' !& (  %!% %!& ) *% !% %!!
campaign. Obama had become well-known within political circles after his keynote
address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention, but, prior to that speech, had been
an obscure Illinois state senator with negligible name recognition nationally. Having been
in Washington only 2 years, he ranked among the least-powerful senators and had
garnered few legislative accomplishments. As late as October 22, 2006, he was still
making Shermanesque statements to Tim Russert on Meet the Press, clearly stating his
intentions for the upcoming presidential election cycle:
+%% ,*(   -! .% % %%  / '%0 ' * (
any executive experience. Are you ready to be president?
Obama: 12 *  % '' !% '   %!  '*
president. You know, ultimately, I trust the judgment of the American people that,
in any election, they sort it through. And we have a long and rigorous process,
and, should I decide to run, if I ever did decide to run...
Russert: 1 / ) ) ! (  3#42  ' 5-6.6 .7
election, I sai2 *%  % %!  ' !! 6
Will you serve your full six-'  %  -! .% %  !!%8
5, %!7 %'6
Obama: I will serve out my full six-year term. You know, Tim, if you get asked
enough, sooner or later you get weary and you start looking for new ways of
saying things, but my thinking has not changed.

2
Russert: So you will not run for president or vice president in 2008?
Obama: I will not.
As it so happened, by February 2007, tremendous encouragement from his
supporters had persuaded Senator Obama to throw his hat into the ring. Yet nobody
believed his nomination to be a foregone conclusion. From the beginning, Senator Hillary
Clinton was widely considered by pollsters and by the national press to be the prohibitive
frontrunner. She would, in fact, maintain a dominant lead in national polls over the rest of
the Democratic primary field all throughout 2007. As

 

    

October:
Clinton has led the Democratic pack in every Gallup Poll conducted between
November 2006 and October 2007. For most of this time, Clinton has led Obama
by a double-                    
            -14. Gallup polling on Democratic
nominations going back to the 1972 election shows that, by historical standards, a
lead of even 20 points is large for Democratic candidates. (Newport et al. 2007)

            





his budding

support base was undeniable. In 2012, a year after I had decided to write my dissertation
on the Obama Effect, an eponymous film was released by Charles Dutton. In The Obama
Effect, Dutton plays an obsessive supporter so overcome with emotion by Barack
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Obama campaign placards, and embarks on a nearly 2-year crusade in which every aspect
of his life becomes devoted to the singular mission of converting new Obama supporters
to the cause. His next-
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        ign outside

his house, in hopes that he will be left alone at least until Election Day draws nearer.
            
 

      

    

         



candidacy. He was, after all, the first African-American candidate with a serious chance
of winning a major party nomination, let alone the presidency. His future running mate,
Joe Biden, was even criticized for his spontaneous remarks on Obama entering the race:
    !   

    "  "  #    
$ %       

and clean and a nice-

$ % & 



   

apologizing and clarifying that he meant no offense to his friend and competitor, Biden
(then a 35-  !  

 '  ( 

      ) * $

 

probably the most exciting candidate that the Democratic or Republican Party has
+,-./01. 23 41253 56701 89:1 ;117 2,-/7. <&  * rett 2007, emphasis mine).

The Obama campaign made every effort to capitalize on both the positive
coverage and the bright spotlight. In his announcement speech, on February 10, 2007,
Obama effectively cast himself as a transformative figure, needed at that exact moment in
American history. In choosing to deliver the speech from the Illinois State Capital
   
    
  

"  =     "   !      
    



 mself as the logical

>   = % =       



 $   '   ?   #          

 !  
#  " -

American candidate presenting himself as someone who could once again bring together

4
a nation exhausted and seemingly divided by unending war, overridden with hyperpartisanship, and paralyzed by political gridlock.

  



                  

agency and mobilization:               -Illinois

     

 

              

argued, as politicians often do, that this particular election was especially important and
critical. But it would not be good enough, Obama claimed, for the thousands in the
crowds to simply vote on Election Day and then again in four years. His campaign and
presidency would be designed to serve as a grassroots vehicle that would allow the
electorate to maintain their engagement even after the election.

                 
 !          

 

   

    "  "  #$%&'(

 )     *       gave people to understand that
through his presidency, his supporters would be empowered+even more so than
registered lobbyists and special interest groups, he was fond of promising+to create for

*        
Over the yearlong-plus campaign to follow, more than a few political observers
would come to criticize the Obama Effect. National Review editor Rich Lowry (2008),
for example, poked fun at Obama supporters for appearing to pre-anoint the relatively
unaccomplished Illinois Senator as the reincarnation of John F. Kennedy. Archconservative firebrand radio host Rush Limbaugh (2008) sneered aloud at the notion that
several Obama supporters had actually fainted in his presence from too much excitement.
At one point, even !  ,   

#         *     (
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the supporter enthusiasm

            
          was both asinine and

undeserved.
However, for the Obama campaign, this agency-based approach proved to be a
remarkable success in terms of supporter recruitment and mobilization. By many
measures, such as primary election turnout, general election turnout, overall fundraising,
small-donor fundraising, grassroots volunteerism, and the historic nature of the candidacy
itself, the 2008 Obama candidacy inspired a level of enthusiasm unprecedented in
modern presidential campaigns. And it proved to make all the difference, electorally
speaking.
The Obama Effect in the 2008 Primary
The 30.2% of eligible voters who participated in the 2008 presidential primaries
represented the highest rate of turnout since the direct primary system was implemented
by both major parties in 1972. Almost every state in the Union shattered its previous
turnout record. Yet, despite both the Democratic and Republican Parties featuring an

                  ! 
despite highly competitive races for both Party no          
votes"19.3%"were cast in the Democratic Primary. Only 10.8% chose to vote in the
Republican Primary. For recent comparison: the previous two open Democratic races in
2004 and 1992 had witnessed turnout rates of 9.7% and 12.6%, respectively. Similarly,
the previous two open Republican races in 2000 and 1996 had produced turnout rates of
10.1% and 9.8%, respectively. One must go back to 1980 to find a combined-party

6
primary turnout rate above 26% of eligible voters, and back to 1976 to find a single-party
primary turnout rate higher than 16% (Gans 2008).

 

            

Democrats and Republicansone that would persist throughout the general election
seasonto the Obama Effect. Other major factors that likely contributed to driving up

                  
campaign as the first major female candidate for president, the determinedly low
approval ratings of sitting Republican President George W. Bush, the weakening national
economy, and the increasing unpopularity of the War in Iraq. (Only the Democratic
candidates were calling for troop withdrawal.)
Despite a possible convergence of several factors, once the Democratic primary
voting began, the undeniably unique reality of the Obama Effect came into clear focus.
On January 3, 2008, Obama received a stunning 38% support from caucus-goers in the
first-in-the-nation Iowa caucus. John Edwards followed with 30%, with Hillary Clinton
receiving 29%. Although Obama was favored to win, the wide margin was a major
surprise to pollsters and the national press. The average of the six polls conducted the
week prior placed him at 30.8%, less than 2 points ahead of his closest rival, and not a
single poll had him above 34% (Real Clear Politics 2008). In fact, many prognosticators

             -time caucus-goers would
underperform turnout expectations (due to the time-consuming nature of caucus-going

           ! "   

    

Iowa caucus victory was a widely-recognized affirmation of the extraordinary enthusiasm

7
surrounding his campaign, that is, the Obama Effect. Once the voting began, nobody
could deny that it was a very unique and a very real phenomenon.
Clinton rebounded by defeating Obama 39-36 in the New Hampshire primary a
week later; however, on January 26, Obama regained his momentum with a landslide 5527 victory over her in the South Carolina primary. He was widely regarded as the favorite
    



    

   



newfound frontrunner status by dominating the Illinois, Georgia, and Alabama primaries
and by winning with supermajorities in each of the caucus states that voted that day:
Colorado, Minnesota, Kansas, Idaho, Alaska, and North Dakota. Over the next few
weeks, his momentum continued with huge victories in Washington State, Nebraska,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Washington D.C., Virginia, Hawaii, and Wisconsin. By the
time Clinton recovered to win the March and April primaries in Ohio, Texas, and
Pennsylvania, Obama had already opened up a nearly insurmountable delegate lead,
giving him a clear pat  

 

 





!!"#

The Obama Effect in the 2008 General Election
The November 4, 2008, election cycle produced a higher rate of voter turnout$
about 58% of the voting-age public$than in any United States election since 1968. For
recent comparison, the 2012 presidential campaigns produced a voter turnout rate below
55% of eligible voters. Despite a voting-age population increase of roughly 10 million
between the 2008 and 2012 elections, more people overall voted in the 2008 presidential
election (131 million) than in the 2012 election (129 million) (Peters and Woolley 2015).
%



 & '

() *    

 + 



considerable accomplishments in the Senate, the heightened electoral participation in

8
   

                  

many commentators observed that the Republican Party tended to nominate the logical
         

 !  "   #   $% Bush), and John

McCain was simply and clearly next in line, as the candidate who had lost to George W.
Bush in the 2000 Republican Primary.
Attributing the higher-than-usual turnout at least in part to the Obama Effect
instead of a McCain effect also makes sense in light of the proportion of the vote received
 & '   '         & '( ) *+

        

of the national popular vote received by any candidate since George H.W. Bush in 1988.
Obama received nearly 70 million votes, about 10% more than George W. Bush had
received in the previous election cycle of 2004 (Peters and Woolley 2012).
It was also noteworthy that Obama won every swing state in the 2008 general
election besides Missouri. His 365 Electoral College votes represented the highest total
  ,   ( -.*      /   0**1 $         '
important swing states, Ohio and Florida, and by relatively comfortable margins.
!  '  & '(   (  '     ditional blue states or even traditional
swing states; he was able to expand the electoral playing field even into traditionally red
states (Nagourney and Zeleny 2008). North Carolina wound up voting for the Democratic
presidential candidate for the first time since choosing Jimmy Carter over Gerald Ford in
1976. Similarly, Virginia and Indiana voted for the Democratic candidate for the first
 '   2 , 3(      /

,  #

 0*14    

Goldwater won only 6 states). Indeed, the enthusiasm driving the 2008 Obama campaign

9
proved to be more broad-based than even his most optimistic supporters could have
imagined 2 years prior as they were encouraging him to enter the race.
The Obama Effect on Fundraising
In early 2007, while still trailing Senator Clinton in the Democratic primary polls,
Obama promised that he would finance his general election campaign with public
funding. However, by June of 2008, as the general election campaign season was
beginning, it was clear that Obama could raise much more money privately than he
would receive from the public funding system; thus, it made little practical sense to
adhere to his commitment. The move was widely noted by the national press as the sort
of blatant promise-breaking that is common among presidential primary candidates. They
    

                

without intending to adhere to those promises during the general election. In all
likelihood, his campaign simply had not anticipated his remarkable capacity for
fundraising. At any rate, Obama was largely able to avoid sharp or sustained criticisms.
Kenneth Vogel of Politico reported the press reaction to the broken promise as follows:
In a widely expected move that will give Democrat Barack Obama a huge cash
advantage over Republican John McCain, Obama announced Thursday morning
that he will be the first modern presidential candidate to decline public financing

        ts a break from the strong signals
he sent last year about his commitment to the public financing program. It means
                     
      !  
       

$84 million spending limit. (2008)
In 2004, the George W. Bush and John Kerry campaigns had raised a combined
$653 million between the primary and general election campaigns. This included the
nearly $75 million that each candidate received in public funding for the general election.

10
That massive sum (which did not include substantial fundraising from Howard Dean and
several other primary candidates) dwarfed the $528 million raised by all candidates
combined in the 2000 primary and general election cycle.
Surprisingly, the 2008 Obama campaign blew right past that 2004 fundraising
record. The Associated Press (2008) observed that the Obama campaign outraised the
Bush and Kerry campaigns combined, for a total of about $745 million between the
primary and general elections. As Tahman Bradley reported in December of 2008, while
most candidates opted out of public funding for their primary campaigns (on the
calculation that they could raise more money independently), Obama was the first major
presidential candidate to decline public funding in the general election. As noted above,
the reason was clear: his campaign was a fundraising juggernaut by any comparative
 

 

  

    

  



 

public financing rules, the Obama campaign amassed nearly $300 million just in the two
months following the Democratic National Convention.
Shortly after the 2008 general election, NPR reporters Renee Montagne and Peter
Overby summarized the Obama campaign



 

       

Montagne: Now, Peter, we've been hearing about record financing from the
Obama campaign for a couple of years now. Is this more of the same?
Overby: It isit's more of more of the same. This report runs from October 16th
to 20 days after the election and over that time periodobviously, mostly before
Election Daythe Obama campaign raised $104 million. Not so long ago, that
was a good amount to run a whole presidential campaign on. I was at a conference
yesterday with some political scientists, talking about all this. And Tony Corrado
[of the Brookings Institute] made the point that the Obama campaign raised more
than the Democratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee
combined. And Corrado            
itself.

11
By the spring of 2008, the national press had become especially enamored with
  

 

  

   

 

    

campaign in history had ever tapped into such a broad donor base. In May 2008, the
Associated Press pointed to the unprecedented breadth and nature of the operation:
Dozens of Associated Press interviews with donors and an AP financial analysis
show how contributions that make only a  -       
in increments of $10, $15 and $50, have collectively swelled into a financial roar
that has helped propel Obama toward the Democratic presidential nomination.
Altogether, Obama's campaign has taken in an unprecedented $226 million, most
of it contributed online. His donor base is larger than the one the Democratic
National Committee had for the 2000 election. (May 9, 2008, emphasis mine)
The Washington Post reported that by Election Day of 2008, more than 4 million
individual donors had contributed to the Obama campaign. Over 40% of these donations
were from donors who contributed $200 or less, representing a record percentage of
fundraising from small donors for any campaign on record (MacGillis and Cohen 2008).
A LexisNexis search revealed that in the last 3 months of 2008 alone, the Washington
Post and New York Times 

  

  



 



remarkable ability to raise funds from small donors.
The Obama Effect on Grassroots Volunteerism
  

 





  



impressiveness only by its volunteer recruitment operation. Volunteerism was an
    

 

 



 

    

had considerable experience running field operations for previous campaigns. (Field
operations refer to direct voter contact operations, e.g., phone-banking, canvassing, and
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served as a Field Dire    '
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Campaign Manager Steve Hillenbrand, who served as chief coordinator for early state
  

  

            

 

Director Paul Tewes had worked alongside Hillenbrand on the 2000 Gore field team and
   

          



chief deputy in Iowa, had previously coordinated statewide field operations for both the
Louisiana Democratic Party and the South Dakota Democratic Party, as well as for Jon
!   "    

    #  $   % 

Carson, was highly-regarded for his previous successes in running statewide field
operations for the Democratic Party in both South Carolina and New Jersey.
The grand idea was for this experienced senior staff to channel the remarkable
enthusiasm of early Obama supporters into a massive and sustainable grassroots
volunteer operation. The national press began to take notice of this emphasis on


 &  '   ( )  )&& Washington Post article

*  )  

  +,    $ - .(/

chronicled the earliest stages of the volunteer recruitment operation. He observed that
         0   "    
  '  '     '     
enthusiasm into actual support on the ground in the early voting states (i.e., Iowa and
New Hampshire). And without success in the early states, it was virtually impossible for
any campaign to gain momentum leading into the later voting states. Thus, the promise,
energy, and momentum that had earned considerable media praise and attention for the
Dean campaign throughout 2003 had been largely quelled even before the first caucus
and primary votes were cast in January of 2004.
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from the beginning to translate their enthusiastic support base not just into voter turnout,
but also into volunteerism. Anyone who attended an Obama campaign event was required
to provide the campaign with their phone number and email address, so that they could
late

                    

                     
                !"""    #!""$%
On March 31, 2007, more than 9 months before the start of the primary voting,
this loose grassroots infrastructure was put to the test for the first time. Supporters were
encouraged to use a basic social media tool on the campaign website to self-organize a

       & '

 ( &  

     

event or find one nearby through a zip code search feature. The strategy proved an
astounding success: over 6,000 meetings nationwide were set up at venues such as
Obama supporter homes, local public libraries, and college student union buildings. In a
video recorded for these meetings, Obama emphasized to his highly enthusiastic support

) *       &          
t

&       

            

        #!""$%
Throughout most of 2007, the Obama campaign provided few material resources
to volunteers outside of the early states (Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South
Carolina). Most states had few, if any, campaign offices or paid staffers, and volunteers
on the ground received very little from campaign headquarters in terms of direct funding
or other material resources. Through the website, volunteers were typically provided only
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with printable lists of voters to contact in their areas and printable messaging scripts to
   

     

        

  

the campaign. Volunteers were always asked to record information for the campaign
database about every voter they contacted (in particular, whether the voter was a
supporter, non-supporter, or undecided). By allowing their loosely-organized grassroots
volunteer operation to channel its enthusiasm into direct voter contact, the Obama
campaign was able to collect large amounts of data and thus continually improve the
efficiency of its voter outreach efforts throughout the campaign.
By June of 2007, the wide-ranging grassroots network had blossomed to include
more than 10,000 volunteers nationwide. At this early stage in the primary campaign,
they had already knocked on more than 350,000 doors during their door-to-door
canvassing operations (Keating 2007). In December, Obama campaign volunteers were
making over 10,000 calls per night to potential caucus-goers in advance of the January 3rd
Iowa caucus (Zeleny 2007). By the time the general election got into full swing in the
summer of 2008, already more than two million people had volunteered for the Obama
campaign at least one time. The campaign estimated that about 70% of these volunteers
had never previously volunteered for any political campaign, and that around six million
people would volunteer at least once before Election Day (Mooney 2008).
The aforementioned record-setting fundraising hauls were now being translated
into more professionalized field operations in more than a dozen swing states that the
Obama campaign considered winnable for the general election. Boston Globe reporter
Brian Mooney (2008) observed that the ever-growing base of enthusiastic volunteers that
had been called upon to self-organize during the primary season, were now being
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organized by the largest army of paid field staff in the history of presidential campaigns.
The Obama campaign reported deploying an astonishing 1.5 million volunteers for getout-the-vote operations on Election Day 2008 alone (Moore 2008).
The Obama Effect and the Historic

    



The uniqueness of  race and racial identity also contributed to the
enthusiasm surrounding his 2008 campaign. Obama was not treated by the national press
as just another candidate who happened to be black. Instead, journalists frequently

   ! "#"$ % #  "y and commented explicitly on his
status as the first African American nominee of a major political party, or as the first
African American with a serious chance of winning the presidency. A Lexis Nexis search
from 2007-2008 revealed no less than 103 different New York Times or Washington Post
articles containing both 

  !$  ! "#"$ # !$  !&"

&"'$ A good deal of academic literature also appeared in the two years after his
election to challenge those who attempted to cha"(    !)#"*$
candidate (Teasley and Ikard, 2010; Donovan 2010; Asukile 2009).
While 

 ) # # #  +  , "* Obama himself

wrote extensively about his racial identity in his 1995 memoir Dreams from My Father,
he took great pains in his national political career to avoid being viewed simply as a black
candidate who was representing or %"- # !*. "%.$ This is illustrated in

!/.     0#*"" # /*.$ 123345+ in which Ron Walters draws
multiple points of # , 6 6.# "* 789:  7899 "" and

 ";' Of particular note, Walters argues that 6.# principal
motivation was to empower the black electorate and other marginalized groups.
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Conversely, Obama took a universalistic approach: his campaign wanted to capitalize on
his newness with the electorate and to focus less on issues specifically of race, and more
on issues like health care and opposition to the Iraq War. Also, while Jackson sought to
lead a social movement reminiscent of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and
1960s, Obama set out to run a more traditional campaign merely seeking to maximize
votes. A third major distinction was



limited fundraising appealhe raised less

than $14 million between his two presidential campaigns

 

 

renowned

fundraising prowess and reliance on a much broader donor base (as described above) to
support his campaign.
    

attempts to employ 

desire to appeal to the broader electorate often did result in

  

rhetoric. For example, in his 2004 convention speech

Obama claimed    

    

only the United States of America.  
!    



 "

way too simplistic just to say that

 #



 
 ! 

   

  

 



criticize the Bush

ized terms. He insisted, It is

  !     ! t

instead arguing that the administration had simply been ins
  



care about black people,





 

   

(p. 18). Even in his 2007 announcement speech he explicitly invoked President

Lincoln, yet did not explicitly mention race at any point during the speech.
Walters notes that when Obama did employ racialized rhetoric, it was again often
as a tactic to reassure whites that he was not going to focus too much on black issues. For
example, he would occasionally chastise blacks about not taking personal responsibility
for community or family plights (e.g., gang violence or absentee parenting), but without
mentioning any public policy issues at the root of those very plights. This reassurance
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tactic was employed broadly, for example, in his March 18, 2008 speech entirely about
race, delivered in Philadelphia in the wake of a firestorm of negative press over
 

    Jeremiah Wright. In that speech Obama

did attempt, at great length, to articulate reasons behind the anger felt by many black
Americans such as Reverend Wright; yet he also spoke at length and in a legitimizing
way about frustrations experienced by whites toward nonwhites. He placed much of his
emphasis on themes such as optimism and the need for more cross-racial dialogue. The
New York Times            



Chooses Reconciliation over Rancor (Scott 2008).
  apparent cross-racial appeal during the 2008 election does not, of

course, mean that Obama  nonwhite racial identity was an asset to his electoral chances
or that it made campaigning easier for him. In fact, in his analysis of survey data from
1992-2008, Piston (2010) found considerable evidence to the contrary, arguing that
Obama likely would have done much better if not for persistent white prejudice (as
defined by whites characterizing blacks as lazier and/or less intelligent than whites).
Piston noted that Obama won 95% of the vote among African Americans and 67%
among Latinos, but only 43% among whites. He concluded that Obama was affected
negatively by racial prejudice more than any other candidate in the previous two decades.
Notwithstanding the headwinds Obama likely faced as a result of race, I argue
that his unique racial identity did serve as a genuine source of excitement for the national
press and for many racial minorities as well. The national press was largely positive
toward Obama regarding his handling of race-related issues, and more generally about his
status as the first African American nominee of a major party. African Americans and
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Latinos alike voted for Obama at a substantially higher rate than they had voted for John
Kerry, the Democratic nominee, in 2004. I therefore I argue that the historic nature of the

 

was a major contributing factor to the Obama Effect in 2008.

Chapter Breakdown
In these opening pages, I defined the Obama Effect as the extraordinarily high

            
Effect was observable from early 2007 when he announced his candidacy and up until his
election to the Presidency of the United States on November 4, 2008. I explained how the
Obama Effect manifested itself in a dominant primary election win over the heavilyfavored Hillary Clinton, and then in a general election landslide victory over John
McCain; in record fundraising totals from small donors in particular; in extraordinary
levels of volunteerism from his tremendously enthusiastic support base; and even in part
because of his historic status as the first African American nominee of a major political
party.
Chapter 2 contains my literature review and theory chapter. I begin by situating
my research question within the pertinent literature on and candidate-centered campaigns.
While most studies of campaign effects employ vote choice as the dependent variable
(i.e., they investigate the factors that influence the vote choice), I explain my decision to
use vote choice as an independent variable to investigate possible campaign effects. I
employ it to compare attitudinal and behavioral outcomes of Obama supporters over time
to outcomes of non-supporters over time. Through my theoretical framework, I juxtapose
Obama with other outsider candidates in the post-reform era and posits the 2008 Obama
campaign as the culmination of the candidate-centered campaigns (as opposed to party-
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centered campaigns) that have characterized these last 4 decades of American
presidential elections. As such, the central research question guiding the study is: Did the
2008 Obama campaign actually have, as I hypothesize, a positive, unique, and lasting
Obama Effect on the political attitudes and political participation of his supporters? In
other words, was the 2008 election truly a transformative election
campaign hoped

as the Obama

that was able to keep supporters engaged even after the election? Or

was the Obama Effect just a campaign phenomenon of extraordinary but short-lived
enthusiasm, easily observable during the campaign season, but destined only to wither
and die out after Election Day 2008? (This would represent the null hypothesis, i.e., that
there was no lasting Obama Effect.) Or, to consider a third possibility, was there indeed a
lasting effect to the campaign, but one that represented a larger presidential effect or
candidate effect (as opposed to an Obama Effect), not at all unique to Obama supporters?
A fourth and final possibility is that the lasting Obama Effect actually constituted a
negative effect on the political attitudes and political participation of Obama supporters.
(These last two outcomes would constitute rejections of my general hypothesis of a
positive Obama Effect.) After explaining each possible outcome, I argue that a positive
and durable Obama Effect on his supporters should be expected precisely because of the
unique and extraordinary success enjoyed by his 2008 campaign. Lastly, I provide a
theoretical basis for the inclusion of all other dependent and independent variables under
investigation in my analytical chapters (Chapters 4-6).
Chapter 3, my Data and Methods chapter, includes a discussion of my empirical
mixed-methods approach to investigating the Obama Effect. It begins with an explanation
of the rationale for employing panel survey data and American National Election Studies
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(ANES) data, in particular, for my quantitative analyses in Chapters 4 and 5. Second, it
explains how data is incorporated from earlier election cycles for comparative purposes,
so that it is possible to differentiate between an actual Obama Effect, and an effect that is
not unique among Obama supporters. Third, it discusses relevant information on
interviewer methods, survey items, variable measurement, and validity and reliability
concerns. Further, it explains the approach to hypothesis-testing and lays out all of my
major hypotheses for Chapters 4 and 5. I then shift my attention to the discussion of the
qualitative data and methods for Chapter 6, the interview-based analysis. This section
begins with a discussion of interviewee sampling and recruitment techniques, including
the Internal Review Board process required for working with human subjects. It explains
how my sample of interviewees

all volunteers from the 2008 Obama campaign

differs

from the samples of panel participants that constitute the ANES panel surveys. Next, it
provides general data on my interview subjects, such as dates, lengths, questions, and
formatting of interviews. Finally, it establishes the relationship between my chosen
interview question wording and the ANES survey items used in my quantitative analyses.
I explain how the in-depth interviews were designed to flesh out the major themes from
my quantitative findings, in order to draw comparisons and contrasts between these
campaign volunteers and the ANES panel participants (who are more reflective of the
national electorate than a group of volunteers).
Chapter 4 presents my empirical quantitative analysis of potential Obama Effects
on political attitudes. I run regression models testing my hypotheses of a lasting and
positive Obama Effect on the political interest, on the political efficacy, and on the
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  the 2008

2010 election cycle to corresponding results from the previous two presidencies (2000
2002 and 19921994). While I identified certain instances of a clear and positive Obama
Effecton political efficacy in particularin the broader analysis, I find it quite difficult
to draw neat conclusions about a positive and lasting Obama Effect on the political
attitudes of his supporters. While some ambiguity in the data is to be expected, patterns
that apply to all political attitudes in my analyses were far less clear than I had
anticipated. In some cases, such as with political interest, I actually observe what appears
to be a negative Obama Effect. In yet other cases, such as with partisanship, I observe
remarkably similar outcomes across groups and across election cycles, prompting me to
posit a broader candidate effect instead of the hypothesized Obama Effect. This result
leads to a discussion of some broader candidate effects that were identifiable among
Obama supporters, but not unique to that group. I interpret all of my statistical analysis
for this chapter (and the next) in the comparative context of the three election cycles.
Chapters 5 follows a layout similar to Chapter 4. In this second quantitative
chapter, I present my empirical analysis of potential Obama Effects on political
participation. Once again, I employ multiple regression models, as well as binary logit
models, for hypothesis testing. I hypothesize a lasting and positive Obama Effect on the
voting behavior, on attendance of political meetings, and on attendance of political
protests among  

 

 ! "       support for a

candidate had no observable impact on voter turnout. In the case of attending political
meetings, I find increased participation among supporters of both candidates; but the
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level of increase if consistently higher among supporters of the losing candidates.
Similarly and unsurprisingly, supporters of losing candidates tended to participate more
in protests, marches, rallies, or demonstrations.
Chapter 6 is my qualitative analytical chapter. My data package for this chapter is
comprised of transcripts from 30 in-depth interviews I conducted with volunteers from
the 2008 Obama campaign. All 30 volunteers were Purdue University students who
volunteered for Obama on the Purdue campus at least twice in 2008. I asked these former
volunteers wide-ranging questions about their political attitudes and participation since
2008, with particular focus on how they came to feel about the candidate they helped
elect after the initial excitement of his election

 

 

 

had subsided. I also probed into their political and civic participation, or lack thereof,
                

my quantitative results from Chapters 4-5

the analysis in relation to

that is, I compare the political attitudes and

political participation of these volunteers to the much larger and more representative
samples of panel respondents analyzed in the previous two chapters
serves as a stand-

 

     

 



this chapter also

      

enthusiastic group of supporters: those who were willing to go out and volunteer for his
campaign on their free time.
Chapter 7, my concluding chapter, contains a summary of my quantitative and
qualitative analyses and situates my findings in the context of further discussion. I will be
completing this dissertation in the spring of 2016; so the following question is raised in
my closing pages: what might we expect in terms of the long-term attitudinal outcomes of
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there are likel 





  

 

      

         

lack thereof, as was often the case) and that truly transformational effects may be the
rarest of legacies for American presidential campaigns.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Central Research Question
Following the 2008 election, was there a positive, unique, and lasting Obama
Effect on the political attitudes and political participation of Obama supporters? Based
upon some of the more remarkable elements of the 2008 campaign which I discussed in
Chapter 1 (i.e., turnout, fundraising, volunteerism), my general hypothesis at the outset of
the study was that such an Obama Effect may have been not only positive, but possibly
even transformational, in terms of its lasting impact on the political attitudes and political
   

 

        

  

  

the American electorate in these ways. My central task in this research is to investigate
the extent to which he succeeded in that endeavor, in other words, the degree to which his
campaign succeeded in producing a positive, unique, and lasting Obama Effect.
Why Study Campaign Effects?
The study of political campaigns can potentially tell us a great deal about the
quality of democratic representation in the United States. As a representative democracy,
we expect our candidates to tell us what they plan to do if elected. We thus provide
candidates who hope to be re-elected (i.e., the vast majority of candidates) with a clear
incentive to govern in a fashion consistent with their campaign rhetoric. To disappoint
public expectations would signal to voters that the campaign was little more than a
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charade and that the candidate (and, by extension, his or her party) cannot be trusted in
the future. To this point, political scientists have indeed found that
conventional wisdom

contrary to

candidates for office are, in fact, inclined toward honoring or at

least attempting to honor their campaign promises. The nature of democratic
representation, that is, the re-election principle, gives them great reason to do so (Shaw
1998; Mayhew 1977; Downs, 1957).
This incentive to campaign in good faith allows us to study political campaigns as
the mechanism through which candidates for office seek to inform voters about their

                    
certain political attitudes and/or political behaviors within the electorate. We can
distinguish between more immediate or short-term campaign effects, such as influencing
the vote choice in that immediate election, and longer-lasting campaign effects, such as
sustained changes in political attitudes and behaviors that can be observed over the
course of multiple years or even multiple election cycles.
The study of campaigns can also potentially tell us a great deal about the relative

                     
        The Decline of Political Parties (1984) was published
over 30 years ago, and his thesis has only gained traction in the years since. He has
updated the volume several times to present new data and evidence regarding this decline
in pure partisanship and in party power, especially since the 1970s era of Vietnam and
Watergate. To be clear, this decline in pure partisanship should not be overstated; many

                      
words, while the decline in pure partisanship over the last 4 decades looks quite stark on
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a 3-point scale (Democrat, Independent, Republican), a 7-point scale reveals that the
decline in pure partisanship has led to a rise in Independent-Democrat leaners and
Independent-Republicans leaners.
From Party-Centered to Candidate-Centered Campaigns
I am particularly interested in the uniqueness, or lack thereof, of the 2008 Obama
campaign and its effects. This potential uniqueness is best understood in the larger
context of the modern presidential nomination process. Prior to the post-reform era (pre1972), presidential nominations were essentially the business of the national Democratic
Party and the national Republican Party. Whether running for local, state, or national
office, candidates typically could not be seen as viable without strong party backing
(McCann 1996). Logistical support, including fundraising operations, get-out-the-vote
drives, and campaign office staffing, was largely provided by the party infrastructure,
which served as the centralized decision-making apparatus (including candidate
selection) from the national all the way down to the local level.
Following the 1968 Chicago protests and riots outside the Democratic National
Convention, the Democratic Party changed its nomination process to allow primary
voters to nominate candidates directly. The Republican Party followed suit shortly after.
Any introductory American Government textbook will observe that these changes
  

  

 

  



    didates

in those

proverbial smoke filled back rooms, without any input whatsoever from rank and file
voters. However Cohen et al. argue in The Party Decides (2008) that contrary to this
conventional wisdom, not much has changed in the post-reform era. The nomination
systems still allow for party insiders and activists to function as filters for presidential
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nominees, thus limiting the choices available to primary voters. No candidate can win a
major party nomination on the strength of primary voters, they argue, unless that
candidate already has a strong base of support among state party officials, lobbyists, and
leaders of special interest groups.
We do have clear evidence, however, that in at least certain circumstances
candidates can earn substantial popular support with primary and general election voters
regardless of their standing or level of formal support within the party. Wattenberg
(1991) contends, convincingly, that political campaigns in the United States have indeed
become increasingly candidate-centric and decreasingly party-centric since the early
1970s reforms. Most notably, despite having no institutional supporter whatsoever, in the
1992 general election Ross Perot won 19% of the national popular vote as an Independent
candidate running against the candidates nominated by the two major parties. Ralph
Nader, a famously independent-minded candidate running on the Green Party ticket in
2000, played a widely-documented outsized role in influencing that presidential election
despite earning less than 1% of the national popular vote. Many others have run
- 



      

       

Pat Robertson, Pat Buchanan, Steve Forbes, Alan Keyes, Mike Huckabee, Rick
Santorum, and Ron Paul for the Republicans; and Jesse Jackson, Gary Hart, Bill Clinton,
and, of course, Barack Obama for the Democrats. Except for Clinton and Obama, who of
course ultimately did secure the nominations for their party, each of these candidates was
able to secure substantial support within his  
institutional support from the party itself.

     

  

his lack of
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One might argue that the Republican Party remains relatively strong compared to
the Democratic Party, in the sense that Republican voters have repeatedly selected the
     



  

         



been loath to nominate an individual-centered candidate the way the Democratic Party
did with Clinton and Obama. For example, Gerald Ford who inherited the presidency
     

  

   

      

Republicans in the 1976 election. Reagan, having lost the last time around, was able to
win the nomination over George H.W. Bush in 1980. After serving      
vice president, George H.W. Bush was tapped for the Republican nomination in 1988.
Party elder Bob Dole was nominated to run in 1996; and then George W. Bush, son of the
former Republican president, was chosen by Republican primary voters in 2000.
Longtime Washington stalwart and party leader John McCain won the Republican
nomination in 2008. His closest rival in that 2008 primary election, Mitt Romney, was
the winner of the 2012 Republican primary. Therefore, we might draw this conclusion:
although many candidates have attracted a substantial segment of enthusiastic Republican
primary voters, the Republican primary electorate as a whole have typically selected the
same candidate that would likely have been chosen by party elders in that proverbial
smoke-filled back room. This conclusion suggests that although candidates are no longer
beholden to merely carrying out the will of the party and its platform, the parties are not
equal in strength; in this regard the Republican Party is the stronger of the two.
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party structure in the modern era. The Democratic Party has actually nominated several
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candidates in recent decades whose nomination did not seem likely at the beginning of
the primary. Jimmy Carter, for example, was nominated in 1976 despite being an obscure
governor from Georgia with negligible national name recognition at the time of his
announcement. Bill Clinton, similarly, was running outside the top five Democratic
candidates in the early primary polls from 1992. And perhaps most obviously, Obama,
having only served 2 years in an office higher than state senator when his candidacy
began, was also relatively unknown among the national electorate at the time of his
campaign announcement speech.
 

The Rise of Candidate Centered Politics was published in

1991 as a sequel to The Decline of American Political Parties. This modification in
terminology indicates the dual nature of the phenomenon under observation: not only that
parties have grown increasingly weak, but that the vacuum was being filled by individual
candidates often with strong, dynamic, unique, and engaging personalities. Many of these
candidates have been willing or even eager to draw contrasts with their own party
       

            

emphasize these contrasts as an effective mechanism for highlighting their independence
from their party. After all, the thinking goes, voters respect qualities in a candidate such
as independence, leadership, and willingness to do what they think is right even if
unpopular within their own parties.
The Popular Question in Campaign Effects Research
Traditionally, political scientists have tended to treat vote choice as the dependent
variable in research on campaign effects (Holbrook, 1996). They ask, what factors
influence vote choice? This is often the case for both individual-level analyses, in which
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the goal is to determine the potential factors that may influence the vote choice of
individuals, and aggregate-level analysis, in which the goal is to determine the potential
factors that may influence larger electoral outcomes at the local/state/national level.
In this project, however, I am investigating the possible existence of a very
different type of campaign effect. Instead of treating vote choice as the dependent
variable and then seeking to d       



     

major impact on voting behavior, I treat vote choice as my key independent variable. In
essence, my question deals with whether support for a particular campaign may condition
certain types of changes in our political attitudes and political behaviors. Nonetheless it
makes sense to briefly review the main studies looking at potential campaign effects on
voting behavior, since this constitutes the general thrust of the literature on campaign
effects.
The Case for Limited or Minimal Campaign Effects
As noted above, the over-arching theme in this body of research is to determine
the degree to which political campaigns affect voting behavior. Some political observers
assume campaigns to be the key independent variable, or at least one of the more
important ones, that influences vote choice. After all, presidential campaigns are very
expensive and time-consuming. For that reason, the lay reader may be surprised to learn
that in the view of many political scientists, campaigns are essentially tales of sound and
fury, but which signify very, very little in terms of actual campaign effects (i.e.,
influencing individual or aggregate vote choice). For example:


In their groundbreaking 1940s Columbia panel study on voting behavior,
Lazarsfeld, Berleson, and Gaudet (1944) found that individuals rarely changed
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their vote preference at the end of the campaign from the preference they had
expressed at the beginning of the campaign. They argued that campaigns may
strengthen or weaken previous political dispositions held by individuals, which
are typically derived from family/group membership. But campaigns were
unlikely to convert more than a very small percentage of voters to the other
candidate, because most voters would be disinclined to break from the perceived
group interests that led to their original candidate preference. This research is
considered seminal seven decades after publication.
The authors of the seminal The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) argued that
party identification was far more influential as a vote choice determinant than
campaigns could ever be. One may assume that policy preferences tend to
condition support for a party/candidate; however, they argued that the causal
arrow typically points in the opposite direction: Americans actually talk
themselves into agreeing with the positions and voting for the candidates because
of their party affiliation. According to this argument, then, individual campaign
effects are not produced in a vacuum but are typically additive to the effect of
    

         

  



deterministic or set in stone for life, Campbell and colleagues characterized it as a
relatively stable political attitude, typically adopted through the political
socialization process involving institutions such as family, schools, and media.
They argued that party affiliation was unlikely to be flipped by any single
political campaign. They found that on average, a strong majority of 63% of
voters had already made up their minds who they would vote for by the ends of
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the respective Democratic and Republican nomination conventions, before the
beginning of the general election campaign.
In The Responsible Electorate (1966), Key argued that neither predisposition
based on group membership nor party identification was the most important factor
 



      

     

and that they were inclined toward rewarding the party of the previous
administration if they did a good job while in office. Conversely, voters would
punish that party by supporting their opponents if the previous administration had
done a poor job. Vote choice in the future, in his view, would largely be a
function of how voters evaluated the previous administration. His work is perhaps
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victory no matter whom the Democrats had nominated and no matter what
Mondale had done differently during his campaign.
A senior Dukakis strategist Susan Estrich argued after the 1988 campaign that
while they could have run a much better campaign, they never really had much of
a chance of winning. After all, she noted, the unemployment rate was at a 20+
year low, and the Reagan/Bush administration was able to point to a years-in-themaking economic recovery to provide all the tailwind Bush needed for his
campaign sails.
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Quirk and Dalager (1993) argued, similarly, that for structural reasons, any
Democrat would have beaten George H. W. Bush in 1992 by emphasizing the
theme of change (as Clinton did). After all, with the economy in such a deep
slump and after 12 years of Bush being in the White House as vice president and
then president, it was all but a given that Americans would elect a Democrat to
replace him in 1992.
2008 may have been very similar to 1992, in that any Democrat running on the
   



            

or any other Republican would have been associated with the party that was in
office when the housing market and stock market collapsed in 2007-2008. These
collapses led to a national (and worldwide) recession, further suppressing the
approval ratings of the already unpopular George W. Bush.
The Case for Significant Campaign Effects
While the more prominent line of research argues that campaign effects are
relatively minimal, or at least relatively unimportant, certainly not all scholars have
arrived at this conclusion that campaigns have little, if any, impact on vote decisions.
Many observers of American campaigns have referred to powerful campaign occurrences
that seemed to represent a major impact on the attitudes of the electorate, such as the
following:
In the second debate of 1984 between Reagan and Mondale, the incumbent
Reagan drew loud laughter from the audience and an overwhelmingly positive
   
  

            

    tant not to exaggerate the impact of debates, it
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election campaign because he effectively deflected criticisms that his age may
render him unfit for office.


The Willie Horton adve          
widely seen as successfully instilling fear in the public that Dukakis would be
weak on crime. Later, when Dukakis was asked if he would support the death
penalty if his own wife were raped and murdered, he answered in the negative,
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Early in the 1992 campaign, George H.W. Bush visited a grocery store and
expressed wonder and amazement at the technology of the price scanner (which
had been commonplace for many years). The New York Times described his
   

, -         is having trouble presenting

himself to the electorate as a man in touch with middle- 

$ !   

his inability to run an effective campaign would prohibit him from winning reelection in his campaign against Bill Clinton.


Following the 2000 election in Florida, Al Gore drew considerable criticism for
looking dull and boring compared to George W. Bush. Gore was viewed
throughout the campaign as an uninspiring policy wonk, while Bush became a
    "  

    

$
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In 2008, John McCain was widely scrutinized for his selection of the relatively
unknown Sarah Palin as his running mate. This initial decision seemed to provide
a jolt of momentum to the McCain campaign, indicating a sort of campaign effect;
indeed, McCain closed a significant polling gap with Obama in less than a week
after the Palin announcement. However as the campaign wore on, the Palin
detractors grew increasingly louder as her inexperience and unpreparedness were
revealed through a series of media interviews. Ultimately, the campaign felt these
media appearances were so damaging with voters that they completely withdrew
media access to the vice presidential candidate. She did not conduct a single
media interview for the entire 2 months of the 2008 campaign.
Speaking of campaign instances such as these, Holbrook (1996) offered the


 

   -profile moments that survive

well after the campaign has ended. Imagining that anything we remember as being
significant must have been so is, therefore, easy. But is it really that simple? Is the
             !    !  above

with the Reagan debate example, it is important not to overstate or exaggerate the
existence of a campaign effects based on conventional wisdom and anecdotal evidence
alone. Holbrook essentially cautions that while we can point to many instances of
apparent campaign effects, the scholarly community does well to remember the more
established body of literature suggesting that campaign effects are typically quite limited.
The above sections suggest that while many campaign happenings may move the
polls in the short term, or in minute ways, ultimately, the discipline of political science
remains skeptical that such events are the overarching determinants of individual voting
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behavior or aggregate electoral outcomes. Instead, scholars have pointed to more
structural factors such as socialization processes, economic conditions, and party/group
identification, as much more relevant variables, generally speaking, than campaign
effects could ever be.
Theorizing an Obama Effect
I have stated my intent to investigate the existence of a positive, unique, and
lasting Obama Effect following his 2008 campaign. At this point, it becomes important to
clarify exactly what would constitute such an effect. By lasting, I mean the effect was
observable two years after the campaign. By unique, I mean the effect was not similarly
observable in the supporters of other recent presidential candidates. By positive, I mean
that Obama supporters could be distinguished from non-supporters on the value of
change in the dependent variable (i.e. the attitude or behavior), and that the change
occurred in the direction that the Obama campaign would find desirable. For example:
If Obama supporters increased or sustained their political interest and/or external
political efficacy over time, relative to non-supporters, the conclusion would be
that they experienced a positive Obama Effect on political interest and/or external
efficacy, respectively. If, however, Obama supporters decreased their interest
and/or efficacy over time, relative to non-supporters, this would constitute a
negative Obama effect on political interest and/or efficacy.
If Obama supporters increased or sustained their loyalty to the Democratic Party
    

          rty, then I

would argue that they have experienced a positive Obama Effect on partisanship;

37
conversely, if Obama supporters decreased their party loyalty over time, relative
to McCain supporters, then this would constitute a negative Obama Effect.
Finally, if Obama supporters have increased their political participation and/or
civic engagement over time, relative to non-supporters, it would show that they
have experienced a positive Obama Effect. If they have decreased their
participation in these areas relative to non-supporters, this would constitute a
negative Obama Effect on participation.
It is worth emphasizing here the theoretical importance of the relative factor, that
is, the comparison of Obama supporters to non-supporters when I theorize an Obama
Effect. In my estimation, it is not enough to observe that Obama supporters experienced,
for example, an increase in political participation after the 2008 election. Even if the
numbers demonstrated increased participation among Obama supporters, to accept that as
proof of an Obama Effect would be to ignore the possibility that non-supporters also
experienced this increase in participation. If it were true for non-supporters as well as
Obama supporters, then the observation would clearly be attributable to something other
than the type of Obama Effect I am hypothesizing for this research, such as a larger
candidate effect that tend to characterize supporters of all presidential candidates, not
only winning candidates.
For this reason, I set up my analysis of the political attitudes and behaviors of
2008 Obama campaign supporters as a relative comparison to non-supporters (a category
that includes McCain supporters, third party voters, and nonvoters). If I observe changes
(positive or negative) in the attitudes and behaviors of Obama supporters relative to nonsupporters, but do not observe similar changes among McCain supporters relative to
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McCain non-supporters, then these changes can possibly be attributed to an Obama
Effect.
I am expecting a positive Obama Effect to manifest in Obama supporters, relative
to non-supporters, in the form of a sustained increase in political interest, a heightened
sense of external political efficacy, a strengthening of party loyalty, an increase in voting
activity and partisan voting, and an increase in civic engagement.
Theorizing My Dependent Variables
I have chosen to focus my study on five important dependent variables which can
tell us a great deal about the lasting impacts, or lack thereof, of the 2008 Obama
campaign. These variables

political interest, political efficacy, partisanship, voting

behavior, and civic engagement

are conceptually important because, in conjunction,

they represent a robust combination of both mental and physical engagement with
political and civic life.
Dependent Variable #1: Political Interest. Some degree of political interest is a necessary
precursor to the level of political engagement that is critical for effective democratic
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people are more

knowledgeable about politics, more likely to vote, and more likely to participate in
  

              

 

in and of itself, it functions as a conduit to other desirable outcomes related to democratic
and civic engagement.
The subject of political interest has captured the attention of political scientists
since the Columbia Studies of the 1940s!1950s. These authors (Berleson, Lazarsfeld, and
McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berleson, and Gaudet 1944) argued that interest in politics was
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primarily a function of family background. Before we are even aware of any external
  

 



  





 



     

al. (1960) agreed that socialization played a major role in political interest, but they
contended that the relationship was less direct. They believed in a more direct
relationship between family socialization and party identification. Then, by extension, the
strength of our party identification would condition our political attitudes, in other words,
our level of political interest. As such, they found that political interest was strongest
among the strongest partisans in the electorate (including political elites) and weakest




 

  

              

      

        

 

  



In a recent study that employed panel data analysis, spanning four decades and
four c
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analysis revealed that political interest more closely resembles a personality trait than an
attitude that would fluctuate for individuals whenever the newsworthiness of politics
changes. This finding is particularly important for my research because I am examining
the possibility that one specific campaign'the 2008 Obama campaign'became an
exception to the relatively static nature of political interest. If this campaign truly
represented a transformational moment in American politics, then theoretically we would
expect to see significant, substantive, and positive changes in the political interest of the
supporters of that campaign (relative to non-supporters).
Dependent Variable #2: Political Efficacy. A high degree of political efficacy is a
necessary condition to a healthy citizenry in any democratic system of government.
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action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile
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typical American Government textbook would further distinguish between internal


 

#

  

  

  $#  

  #  

%  





 

 $

     

#   

erstand matters of



 

 

actually influence matters of government and politics because government is responsive.
Campbell and colleagues (1960) were mainly concerned with the concept of
external political efficacy. They included two questions on external political efficacy in
the American National Election Studies surveys that serve as the quantitative datasets for
my analyses in Chapters 4-&   
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These scholars theorized that an understanding of external political efficacy was
particularly important because it represented the political attitude that could best explain
varying levels of political participation within the citizenry. Those who chose not to
participate in politics, they argued, lacked the desire to participate largely as an artifact of
low external efficacy. These citizens did not believe that they could positively influence
their own democratic representation. Conversely, those who participated at high levels
were reflecting the highest possible levels of external efficacy. These citizens reckoned
that political participation was worth their investments of time and energy.
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Early scholarship on the subject found political efficacy to be positively
correlated with other desirable attitudes such as trust in government, trust in leadership,
and patriotism, and also positively associated with various forms of participation, such as
participation in campaign politics, voting, and participation in protest politics. (For a brief
review of this early literature, see Balch, 1974, 2-3.) Some scholarship on efficacy has
observed that the causal arrow does not always point from external efficacy toward
participation; rather, the act of participation can actually breed an increased sense of
external efficacy in the individual.
Balch (1974) argued for the importance of analyzing efficacy as a dependent
rather than an independent variable, thus emphasizing the importance of figuring out
what affects individuals with respect to efficacy. This trend has not shaped the prevailing
research tradition, unfortunately; as Anderson (201           
studies tend to use efficacy . . . as an independent variable to explain political actions
         

     

and scholars in the tradition of John Stuart Mill or The American Voter authors were
concerned primarily with what efficacy could do for the state or the elites, rather than
with efficacy in and of itself. However I would argue along with Balch, if we are truly
concerned with the quality of our democratic representation, it is more important to ask
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government exists for the people, and not the other way around.
In more recent scholarship following this theoretical tradition, Anderson (2010)
found that a sense of community had a significant impact on individual efficacy. For
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individuals to truly have a sense of community, she argued, they needed to feel not only
membership in the community, but also influence, in other words, a sense that the
relationship is reciprocal. A strong community implies that individuals within that
community feel they are contributing to communal needs, not only taking from the
community. It makes sense, therefore, to analyze the 2008 Obama campaign through this
theoretical lens. Of particular interest is determining whether a political campaign can
have a lasting positive impact on external efficacy by making its supporters feel as if they
are a part of something important. As discussed in Chapter 1, this campaign made a
particularly strong effort to engage and mobilize its supporters by putting unprecedented
focus on volunteerism and creating a sense of community within that campaign. So if a
lasting Obama Effect on his supporters truly exists, it very well may manifest in an
increased sense of external political efficacy because his supporters felt like they were
getting something out of the campaign for themselves, as opposed to only contributing to
the campaign for the sake of the candidate.
Dependent Variable #3: Partisanship. To state the obvious, both the Democratic Party and
the Republican Party have a vested interest in increasing partisanship within the
electorate. By partisanship, I simply mean party loyalty among voters. Of course
Democratic Party candidates, officeholders, officials, and other elites want to see more
  

    

     

Research from Miller and Shanks (1996) has shown party identification to be a
relatively stable attitude in adults. Notwithstanding the occasional realignment or
generational change by cohort, Americans stick with the party affiliations of their parents
more often than not; and meaningful group bonds are not easily broken. (Achen 2002;
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Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964). However, Gerber and Green (1998) discovered
  







    

        

receive new information about a party, they show more willingness to change their
attitudes towards that party. Furthermore, as voters observe parties change their focus on
specific issues (if not their positions on those issues), those voters may begin to change
their minds about the parties based on their own issue preferences (Carsey and Layman
2006).
Traditionally, the rise of candidate-centered campaigns in this post-reform era has
been viewed as a largely negative trend for both parties (Wattenberg 1991). After all,
such campaigns seek to breed loyalty for that individual candidate himself or herself, as
opposed to attempting to breed loyalty for the political party to which that candidate
belongs. As noted above, candidates sometimes find it advantageous to draw explicit
contrasts between their own views and those of their party platforms and/or leadership.
Furthermore, multiple individual-centered campaigns are likely to divide support between


 

            

which may further weaken

partisanship. (Stone et al. 1992).
To be sure, the vast majority of Americans still identify with one of the two major
political parties, as leaners if not strong partisans. This has been the case since the ANES
began asking about party identification in the 1952. Yet, partisan identification has
weakened in recent decades, corresponding to the rise of individual-centered campaigns
discussed above (American National Election Studies 2010). In the 1950s, those who
identified as Strong/Weak Democrats/Republicans comprised more than 75% of the
respondents; pure Independents comprised fewer than 10%, and Independent-Leaners
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represented about 15%. By the early 1970s, as Vietnam and Watergate took their toll on
the public trust, and as candidate-centered campaigns became more prevalent, a much
larger segment of the population began to identify as Independent or as Leaners. In fact,
from the 1970s all the way through 2008, party identification remained relatively stable.
Pure Independents and Independent-Leaners have tended to comprise about 40% of the
electorate, with the percentage of Strong/Weak partisans falling from the high 70s before
the post-reform era down to about 60% in recent decades.
Against this backdrop, can any single campaign, such as the 2008 Obama
campaign, actually produce a positive effect on partisanship, or are all individualcentered campaigns doomed to having a negative if any effect? Aldrich (1995) noted that
despite the rise of Independents within the electorate, and the overall weakening of the
party system in certain respects, most candidates still do maintain a highly symbiotic
relationship with state parties and with the national party. This again suggests that parties
are appropriately described as weaker than they once were, but not necessarily as weak.
Consider the following: as noted above, the majority of Americans continue to
identify as either Democrat or Republican. Furthermore, once the primary process has
concluded, parties typically try to unite all their members (including the weakest partisan
leaners) under a big tent by providing a great deal of logistical, organizational, and
financial support for their nominees. Once the general election begins, former intra-party
primary opponents of a candidate may now actually serve as surrogates for that same
candidate they had previously opposed, because they are now on the same team. Aldrich
observed that these reciprocal partisan relationships do not end with the election of a new
president; in fact, the opposite tends to occur. Once the governing starts, relationships
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within and between the branches of government are typically characterized by partisan
considerations and structures.
Perhaps the strongest theoretical reason to suggest that a particularly effective
campaign can positively impact partisanship is that presidents traditionally serve as heads
of party (not just heads of state) while they are in the White House. This symbiotic
 



 

 



    

 

popularity that led

to his/her election and obviously from his/her presidential powers; on the other hand, it
allows the president to set much of the party agenda and to set the tone for the party


 

 

        

   esignation

provides a great

incentive for presidential candidates to promote their parties up and down the ballot, in
other words, to truly promote partisanship from the top of the ticket during their
campaigns.
Dependent Variable #4: Voter Turnout. As I have mentioned, presidential candidates
have a vested interest in building long-term relationships with voters. While the current
campaign cycle may be the top priority, all candidates are cognizant of the need to build a
durable coalition of voters, which can be mobilized again for the re-election campaign
(and potentially for other party operations as well).
A line of experimental research developed by Alan Gerber and Donald Green and
colleagues has been particularly instructive for understanding the potential for a
campaign effect to mobilize voters to turn out for future elections. Gerber, Green, and
        !       
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that is, that voting in one election play a significant role in turning out in subsequent
elections (or at least the next election if not long-term). They are careful not to overstate
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the causal impact, but on the aggregate their research makes clear that successful
campaign mobilization can have positive implications beyond the current campaign.
In a different experiment, Gerber and Green (2000) were able to show that
nonpartisan contact with voters

face-to-face canvassing, in particular

had a positive

and very substantial impact in terms of increasing voter turnout. Conversely,
professionalized direct mail operations had no effect in terms of driving up turnout, even
when prospective voters were blasted with get-out-the-vote mailings multiple times in the
weeks leading up to an election. Given the exceptionally high level of emphasis placed
on direct voter contact and direct mobilization by the 208 Obama campaign, it seems at
least possible that a lasting Obama Effect could produce increased voter turnout among
its supporters in subsequent election cycles.
Dependent Variable #5: Civic Engagement. While most of my analysis for this project
focuses directly on political attitudes and voting behavior, I also wanted to consider other
forms of civic engagement, such as volunteerism (political or otherwise), engagement in
local political or social issues, attendance of protests or rallies. I think it is at least
theoretically plausible that the 2008 Obama campaign may have produced a positive

                  life in
                   
mobilization in a nomination campaign increases participation in nonpresidential
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Pastor and Rappaport (1999) identified strong evidence for positive spillover

     & ' (    -centered 1992 campaign. Distinguishing
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almost twice as likely to become involved in the Republican House campaigns in 1988 as
those who merely preferred Robertson...especially remarkable because a majority of

                
active in a candidate-centered campaign were far more likely to also become active
volunteers (not just voters) for their local House candidate, despite never having been
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turned up evidence of positive spillover effects, revealing that activists for losing
candidates were just as likely to become active in their local House races that year as
activists for winning campaigns.
Research in this area has tended toward analysis of losing primary candidates
because they are often very candidate-centered in their campaigns (relative to the
candidates who often win the nominations). Often primary candidates have been able to
appeal to a particular subgroup of highly vocal and active supporters (e.g., antiwar voters
for McCarthy in 1968, evangelical voters for Robertson in 1988, or libertarians for Ron

%!  &'' ! !      !          $
nomination. Needless to say, the Obama campaign was unique in that regard. The
question I will examine, then, is whether or not his winning campaign produced any
positive spillover effects on his supporters.
Inclusion of Resource Variables into the Analysis
The goal of my quantitative research in Chapters 4-5 is to uncover potential
changes in the political attitudes and behaviors of 2008 Obama campaign supporters,
relative to non-supporters. I am primarily interested in determining whether any such
changes can be attributable to an Obama Effect, that is, support for the 2008 Obama
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campaign, or lack thereof. As such, the key independent variable in my statistical
    

              



It is common in these types of studies to include resource variablesgender, age,
race/ethnicity, income, and education as independent variables that allow to factor
demographics into the causal analysis. These resource variables are typically included in
causal analysis to determine if they, rather than vote choice, may be responsible for some
or all of the statistically significant change that is observed in a model.
For example, suppose we discover that support for Obama (i.e., vote choice, the
key independent variable under observation) had a statistically significant impact on the


         efficacy from 2008-2010. This inference may prompt me

to hastily claim that there is a positive Obama Effect on external efficacy. However if the
resource variables are included in this same analysis as independent variables in a
multivariate regression model, the results could show that most of the statistical
significance previously observed in the first model is attributable to certain participants
being female and/or highly-educated, rather than to being Obama supporters. Or, the
analysis could imply that all three independent variables have statistical significance, but
that the other resource variables (race/ethnicity, age, and income) have no impact on this
specific model. This type of finding would suggest an additive effect, meaning that being
an Obama supporter, being female, and being highly educated each separately increased
the impact on political efficacy.
There is another major reason for including resource variables in my analyses. In
addition to analyzing differences between groups (i.e. between Obama supporters and
non-supporters), such analysis design allows to study also intragroup differences (i.e.,
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within the group of Obama supporters and, separately, within the group of nonsupporters). Resource variables can be very effective in helping us understand the
potential impact of sub-sample variations. For example, the analysis of sub-sample (intragroup) variation can help distinguish between the impact of being a female, high-income
Obama supporter and being a female, low-income Obama supporter. In this example, my
model can test not only for a potential additive effect among the three variables
separately, but also for an interactive effect.
I now turn to the next chapter for a discussion of the data and methods employed
in my quantitative and qualitative research for this project.
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS

My original dissertation research required an empirical mixed-methods
approach

incorporating analyses of both quantitative survey data and qualitative

interview data in order to explore the legacy of the Obama Effect. This chapter first
details the quantitative data and methods employed in Chapters 4 and 5. It then details the
qualitative data and methods employed in Chapter 6.
Using Panel Surveys for Quantitative Analysis
Panel surveys were the most appropriate form of data for my quantitative
 



         

       

survey research is to interview the same individuals at two or more points in time and
attribute observed changes in their attitudes or behavior to the effects of intervening
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were conducted by the American National Election Studies (ANES), which has been
conducting election studies surveys biennially since 1952.
Panel data is generally characterized by surveying the same individuals on the
same set of variables at different points in time (e.g., t, t - 1, t - 2, etc.), for purposes of
identifying causal mechanisms for any observable changes over time. For the ANES,
typically one wave of a panel survey (t) is conducted shortly after a given presidential
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election, and another wave (t

1) is conducted either shortly before or shortly after the

midterm elections two years later.
Use of panel data has two major advantages for my research over other types of
survey data. First, it allows for a direct measurement of change over time. This
measurement of change is preferable here to cross-sectional survey data, in which
respondents are surveyed on a set of variables only at one point in time. It also differs
    

      

    

   

cannot measure it directly) because different individuals are being surveyed at each point
in time (Bartols 2000; Finkel 1995).
The second major advantage is that, as noted above, panel data lends especially
well to causal analysis. Establishing a causal connection between independent and
dependent variables requires three commonly-cited conditions to be met: that x and y covary, that x precedes y in time, and that the relationship is not spurious, that is, caused by
some other variable(s) not included in the model. (A fourth and usually implied condition
is an accurate measurement of variables or the reliability of survey instruments.) By
definition, cross-sectional data cannot meet the second condition. Even if covariance is
established and all relevant variables are included in the model, it is not possible to
determine temporal order from cross-sectional data (in other words, it is not possible to
know whether x influenced y, or whether y influenced x, or whether the connection was
spurious). Conversely, panel data avoids this pitfall precisely because the temporal
ordering is self-evident for survey data collected at different points in time (Finkel 1995).
In contrast to cross-sectional data, time series data is sometimes employed to
establish causal inference (e.g., Granger Causality, which uses past variable values to
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predict future variable values for the different sample of respondents). However,
establishing causality with time series data is a noisier and less precise process than with
panel data, for the very reason that respondents are not the exact same individuals who
were surveyed at the earlier point(s) in time. As such, observable changes on the value of
the dependent variable are reflecting an estimate of change, as opposed to an exact
measurement of change among the same individuals.
Comparing Panel Surveys between Presidencies
My analytical research incorporates panel data from the first two years of the past
three presidential administrations: the Barack Obama presidency from 2008-2010, the
George W. Bush (hereafter referred to as Bush II) presidency from 2000-2002, and the
Bill Clinton presidency from 1992-1994. Within the first few weeks after each
presidential election, panel respondents were asked a series of questions about their
political attitudes and political behaviors. These same respondents were surveyed again
roughly two years later and asked many of the same questions. In the case of 2010, the
panel re-contact survey took place in June-July 2010, shortly before the midterm
elections. In the case of 2002 and 1994, the panel re-contact survey took place shortly
after the midterm elections, in November-December of those years.
My central focus is on the political attitudes and political participation of Obama
supporters from 2008-2010. Across all survey instruments, I compared Obama supporters
to non-supporters. Merely observing hypothesized differences between these two groups,
however, would not necessarily constitute evidence that these differences could be
attributed to an enduring Obama Effect. Such differences could potentially be explained
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experienced by the supporters of earlier presidents and therefore not unique to Obama
   



 



      

  



supporters of even the losing presidential candidates.
Because of these possibilities, I compared my 2008-2010 panel data to the
corresponding data from the previous two presidencies mentioned above. I analyzed
responses to identical or similar survey questions from each of the three panels in order to
draw conclusions about Obama panel data in comparison to similar data for supporters of
previous presidents. These comparisons were essential for allowing me to speak more
narrowly about an actual lasting Obama Effect (or lack thereof) or more broadly about
presidential effects and/or candidate effects.
Respondents for ANES surveys are recruited using traditional random sampling
methods. The 2008-2010 panel included 1,588 respondents who were recruited by
telephone and who completed surveys on the internet. The 2000-2002 panel included
1,187 respondents who were recruited by telephone and who also completed the surveys
by telephone. The 1992-1994 panel included 759 respondents who were recruited by
telephone and who completed the surveys face-to-face.
Variable Measurement and Missing Values
My quantitative analyses of each empanelment revolved around the five
dependent variables discussed in the previous chapter: political interest, political efficacy,
and partisanship in Chapter 4 (on political attitudes); and voting behavior and civic
engagement in Chapter 5 (on political participation). Operationally, these concepts are
measured by the responses of panel participants. Content validity is supported by the
phrasing of each sur 
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validity as a measure of political interest.
As a measure of supporter enthusiasm, these five dependent variables in
conjunction have strong construct validity. A relative increase in these areasfor
example, an increase in political interest among Obama supporters relative to nonsupporterswould reflect a certain form of increased enthusiasm (i.e., a positive Obama
Effect), just as a relative decrease in efficacy would reflect a certain form of decreased
enthusiasm (i.e., a negative Obama Effect). Each variable by itself could not be viewed as
synonymous with enthusiasm, but taken together, these measurements of political
attitudes and participation can tell us a great deal about voter enthusiasm, and in
particular, how it changes over time.
My statistical models include three types of independent variables. First, each
model incorporates two dichotomous presidential vote choice variables as my key
      

       

 

Including these vote choice variables allowed me to compare all Obama supporters to
non-supporters and all McCain supporters to non-supporters, for purposes of intra-panel
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-voters and third-party voters in

addition to those who voted for the opposing candidate.)
Second, each model incorporates a lag of the dependent variable (e.g., #  
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control variable. Without this lagged control variable, much of the causality for the value
in the later period (t -1) would be mistakenly attributed to other independent variables
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t). Inclusion of the lagged
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variable thus avoids the problem of endogeneity by accounting for the earlier value
instead of analyzing the later value in a vacuum.
Finally, each model includes as explanatory variables the five resource variables
referenced in Chapter 2 (i.e. age, gender, race/ethnicity, income, and education).
Inclusion of resource variables allows for consideration of demographic effects in
addition to candidate effects. As with the dependent variables, each of the independent
variables in my models are operationalized as responses to the ANES survey items.
In rare instances, a given observation did call into question the reliability (i.e.,
accuracy in measurement) of certain survey instruments. A classic example, commonly
observed in election surveys, is that many more respondents typically say they voted than
those who actually have voted. This observation was true for each of my datasets. In such
a case, it can be said that a voter turnout survey instrument is not reliable because it is not
measuring actual turnout. However, this was not a major concern for this study because
there is no reason to assume any systematic bias that would skew my results (i.e., no
     
    




     

      





             

would be randomly distributed across groups of respondents. As such, my analysis of
panel data should be unaffected by such reliability issues.
Missing values were not a major concern. For almost all the variables in all
surveys, missing values represented less than 2% of total cases. Given the voluntary
nature of empanelment, this extremely high response rate for all questions is
unsurprising. Those who were disinclined to answer these types of political questions
would likely have been filtered out of the first panel wave (in other words, they would
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likely not be included in these samples). In light of such rarity, missing values are
unlikely to have had any substantive impact on my statistical findings.
Where they do appear, missing values may exist in ANES survey data sets for
several reasons, including the respondent not finishing the survey, refusing to answer a
   

   

  

       

respondents were dropped from the analyses, so that they are unaffected by cases of
missing values.
Question Wording
For each of the three presidential periods, I analyzed the exact same survey
questions whenever possible. In the most ideal cases, identical questions were used across
all surveys. For example, the same Party Identification (partisanship) question,
       usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an
 

           

!-2010.

In a few instances, the essence of a question is identical, but the wording is
slightly different. For example, in 2008-2010, responde    "   
           #-point rating scale, ranging
  $    %
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corresponding survey question employed different L    & '  
(               #-point scale ranging from
%  )    *

 )               

     #    highest level of political efficacy.
In still other instances, I had to use different questions for different periods
because they address the same concept despite variances in wording. Even minor
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differences in question wording can make a significant difference, so this unideal
decision reflected the limited and sometimes inconsistent nature of ANES survey
questions from one election cycle to the next. For example from the 2008-2010 survey, I
   

              

         

       

Therefore, to gauge political interest from 2000-2002 and from 1992-1994, I relied upon
    

   !       itical campaigns. How

    "                 
interest, and therefore not ideal for comparative analysis, I determined that both questions
           
Below are the full texts of survey questions that were incorporated into my
analyses for Chapters 4-5. When necessary, the year of the question is included in
parentheses to designate varied question wording between surveys. The questions on
political attitudes relate to interest in politics, political efficacy, and partisanship. The
questions on political participation relate to voter turnout, voter choice, and civic
engagement.
Survey Questions: 2008-2010
Political Interest: How interested are yo          
government and politics? (5-point scale)
External Efficacy A: How much do government officials care what people like you think?
(5-point scale)
External Efficacy B: How much can people like you affect what the government does? (5point scale)
Partisanship/Party ID: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what? (7-point scale)
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Turnout (2010 only): How likely is it that you will vote in the congressional elections this
November? (5-point scale)
Turnout (2008 only): How about the election for the U.S. House of Representatives in
Washington DC? Did you vote for a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, or
not?
Meetings (2010 only): During the past 12 months, have you attended a meeting to talk
about political or social concerns, or have you not done this during the past 12 months?
Meetings (2008 only): Have you done this, or have you never done it? Attended a
meeting to talk about political or social concerns.
Protests (2010 only): During the past 12 months, have you joined in a protest march,
rally, or demonstration, or have you not done this during the past 12 months?
Protests (2008 only): Have you done this, or have you never done it? Joined in a protest
march, rally, or demonstration.
Survey Questions: 2000-2002 and 1992-1994
Political Interest: Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How
about you? (5-point scale)
External Efficacy A                 
you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or
disagree strongly with this statement? (5-point scale)
External Efficacy B
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somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement? (5-point scale)
Partisanship/Party ID: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what? (7-point scale)
Turnout (2002, 1994 only): In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of
 




   

             




    

you!did you vote in the elections this November?

Turnout (2000, 1992 only): How about the election for the House of Representatives in
Washington. Did you vote for a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives?
Meetings: Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like
that in support of a particular candidate?
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Protests (2000, 2002 only): Aside from a strike against your employer, in the past twelve
months, have you taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or
local issue?
Hypothesis Testing
In Chapters 4 and 5, my quantitative analysis chapters, I tested several specific
hypotheses on relative change in political attitudes and political participation. My
hypothesis-testing was applied to all three panels (2008-2010, 2000-2002, and 19921994): within each panel, I examined the attitudes and participation of Obama supporters
relative to non-supporters, as well as those of McCain supporters relative to nonsupporters. This allowed me to determine whether there was a possibility of a positive
Obama Effect (if the results support the hypothesis), a negative Obama Effect (if the
results run contrary to the hypothesis), a candidate effect experienced by supporters of
both candidates, or no effect at all (the null hypothesis). I then drew comparisons between
panels to determine whether the initial findings are unique to the 2008-2010 cycle, or
whether any significant results can be better explained as a broader presidential effect or
a candidate effect. A presidential effect would be one experienced by the supporters of
winning candidates (i.e., Obama, Bush II, and Clinton), whereas a candidate effect would
be one experienced by the supporters of both winning and losing candidates.
The dependent variable for each specific hypothesis is the political attitude or
political behavior in the midterm year. My general hypothesis is that presidential vote
choice has a significant impact on attitudinal and behavioral change over time. I generally
expect the changes between 2008 and 2010 to be in the direction that would be
considered a positive Obama Effect.

60
I also expect positive Obama Effects to be most concentrated among the
demographic groups that were most supportive of Obama in the 2008 election. Tables 1-5
below present cross-tabulations for my 2008

2010 panel data that break down each

demographic group by voice choice.
Table 1 Gender and Presidential Vote Choice, 2008
Candidate Male Female Total
McCain
47.8
37.9
42.0
Obama
39.8
52.1
47.0
Neither
12.4
10.0
11.0
Total
100% 100% 100%
N

655

933

1588

Gender: Table 1 reveals a major gender gap in candidate support among
respondents, with Obama defeating McCain 52-40 among female respondents, and
McCain defeating Obama 48-40 among male respondents. The panel included 933
women (58.8%) and only 655 men (41.2%). Therefore, Obama received a substantially
wider margin of the vote among the much larger gender group in the sample. Clearly, this
gender gap favoring female respondents was a

         

leading me to hypothesize a significant and positive Obama Effect among females
relative to males and a significant interaction effect indicating a stronger positive Obama
Effect on Obama-supporting women than on Obama-supporting men.
Age: Table 2 shows the breakdown of presidential vote choice by age group.

                 !"# $  
          %      force to
success, their impact should not be overstated. The gap in candidate support was indeed
widest among this 18-29 year old group, but they represented only about 6% of
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respondents, the smallest portion of the panel by far. The next smallest group was 30-44
year olds, who represented about 23% of respondents.
Table 2 Age and Presidential Vote Choice, 2008
60above
18-29 30-44 45-59
McCain
30.4
36.1
41.2
49.2
Obama
45.7
47.5
48.4
45.3
Neither
23.9
16.4
10.5
5.4
Total
100% 100% 100%
100%
N
92
360
622
514

Total
42.0
47.0
11.0
100%
1588

The more noteworthy takeaway from Table 2 is the remarkably consistent share
of the vote that Obama received from each age group. His support ranged from 45% to
48%, meaning he drew almost the same proportion of support from senior citizens as
from younger respondents. Thus, the age gaps between candidates are almost entirely
  

   

    

 

  

only 30 % support from the youngest bracket, but over 49% from the oldest group of
respondents.
Nevertheless, the age gap between candidates did narrow with each bracket of
older respondents relative to the next-youngest bracket. This leads me to hypothesize a
significant and positive Obama Effect among younger respondents relative to older
respondents and a significant interaction effect, indicating a stronger positive Obama
Effect on younger Obama supporters than on older Obama supporters.
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Table 3. Race and Presidential Vote Choice, 2008
White,
Black,
Other,
nonnonnonHispanic Hispanic Hispanic Hispanic
McCain
46.7
1.8
29.6
27.0
Obama
43.1
88.3
50.7
54.0
Neither
10.2
9.9
19.7
19.0
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
N
1343
111
71
63

Total
42.0
47.0
11.0
100%
1588

Race/Ethnicity: Table 3 shows the breakdown of presidential vote choice by
race/ethnicity. White respondents comprised over 84% of the sample and supported
McCain by a relatively narrow margin of 47-43%. But the three non-white groups
supported Obama over McCain by a much larger margin of 66% to 20%. Thus, while
    

 

      

  

  

the panel, the overwhelming support for Obama among these non-white subgroups more
than made up for his deficit among white voters, effectively accounting for his entire
margin of victory. This leads me to hypothesize a significant and positive Obama Effect
among non-white respondents relative to white respondents and a significant interaction
effect, indicating a stronger positive Obama Effect on non-white Obama supporters than
on white Obama supporters.
Table 4. Income and Presidential Vote Choice, 2008
Less
$15,000 $50,000 $75,000
Than
to
to
to
$100,000
Nonresponse $15,000 $49,999 $74,999 $99,999 or more
McCain
50.0
24.3
40.6
41.8
42.3
46.8
Obama
30.0
54.1
46.5
46.7
48.0
46.5
Neither
20.0
21.6
12.9
11.5
9.8
6.7
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
N
10
74
490
366
246
402

Total
42.0
47.0
11.0
100%
1588
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Income: Table 4 shows the breakdown for presidential vote choice by income
level. Unlike the breakdowns for gender, age, and race/ethnicity, which showed McCain
defeating Obama among at least one subgroup, Obama led McCain by a substantial
margin among all income brackets except among those earning over $100,000. Among
those highest earners, Obama and McCain effectively tied for support, with each
candidate receiving about 47% of the vote among respondents.
Most noteworthy here is that major difference between the three middle brackets,
in which Obama defeated McCain by a margin of 5-6% and the lowest income bracket, in
which Obama defeated McCain by a 30-point margin, 52% to 24%. This leads me to
hypothesize a significant and positive Obama Effect among lower income respondents
relative to higher income respondents and a significant interaction effect, indicating a
stronger positive Obama Effect among lower income Obama supporters than among
higher income Obama supporters.
Education: Table 5 shows the breakdown of vote choice by education level.
Although the widest gap in candidate support was found among those with no high
school diploma, this result was likely skewed by a very low number of respondents (33)
in this subgroup. A clearer pattern emerged across the other four subgroups, with Obama
losing to McCain 44-38 among those with a high school diploma but no college
education, and losing 45-   

 

 

       

degree. Conversely, Obama defeated McCain 53-41 among college graduates, and by an
even wider margin of 56-38 among those with graduate degrees.
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Table 5. Education and Presidential Vote Choice, 2008
Some
college, no
No high
High
school
school Bachelor's Bachelor's Graduate
degree
degree
degree
diploma diploma
McCain
27.3
44.4
44.8
41.0
38.2
Obama
51.5
37.7
41.0
53.3
55.6
Neither
21.2
17.9
14.2
5.7
6.2
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
N
33
223
585
407
340

Total
42.0
47.0
11.0
100%
1588

Interestingly, the trend here was the inverse of the observed trend for income
levels. Given that Obama performed best among the lowest income earners, one might
have expected that Obama would also perform best among the least-educated
respondents. However with a moderately weak correlation between income and education
in this panel (.393), the opposite was true. Obama performed best among college
graduates and those with advanced degrees. This leads me to hypothesize a significant
and positive Obama Effect among higher-education respondents relative to lowereducation respondents and a significant interaction effect, indicating a stronger positive
Obama Effect among higher-education Obama supporters than among lower-education
Obama supporters.
Major Hypotheses for Political Attitudes
1. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their political interest
relative to non-supporters.
2. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their external political
efficacy relative to non-supporters.
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3. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their partisan loyalty
(partisanship) relative to non-supporters.
Major Hypotheses for Political Participation
1. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their voter turnout levels
relative to non-supporters.
2. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their attendance of
political meetings relative to non-supporters.
3. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their attendance of
political protests relative to non-supporters.
Statistical Testing for Quantitative Analysis
My statistical results in Chapters 4 and 5 were derived from OLS regression
models or binary logistic regression models. (Cross-tabulation data for these models are
presented in Tables 6-12 in Appendix A.)

  

    

regression model using two-tailed t tests. These baseline models included only three
independent variables: Voted for [President], Voted for [Challenger], and the lag of the
dependent variable. As noted above, each vote choice variable is dichotomous. These
baseline models allowed me to make an initial determination about the possibility of a
positive Obama Effect or other possible effects (i.e., negative Obama Effects, presidential
effects, or candidate effects).
I then ran each model a second time with resource (demographic) variables
included along with the three aforementioned predictors from that baseline model.
Incorporating these resource variables could result in finding significant additive effects,
in other words, being an Obama supporter mattered x amount, being female mattered y
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amount, and being low income mattered z amount. Although my analyses generally were
focused on  



         (as opposed to

men to women, young to old, etc), testing for additive effects in this way allowed me to
estimate the separate (and cumulative) statistical effects of multiple independent variables
on a given political attitude or behavior.
Finally, one-by-one I added an interaction term to each model to test for possible
interaction effects. An interaction term is created by multiplying the vote choice value by
a given demographic variable value (e.g., Obama*Gender); as such, there were 10
  
  

 

    

   

   

    

   

 

    

variables). Analysis of interaction terms provided for more valuable analysis of the
impact of demographics than that of additive effects alone. A significant interaction
effect is a multiplicative effect indicating that vote choice is significant when moderated
by a given demographic value. For example, the Obama*Gender interaction term allows
for direct comparisons of Obama-supporting women to Obama-supporting men. Testing
for interaction effects allowed me to determine if the attitudinal or behavioral outcomes
of these two subgroups are significantly different from each other.
Interview Methodology: Using In-Depth Interviews for Qualitative Analysis
During the summer of 2013 I conducted 30 in-depth, ethnographic interviews
with former Purdue University students who volunteered on campus for the 2008 Obama
campaign. As a student volunteer for that campaign, I helped maintained a spreadsheet
with contact info for the more than 300 Purdue students who volunteered for the Obama
campaign that fall; thus I was able to sample from this spreadsheet to contact volunteers
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for these interviews. I contacted 43 former volunteers before reaching my target number
of 30. This included 11 non-responses and 2 refusals, resulting in a contact rate of 74%.
(I discuss my personal involvement and sampling technique more broadly in Chapter 6.)
The purpose of these interviews was to broaden my understanding of whether or not there
was a positive, unique, and lasting Obama Effect that the 2008 Obama campaign had on
its most enthusiastic supporters: those who chose to volunteer for the campaign.
These interviews lasted roughly 15-20 minutes each and were conducted by
phone. I used a recording application to record each interview for purposes of accurate
transcription. Each interviewee was asked to elaborate on a series of questions related to
their political attitudes and behaviors over the 5-year period from 2008-2013. The
interview questions were largely open-ended and designed to provide insight into the
causes of their political attitudes and the motivations behind their political behaviors over
the past 5 years. (The interviewee recruitment information sheet, script to begin the
interview, and full list of questions can be found in the appendices.)
Needless to say, this sample of 30 interviewees who spent a portion of their free
time volunteering for a political campaign represents a dramatically different sample than
that of the ANES survey respondents upon which my quantitative analysis is based. In
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in the field

which they were asked to discuss. In other words, while the ANES data employed in my
quantitative analysis was derived from surveys with a representative sample of the
national population, my interview data was derived from a convenience sample of
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interviewees who were not representative of and far more engaged in the Obama
campaign than the national population.
As with the ANES data, my interview questions fall into 2 categories: political
attitudes and political participation. I ask f   
  

  

    



  



 

    

   



   

and the direction of the country. I then ask about their political participation in terms of
voting behavior, campaign engagement, and volunteerism for other political causes.
 

 

 



 

    

 

 

      

2008 Obama campaign and their other forms of civic engagement since 2008, such as
their attendance of local political meetings or volunteer work for non-political causes.
The major benefit of this qualitative approach was the open-ended nature of my
interview questions. This allowed me to explore the major themes from my quantitative
analysis in greater depth and through analysis of volunteers who were presumably
uniquely susceptible to a positive, unique, and lasting Obama Effect. The closed-ended
ANES questions allowed only for respondents to register their attitudes and behaviors on
a limited response-set, and did not allow for follow-up questions, whereas my openended interview questions allowed for respondents to delve deeper into these subjects and
elaborate on their attitudes and behaviors whenever I prompted them to do so. This line
of qualitative interview-based research, then, stands alone as an analysis of the Obama
Effect on former campaign volunteers; but also functions as a powerful complement to
my quantitative analyses in the chapters to come.
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Appendix A: Cross Tabulation Tables for 2008 Survey Responses
Table 6 Political Interest and Candidate Choice, 2008
Not interested
Slightly
Moderately
Interest
at all
interested
interested
McCain
0.70%
5.70%
24.70%
Obama
0.80%
5.50%
23.60%
Neither
5.70%
19.00%
39.10%
Total
1.30%
7.10%
25.80%
N
21
112
409

Very
interested
40.90%
39.50%
24.10%
38.40%
610

Extremely
interested
27.90%
30.70%
12.10%
27.50%
436

Total
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
1588

Table 7 Political Efficacy A and Candidate Choice, 2008
A moderate
Efficacy A
Not at all
A little
amount
A lot
McCain
9.60%
35.80%
45.60%
7.30%
Obama
4.10%
25.60%
50.70%
14.70%
Neither
24.10%
35.60%
28.70%
7.50%
Total
8.60%
31.00%
46.20%
10.80%
N
137
492
733
172

A great
deal
1.60%
4.80%
4.00%
3.40%
54

Total
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
1588

Table 8 Political Efficacy B and Candidate Choice, 2008
A moderate
Efficacy B
Not at all
A little
amount
McCain
9.60%
36.70%
38.80%
Obama
3.20%
28.40%
42.70%
Neither
20.10%
40.80%
25.30%
Total
7.70%
33.20%
39.20%
N
123
528
622

A great
deal
3.90%
8.60%
3.40%
6.00%
96

Total
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
1588

A lot
10.90%
17.10%
10.30%
13.80%
219

Table 9 Party Identification and Candidate Choice, 2008
Strong
Not very Independent Independent- Independent
Party ID Democrat strong D
Democrat
Independent Republican
McCain
3.00%
6.00%
1.30%
6.10%
15.90%
Obama
47.50%
20.50%
17.00%
6.60%
2.30%
Neither
10.90%
11.50%
12.60%
25.30%
12.60%
Total
24.80%
13.40%
9.90%
8.40%
9.10%
N
394
213
158
134
145

Not very
Strong
strong R Republican
21.30%
46.30%
5.10%
1.10%
19.00%
8.00%
13.40%
20.80%
213
331
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Table 10 Voter Turnout and Candidate Choice, 2008
Turnout
Nonvoter
Voter
Total
McCain
0.10%
99.90%
100.00%
Obama
0.10%
99.90%
100.00%
Neither
77.60%
22.40%
100.00%
Total
8.60%
91.40%
100.00%
N
137
1451
1588

Table 11 Attending Political Meetings and Candidate Choice, 2008
Have never
Have
done this
done this
Meetings
Total
McCain
43.50%
56.50%
100.00%
Obama
41.00%
59.00%
100.00%
Neither
69.50%
30.50%
100.00%
Total
45.20%
54.80%
100.00%
N
718
870
1588
Table 12 Attending Political Protests and Candidate Choice, 2008
Have Never
Have
Protests
Done This done this
Total
McCain
81.40%
18.60%
100.00%
Obama
66.40%
33.60%
100.00%
Neither
85.50%
14.50%
100.00%
Total
74.70%
25.30%
100.00%
N
1184
400
1584

Appendix B: Interviewee Recruitment Information Sheet
Title. After the Honeymoon: The Obama Effect on Political Attitudes, Political
Participation, and Civic Engagement
Principal Investigator. Dr. James McCann, Purdue University, Department of Political
Science
Purpose of Research. To gather information from former 2008 Obama campaign
volunteers regarding political attitudes, civic engagement, and political participation, for
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purposes of understanding how and why political attitudes and behaviors develop or
change over time.
Specific Procedures. Your interview will be conducted via telephone or on the Purdue
University campus, whichever you choose. In the interview you will be asked a series of
questions about your political attitudes, civic engagement, and political participation.
You may refuse to answer any questions if you choose. The interview will be conducted
by Laurent Vesely, a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at Purdue
University. Your interview will be audio-recorded for purposes of transcription only.
Duration of Participation. You will be interviewed once for about 15-30 minutes.
Risks. Potential risks in research such as invasion of privacy, breach of confidentiality,
and psychological harm are minimal or absent in this research. Please be aware that your
personal information will not be accessed or collected without your knowledge and
consent; that no information you provide will be disseminated outside the research
setting; and that the risk of psychological harm is minimal given that you may decline to
answer any questions if you choose.
Benefits. There are no direct benefits to you by participating in this study.
Compensation. You will not receive any compensation for your voluntary participation in
this research.
Confidentiality. The project's research records may be reviewed by departments at
Purdue University responsible for regulatory and research oversight. Your records
associated with this research will be kept confidential at all times and your name will not
be reported in the research. The name, audio-recording, and transcription associated with
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of your interview will be destroyed at the conclusion of this research and no later than
August 31st, 2013.
Voluntary Nature of Participation. You do not have to participate in this research project.
If you agree to participate you can withdraw your participation at any time without
penalty.
Contact Information. If you have any questions about this research project, you can
contact the Principal Investigator for this research: Dr. James McCann at 765-494-0738,
or the interviewer, Laurent Vesely at 765-543-4996. Laurent Vesely is designated Key
Personnel for this research and may be considered your first point of contact. If you have
concerns about the treatment of research participants, you can contact the Institutional
Review Board at Purdue University, Ernest C. Young Hall, 10th Floor, Room 1032, 155
S. Grant St., West Lafayette, IN 47907-2114. The phone number for the Board is (765)
494-5942. The email address is irb@purdue.edu.
Informed Consent: I have had the opportunity to read this information form and have the
research study explained. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research
project and my questions have been answered. I am prepared to participate in the
research project described above.
Appendix C: Script to Begin Interview
First off, thank you for your willingness to be interviewed for this research project. This
interview will last about 15 minutes and will be audio-recorded for purposes of accurate
transcription. Just as a reminder, your records will be kept confidential and your name
will not be publicized in this research. At any time, please let me know if you prefer not
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to answer any question, and I will simply skip to the next question. Are you ready to
begin?
Appendix D: Interview Questions

  



      

    

 

1)                           
Has your interest changed very much over the past 5 years or remained fairly
consistent?
2) Do you think the government cares what people like you think?
3) How do you feel about Barack Obama these days? And how have your feelings
about him changed (or not changed) since his 2008 campaign?
4) How do you feel about the way things are going for the U.S. these days? Are you
more optimistic and positive about the future, or are you more pessimistic and
negative?

    



               

1) Did you vote in the midterm elections in November 2010 and/or the presidential
election of 2012? Do you think of voting more as a duty or responsibility, or is it
something where you really need to be inspired by specific candidates or parties
to vote?
2) Have you volunteered on any campaigns since the 2008 Obama campaign? For
what campaign? What kind of stuff did you do?
3) Can you think of any other way in which you participated in politics since the
2008 campaign, such as contributing money to a candidate, putting a campaign
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bumper sticker on your car, contacting an elected official about an issue, or
attending a political protest?
4) Was the 2008 Obama campaign the first political campaign for which you ever
volunteered?

  

                 

1) In the last 5 years, have you voluntarily joined any non-political organizations or
associations?
2) In the last 5 years, have you attended any kind of community meeting about social
or community issues?
3) In the past 5 years, have you voluntarily participated in any kind of charity work
or donated to any charity yourself?
4) Since 2008, can you think of any other type of volunteer work that you have
engaged in?
5) Finally: When you think back to volunteering on that 2008 Obama campaign 5
years later, is there anything in particular that is really memorable for you or that
you think of as having had a lasting impact on your life?
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CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND THE OBAMA EFFECT

Theory
Democratic theory suggests that in an electoral democracy, political candidates
and parties will seek to mobilize specifically those segments of the electorate most likely
to support them in the next election. Presidential candidates, however, have a vested
interest in thinking beyond just the upcoming election. Among other titles, they are
seeking to become the de facto leaders of their respective parties. Both statements hold
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accomplish much without the support of lower party officeholders. A major goal of
presidential campaigns, then, should be to establish the highest quality of democratic
engagement possible. A campaign with a particularly high quality of democratic
engagement may build coalitions of electoral support not only for the upcoming election,
but for future election cycles as well. As such, presidential campaigns should seek to
produce long-term positive effects on the political attitudes, and, ultimately, on the future
political participation of their supporters (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Holbrook, 1996;
Mayhew, 1997; Campbell et al, 1960).
The 2008 Obama campaign experienced unprecedented success by many shortterm measures, such as fundraising, volunteerism, and voter turnout. However, the
campaign also put a tremendous amount of effort into high-quality democratic
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engagement with the electorate, with the express hope of producing more durable
positive effects on its supporters. Their campaign outreach and mobilization efforts were
notoriously methodical and sustained. As I discussed in Chapter 1, they were quite
explicit in seeking this longer-term form of engagement with the electorate, even going as
far as to claim that pulling the lever for Obama in the general election was not enough.
The campaign sought much more from its supporters, asking that they stay engaged, that
they believe in their own power to create change, and that they remain involved in
politics even after the election. In sum, the 2008 Obama campaign sought to have a truly
transformational effect on the political attitudes and participation of its supporters. But
did it succeed?
In this chapter I address this question as it pertains to three political attitudes that
may play particularly strong roles in driving long-term democratic engagement within the
electorate: political interest, external political efficacy, and partisanship. Political interest
     
    

    
 

    

   



 

  

  

     

   

 

abilities

to meaningfully engage and influence government and politics because government is
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partisanship may

largely be a function of long-term socialization which depend on their family, friends,
school, and media, I have theorized that such attitudes may also be influenced
considerably by highly effective candidate-centered campaigns such as the 2008 Obama
campaign.
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Hypothesizing an Obama Effect on Political Attitudes
My general hypothesis for this chapter is that the 2008 Obama campaign had a
significant, lasting, and positive (or even transformational) impact on the political
attitudes of its supporters over time. My approach is to compare Obama supports directly
to non-supporters (i.e., McCain supporters + third-party voters + nonvoters.) I test each
   



            

 

would manifest as an increase in political interest, external efficacy, and partisanship
among Obama supporters relative to non-

           

Obama Effect would manifest as a relative decrease over time in the political interest,
external efficacy, and partisanship of Obama supporters.
Initially, I considered any significant impact (in either direction) to be a sign of
only a possible Obama Effect. This qualification is warranted because what initially
appears to be a confirmed hypothesis may actually reflect a larger presidential effect (i.e.,
one typically experienced by supporters of winning campaigns) or an even broader
candidate effect (i.e. one typically experienced by supporters of both winning and losing
candidates). In other words, Obama supporters may have experienced presidential effects
or candidate effects that are not unique to that group. To account for these possibilities, I
performed comparable hypothesis-testing for the 20002002 campaign, comparing the
political attitudes of Bush II supporters to those of non-supporters, and for the 1992
1994 campaign, comparing Clinton supporters to non-supporters.
My dependent variable for each hypothesis test is the value of the political
attitude in the midterm year (i.e., 2010, 2002, or 1994). The lag of this variable (i.e., the
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value of the attitude in the corresponding presidential year) is always included as a
control variable in each model to avoid the problem of endogeneity (see Chapter 3).
The key independent varia      
      

      

     
       

panel who voted for Obama is compared on the value of the dependent variable to
everyone on the panel who did not vote for Obama (i.e. McCain voters + third-party
voters + nonvoters). Likewise, everyone who voted for McCain is compared to everyone
who did not vote for McCain (i.e., Obama voters + third party voters + nonvoters). In
short, my two key predictors are my vote choice variables. Since both dummy predictors
are included in each model, the coefficient always indicates the difference between voters
for a particular candidate and everyone else who did not vote for that candidate.
My baseline models include only the vote choice variables and the lagged
dependent variable as predictors. After each baseline regression, I ran another
multivariate regression model to test for demographic effects as well. These broader
models allowed me to test for positive additive effects of gender, age, race/ethnicity,
income, and education. I also ran models incorporating all interaction terms that moderate
vote choice by a demographic value. Interaction terms allow me to test for multiplicative
effects instead of only additive effects.
Political Interest
Major Hypothesis #1: Political Interest. My first major hypothesis is that from 20082010, Obama supporters increased or sustained their political interest relative to nonsupporters. I expected this positive Obama Effect to be most pronounced among those
subgroups that were most supportive of Obama, for instance, female respondents,
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younger respondents, non-white respondents, lower income respondents, and highly
educated respondents. The hypothesis would be rejected if a negative Obama Effect (that
is, a decrease in political interest in supporters relative to non-supporters) was found. The
null hypothesis states that vote choice did not have any impact on the direction of
political interest between 2008

2010.

            
             (As noted in Chapter 3,
The measure of political intere

question wording sometimes varies between surveys.) The response set consisted of a 5-

                      
                      
Obama-McCain Findings on Political Interest. Contrary to my hypothesis, results from
Table 13 revealed a possible negative Obama Effect on political interest rather than a
positive one. The lagged dependent variable, with a continuity score of .639, indicates a
fair but not overwhelming level of stability in political interest during these two years;
but it was only McCain supporters who experienced a statistically significant increase
(.191) relative to non-supporters. (Obama supporters actually experienced a relative
decrease of -.041, but this was not statistically significant.) This possible negative Obama
Effect represents a rejection of my hypothesis and a rejection of the null as well. Results
were statistically significant, but in the opposite direction than I had hypothesized.
The broader model reflected in Table 14 indicates that even after controlling for
demographics (gender, age, and race/ethnicity, income, education), McCain supporters
still increased their interest relative to non-supporters (.120), albeit at the lower
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confidence level of .10 as opposed to .01 for the baseline model. The relative decrease
among Obama supporters of -.063 was not statistically insignificant in this model either.
In terms of additive effects, in addition to being a McCain voter, both gender and
age were statistically significant. Contrary to my expectations, for the period of 20082010, it was men rather than women who experienced a relative and significant increase
in political interest (.172). Similarly surprising was that the older the respondents, the
more likely they were to increase their relative political interest over time. I found that
every additional year of age corresponded to an increase in political interest of .009,
representing significance at the .01 level. It should be noted that for purposes of my
regression models, the actual age of respondents was incorporated in the form of
continuous interval data, as opposed to the ordinal age brackets presented in Chapter 3,
Table 2. This was done to provide more specificity for my causal explanations than was
necessary or practical for cross-tabulation purposes.
Race/ethnicity did not appear to have a significant impact on interest in
government and politics over this time period. I had expected that non-white respondents
would increase their interest relative to white respondents, but no significant effect was
observable. It should be noted that for purposes of my regression models, non-white



  

           

       

 

  

 

   

  



  

this grouping was far from ideal, non-whites collectively comprised a relatively small
15.4% of the panel and supported Obama overwhelmingly. Therefore it was more logical
to group them into a sufficiently large n for purposes of hypothesis testing.
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Likewise, income and education appeared to have no impact. I had expected
lower income respondents and highly educated respondents to experience a positive
Obama Effect. However neither group increased their political interest at a statistically
significant level.
Testing for interaction effects revealed two highly significant interaction terms:
Obama*Gender (-.174, see Table 15) and Obama*Income (-.055, see Table 16). In other
words, both gender and income were statistically significant when moderated by support
for Obama. (McCain supporters were not distinguishable by gender or income.) The
Obama*Gender effect was particularly interesting since my gender hypothesis had
already been rejected in the additive model: it was men, not women, who experienced the
relative increase in political interest. The interaction effect ran similarly contrary to my
hypothesized direction: it was specifically Obama-supporting women who decreased
their interest so sharply, relative specifically to Obama-supporting men.
The income variable did not produce an additive effect; however, when
moderated by support for Obama, an observable difference appeared between lowerincome Obama supporters and higher-income Obama supporters. Each increase of 1
income bracket corresponded to a -.055 decrease, indicating a substantial falloff in
relative political interest among higher-income Obama supporters compared to lowerincome Obama supporters. This effect occurred in the hypothesized direction.
Excepting this last observation, each statistically significant result on political
interest ran contrary to my hypothesis. There was no grand correspondence between
support for Obama and increased political interest; in fact, the opposite appeared to be
true under certain conditions. One explanation could be an actual negative Obama Effect
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on political interest, rather than a positive effect, manifested as increased interest among
those who opposed him. A second possibility could be a negative presidential effect,
similarly manifested as increased relative interest among opponents of other winning
candidates as well as Obama. I considered these possibilities by turning my attention to
the 2000 2002 and 1992

1994 panels for comparative purposes.

Bush II-Gore Findings on Political Interest. Results from the baseline model (Table 17)
reveal a significant increase in political interest among both Bush II and Gore supporters
between 2000 and 2002. The lagged continuity score of .431 indicates a relatively low
degree of stability in political interest over those 2 years; therefore, it is unsurprising that
the coefficients for Bush II (.244) and Gore (.197) were substantially higher than for
Obama and McCain (see Table 13).
The Bush II coefficient remains largely unchanged (.224) when demographics are
introduced into the model (Table 18). The relative increase in political interest among
Bush II supporters remains significant at the .05 level (compared to .01 in the baseline
model). For Gore supporters, however, the significance of the increase disappears,
indicating that it was likely attributable to variables other than the Gore vote choice.
This model identified four different demographic variables as statistically
significant. The first variable was age: as with the 2008-2010 panel, older respondents
tended to increase their political interest relative to younger respondents. Each year of

                       
implications similar to 2008-2010, with women decreasing their political interest relative
to men. The coefficient for the Bush II-Gore cycle was actually twice as large (.347) as it
was for the Obama-McCain cycle (.172), indicating an even more substantial gender
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effect. The other two significant variables

race/ethnicity and income

had not been

significant in the Obama-McCain cycle. In this cycle, being non-white was associated
with an increase in political interest (.294), while higher incomes were actually associated
with decreased political interest, with each added income bracket corresponding to a
decrease of -.042.
Based on the significant Obama*Gender and Obama*Income interaction effects
shown in Tables 15 and 16, I tested four interaction terms for the Bush II-Gore election
cycle: Bush II*Gender, Bush II*Income, Gore*Gender, and Gore*Income. None of these
interaction terms appeared to be statistically significant.
Clinton-Bush I Findings on Political Interest. Next, I turn to comparative data from the
1992-1994 cycle. Findings from Table 19 reveal that Clinton and Bush supporters both
experienced a significant increase in political interest relative to non-supporters. The
lagged continuity score of .382 ranks among the lowest in any of my regression models,
indicating relatively high fluctuations in levels of political interest during this cycle.
These fluctuations also helps explain the relatively large coefficients of .440 for Clinton
supporters and .325 for Bush I supporters.
As Table 20 shows, both vote choice variables and nearly all demographic
variables were shown to have a significant additive effect, with the statistically
insignificant race/ethnicity variable being the lone exception. Even after controlling for
demographics, there was a statistically significant relative increase in political interest
among both Clinton supporters (.272) and Bush I supporters (.305). Both were significant
at the .01 level in the baseline model, but dropped to the .05 significance level in this
model incorporating demographic variables.
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For this 1992-1994 cycle, the additive effects of both gender and age were very
similar to those of the other two cycles. Once again, older respondents increased their
interest relative to younger respondents; each year of additional age corresponded to an
increase in political interest of .012. And once ag  



 

  

substantially compared to that of men, as indicated by the relatively large coefficient of
.326.
My analysis of the income and education variables did not produce such clear
patterns. Neither had been significant in the Obama-McCain cycle. Income was
statistically significant for the 2000-2002 cycle, but not in 1992-1994, for which each
increase in income bracket corresponded to a .018 increase in political interest. The
education variable had not been significant for the other cycles, but for 1992-1994, each
increase in educational level corresponded to a .108 increase in political interest.
Summary and Discussion of Political Interest. The most interesting observation from my
findings above is that I had to reject my major hypothesis of a positive Obama Effect on
political interest. In fact, the opposite seems to have been the case. The supporters of all
five of the other candidates in my analysis actually did increase their relative political
interest significantly over the course of two years. Obama was the only candidate whose
supporters actually decreased their relative interest (albeit not at a statistically significant
level) during this span.
This was noteworthy especially because the percentage of respondents who
 

           was very similar for both

candidates: a combined 70.2% for Obama supporters and a combined 68.8% for McCain
supporters (see Table 6). Such comparable percentages indicate that the relative decrease

85
in interest among Obama supporters was not due to having been much more interested in
2008. It would be appropriate, then, to identify these results as having a negative Obama
Effect on political interest.
One possible explanation for their relative falloff in political interest is that
Obama supporters experienced burnout or fatigue due to relatively heavy campaign
involvement. They may have expended so much energy during the 2008 campaign that
they were content with the election itself and less interested, relatively speaking, in the
governance to follow. This potential explanation would gain considerable traction if the
analysis in the next section would show a relative increase in external political efficacy
among Obama supporters. Decreased political interest, combined with increased external
efficacy, could indicate that Obama supporters felt exhausted after a high level of
campaign engagement and were thus inclined to trust the Obama administration to do the
rights things while in office (whether they were paying attention or not).
An alternative explanation that seemed very plausible from the 2008-2010 data,
but that I found to be lacking after comparisons to the earlier data, is the rise of the Tea
Party Movement. Initially, I considered that perhaps the Tea Party phenomenon
manifested as increased political interest among those least supportive of Obama, with
   



              

in negative attitudes (e.g., concern, anger, fear, etc.). Looking only at the results for 20082010, such an explanation may seem not only possible but even intuitive. However, the
comparisons to 2000-2002 and 1992-1994 election periods make this explanation appear
less plausible. After all, the relative increase in political interest of McCain supporters
was actually lower than the comparative relative increases for the supporters of Bush II,
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Gore, Clinton, and Bush I. This suggests that a relative increase in political interest may
be a fairly common candidate effect. The results, then, are likely indicating something
closer to the burnout theory mentioned above. The Obama supporters may have simply
disengaged after the election because they were relatively exhausted after accomplishing
their major goal of helping to elect Obama.
Turning my attention back to demographics: I had initially hypothesized that the
demographic groups most supportive of Obama would experience a positive effect on
political interest, and/or that the significance of those demographics could be fleshed out
by incorporating interaction terms into the models. But this was rarely the case. For
race/ethnicity, income, and education, the null hypothesis was confirmed (i.e., no
statistical significance).
But most notably, in all three cycles women actually decreased their political
interest relative to men, and younger participants decreased their political interest relative
to older participants. I would be reluctant to characterize the age result as a negative
Obama Effect, given that the interaction terms were not statistically significant. I would,
however, characterize the 2008 gender finding as a somewhat negative Obama Effect
given that Obama-supporting women experienced a decline in interest relative to nonsupporting women. More broadly, though, such gender and age effects were not
attributable to the 2008 Obama campaign, given the broader patterns of gender and age
effects that spanned across multiple election cycles and presidencies. For gender, this
pattern was surprising, given the truism in American elections that women consistently
vote at higher rates than men. One might speculate that women may be more engaged in
elections, while men experience a relative uptick in interest during the governance period
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after the presidential election. For age, the established pattern was unsurprising. While I
hypothesized a positive Obama Effect on subgroups that were associated with the Obama
electoral coalition, such as younger voters, I cannot say I was surprised to find that
younger participants were most likely to become disinterested after the election,
compared to older participants who are presumably more likely to remain interested in
government and politics year in and year out.
External Political Efficacy
Major Hypothesis #2: External Political Efficacy. My second major hypothesis is that
between 2008 and 2010, Obama supporters increased or sustained their external political
efficacy relative to non-supporters. Once again, I expected this positive Obama Effect to
be most pronounced among the subgroups most supportive of Obama (i.e. women,
younger respondents, non-white respondents, low income respondents, and highly
educated respondents). I also tested for interaction effects (i.e., vote choice multiplied by
a given resource variable) to determine whether any significance from demographics is
additive or multiplicative (or both) in nature. The major hypothesis would be rejected if a
negative Obama Effect was found, that is, if I observed a decrease in external efficacy
among Obama supporters relative to non-supporters. The null hypothesis states that vote
choice did not have any impact on the direction of external efficacy from 2008-2010.
My analysis incorporated two different survey instruments as measures of
external efficacy. (I will present descriptive results for both measures before delving into
a summary and discussion of outcomes.) The first instrument, External Efficacy A, asks:
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slightly across survey cycles.) Responses were measured on a 5-   
indicating            
   !   

     "

Obama-McCain Findings on Political Efficacy A. Results from Table 21 support my
hypothesis of a positive Obama Effect on the first measure of external efficacy (External
Efficacy A). As I predicted, based on data from 2008-2010, Obama supporters became
significantly more efficacious (.188) relative to non-supporters. This result stands in
sharp contrast with McCain supporters, who became significantly less efficacious (-.180)
during this span. Both values were significant at the .01 level. The continuity score for
the lagged dependent variable was .457, representing a relatively low level of stability for
this attitude.
These findings held up in the broader demographics model as well (see Table 22).
Surprisingly, the coefficient for McCain supporters (-.229) became even larger and
remained significant at the .01 level. The coefficient for Obama supporters (.122) also
remained statistically significant (albeit at the.10 level). Even after controlling for
demographic effects, much of the explanatory power appeared to be concentrated in the
vote choice itself and not just in demographics. These results pointed to the possibility of
a positive Obama Effect on this measure of external efficacy.
Although the gender variable was not significant in this model, other demographic
variables did have additive effects. The age and income variables were significant, but in
the opposite direction from what I hypothesized. Specifically, each additional year of age
corresponded to an increase of .003, indicating that relatively older respondents increased
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their political efficacy relative to younger respondents. And each move up one income
bracket corresponded to an increase of .030, indicating that higher income respondents
increased their efficacy relative to lower income respondents. On the other hand, the
race/ethnicity and education variables were significant in the direction that I
hypothesized. Being non-white corresponded to an increase of .108 relative to white
respondents. And each move up one education bracket corresponded to an increase of
.075, indicating a positive relationship between formal education and increased efficacy.
Two of the 10 interaction terms I tested were statistically significant at the .10
level: Obama*Income (Table 23) and McCain*Income (Table 24). In other words, while
income had an additive effect, a clearer picture of its import emerged when this variable
was moderated by vote choice. Specifically, the interaction effect for Obama*Income
(.056) suggests that higher-income Obama supporters became significantly more
efficacious from 2008-2010 than lower-income Obama supporters. The interaction effect
for McCain*Income (-.056) suggests that lower-income McCain supporters actually
increased their efficacy significantly as compared to higher-income McCain supporters.
These results largely appeared to confirm my major hypothesis that support for
Obama had a positive effect on this first measure of external efficacy. The hypothesis
was further supported by what appeared to be a contrasting negative effect among
McCain supporters. But before I could confirm the hypothesis outright, I turned my
attention back to the 2000-2002 and the 1992-1994 panel data. This comparative data
allowed me to determine whether there truly was a positive Obama Effect at work, or
whether there may have been a broader presidential effect on external efficacy that
predated any Obama campaign effect.
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Bush II-Gore Findings on External Efficacy A. The baseline model in Table 25 indicates
a tremendous increase in this form of external efficacy among Bush II supporters relative
to non-supporters (.577). There was also a statistically significant increase among Gore
supporters relative to non-supporters, but only at the .10 level of significance (.254). The
lagged continuity score of .460 reflected a fairly low level of stability in political efficacy
during this 2-year cycle.
As Table 26 shows, inclusion of demographic variables barely reduced the
explanatory power for the Bush II vote choice variable (.464); it remained significant at
the .01 level. Meanwhile, the Gore vote choice variable lost its explanatory power. These
results were not very surprising, given the controversial outcome of the 2000 election,
which involved the Bush v. Gore Supreme Court ruling in favor of Bush II. Presumably,
that ruling would have made Gore supporters relatively unlikely to respond favorably to
the external effi   
         

How much do government officials care what people like
-white respondentswho supported Gore over Bush II

at a rate of more than 2 to 1significantly decreased their efficacy (-.286) between 2000
and 2002. As I observed in most other models, men increased their efficacy relative to
women (.208). And once again, higher levels of education also corresponded to increased
external efficacy (.123).
Both interaction terms for income (Obama*Income and McCain*Income) had
been significant in the 2008-2010 cycle, but only the Bush II*Income interaction term
was significant (.108, see Table 27) in the 2000-2002 cycle. The direction was the same
as for Obama supporters (with higher-income Bush II supporters increasing their efficacy
relative to lower-income Bush II supporters), and the opposite direction of McCain
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supporters. Given the parallels between Obama and Bush II supporters, and those
between McCain and Gore supporters, these findings may reflect some support for a
positive presidential effect thesis, as opposed to one of a unique Obama Effect.
Clinton-Bush I Findings on External Efficacy A. The pattern did not hold up for the
1992

1994 cycle, as neither support for Clinton nor support for Bush I was statistically

significant in either the baseline model or the broader demographics model (see Tables
28 and 29). Only two demographic variables were statistically significant: income (.014)
and education (.169); both had a positive and significant effect on this measure of
external efficacy, matching the pattern from the other election cycles. However, the vote
choice*income interaction terms that had been significant for the other cycles were not
statistically significant for the Clinton-Bush I cycle.
In the next section, I present the findings for External Efficacy B, my second
measure of the attitude in question. The survey question for this item was:  




         

   I will then summarize and

synthesize the results for both measures of external efficacy.
Obama-McCain Findings on External Efficacy B. Interestingly, as Table 30 shows,
results for this measure of external efficacy stand in stark contrast to results from the first
measure. On this second measure, it was McCain supporters who significantly increased
their efficacy (.142) relative to non-supporters, at the .05 significance level. For Obama
supporters, the increase was not statistically significant. The lagged continuity score of
.511 indicated a moderate level of stability in this attitude over the two-year cycle.
When demographics are introduced into the model (see Table 31), the relative
increase among McCain supporters loses its statistical significance, falling just outside

92
the .10 threshold of significance. Other variables, race/ethnicity and education in
particular, also fell just outside the .10 threshold. The only demographic variable to reach
statistical significance was age: just as with the first measure of external efficacy, each
additional year added .003 for External Efficacy B. In this case, too, older respondents
increased their political efficacy relative to younger respondents. Gender and income
were not statistically significant in this model.
The two interaction terms that were statistically significant for this variable were
Obama*Race (.438, see Table 32) and McCain*Race (-.611, see Table 33). Both were
highly significant at the .01 level. This indicated that non-white Obama supporters
increased their efficacy significantly relative to white Obama supporters while non-white
McCain supporters decreased their efficacy relative to white McCain supporters. It is
important, however, not to read too much into these particular interaction effects, given
the fairly small n of non-white respondents on the panel. Of 1588 respondents, only 245
(15.4%) were non-white. This allows for a very small number of non-white respondents
supporting a candidate to have an outsized impact on the level of significance for these
interaction terms, thus potentially skewing the results. This may be especially the case for
the McCain*Race term, given that only 37 of those 245 non-white respondents on the
panel were McCain supporters.
Bush II-Gore Findings on External Efficacy B. Results from Table 34 reveal a major
significant increase in this measure of external efficacy among Bush II supporters relative
to non-supporters (.636), and a lesser but still significant increase among Gore supporters
relative to non-supporters (.290). The lagged continuity score of .529 reflected a fair but
not especially high degree of stability in this attitude between 2000 and 2002.
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Table 35 reflects a rare instance in which the vote choice coefficients actually
grew larger to .646 for Bush II supporters and to .310 for Gore supporters

after

controlling for demographic variables. None of the explanatory power was conceded to
demographic factors, although the education variable was statistically significant at the
.05 level. Each additional education bracket corresponded to an increase in efficacy of
.113, indicating the positive relationship between education and external efficacy that I
hypothesized and observed in most other models. The Bush II*Race and Gore*Race
interaction terms were not statistically significant.
Clinton-Bush I Findings on External Efficacy B. Results from Tables 36 and 37 reveal
that presidential vote choice had very little impact on this measure of external efficacy in
the 1992-1994 cycle. In the baseline model, the null hypothesis was confirmed for
Clinton supporters; there was no significant change in their efficacy relative to nonsupporters. Bush I supporters showed an increase in efficacy relative to non-supporters
(.179), but it was just barely significant at the .10 level. The lagged continuity score of
.262 was among the lowest in my entire analysis, reflecting a very low level of stability in
this attitude over the two-year period.
Once demographics were introduced into the model, neither support for Clinton
nor support for Bush I had any significant impact. Gender was significant in this model (.157), but only at the .10 level. This result appeared to be an outlier in relation to findings
from the other election cycles. In all other models for which gender has been significant,
it was men who experienced a positive increase in the attitude relative to women, but in
this lone model it was women who became more efficacious relative to men. The
education variable was also significant, and again it was positively associated with
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external efficacy. Each education bracket upward corresponded to a .202 increase in
efficacy, a coefficient that reached the highest level of statistical significance.
The interaction terms Clinton*Race (-.453) and Bush I*Race (.634) were both
statistically significant (see Tables 38 and 39). However, as I noted for Obama*Race
(Table 32) and McCain*Race (Table 33), the relatively small sample size of non-white
participants warrants qualification in terms of the substantive impact of race/ethnicity.
Indeed, the samples were even smaller for 1992-1994: out of 759 participants on the
panel, only 116 where non-white. Among those, only 60 supported Clinton and only 14
supported Bush I. Creating interaction terms for such small n subgroup samples resulted
in unusually large standard errors for these interaction terms. This issue makes it very
difficult to interpret the true impact of race/ethnicity when moderated by vote choice. I
struggled to identify a coherent theoretical explanation for these results, given that
Obama and Clinton supporters experienced opposite outcomes, and McCain and Bush I
supporters experienced opposite outcomes. As with the 2008-2010 findings, I suspect
these 1992-1994 results were skewed by the small sample size of non-white respondents
on the panel.
Summary and Discussion of External Efficacy. I employed two distinct survey items
measuring different dimensions of external political efficacy; the results for each
dimension were markedly different from the other. On the measure asking whether
government cared about what people like them thought, Obama supporters became much
more efficacious while McCain supporters registered a sharp decrease in external
efficacy, not only relative to each other, but relative to all other candidates in the earlier
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95
  

  

  



      

that it would have a lasting and positive effect on their efficacy. Obama supporters had a
unique sense that the Obama-led government now cared, or cared more, about what
people like them thought. This effect appeared to be especially pronounced among higher
income Obama supporters and not as much among lower income supporters. For McCain
supporters, unlike my conclusion for political interest, these efficacy findings did appear
to reflect a manifestation of the 2009-2010 rise of the Tea Party Movement. This
movement of disaffected citizens, overwhelmingly McCain supporters, formed after the
2008 election for the express purpose of organizing around shared feelings of political
disenfranchisement and alienation; so it makes sense that such attitudes would register as
a relative decrease on that first measure of external political efficacy.
On the second measure of external efficacy, which asked whether people like
them could affect what government does, I observed a possible negative Obama Effect
that ran contrary to my hypothesis. It was not Obama supporters but rather, McCain
supporters who experienced the relative increase on this dimension of efficacy. It is likely
that the organizational capacity provided by the Tea Party movement and the decision of
      

  

    









 

(for instance, the Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Act) led to McCain supporters
feeling more emboldened in terms of their capacity to influence government. For Obama
supporters, the relative ambivalence may have reflected a reluctance to continually
engage a grueling legislative process. Obama had campaigned on change, but even with
strong Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, he had to make major
compromises and concessions on his major agenda items to get them passed through
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Congress. It is not completely surprising, then, that Obama supporters would come to feel
that they had a strong advocate (External Efficacy A), but who was not as successful a
change agent as they had hoped (External Efficacy B); and that McCain supporters would
come to feel that they could influence government policy (External Efficacy B) even if
they felt increasingly that the Obama-led government did not care what people like them
thought (External Efficacy A). Presumably they felt they could influence government
specifically by blocking Oba

 

In the above section on political interest, I suggested that the relative decline
among Obama supporters was likely due, at least in part, to burnout or fatigue after an
exciting but exhausting campaign. Here I posit a related argument: that the relative

                        
meet the impossibly high expectations placed upon him by his supporters. Indeed, Obama
rode into Washington in January 2009 on a wave of popularity and high expectations,
with his approval ratings ranging in the high 60s for the first half of that year (Peters and
Woolley 2015), following nearly two full consecutive years of campaigning for support.
But the honeymoon period did not last long. By late 2009 the heated national debate was
raging over passage of the Affordable Care Act, and many supporters had grown
disenchanted with Obama compromising and agreeing to remove key provisions from the
legislation (most notably, the so-called public option being stripped to win the votes of
moderate Democratic senators). His approval ratings dropped into the low 50s by
October 2009 as the legislative process kicked into full gear. The relative decline in
External Efficacy B among supporters, then, was likely more an artifact of an unpopular
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part of Obama to allow his support base to influence his administration. Presumably

  

           but not at all by his

governance after the election. Yet they continued to feel that they had an advocate in the
White House who at least cared about people like them. This would help explain why his
supporters experienced a positive effect on External Efficacy A, but registered a negative
effect on External Efficacy B.
I now turn my attention to partisanship, the attitude which, unsurprisingly,

  

         

      

Partisanship
Major Hypothesis #3: Partisanship. My third major hypothesis is that from 2008-2010,
Obama supporters increased or sustained their partisanship (i.e., party identification)
relative to non-supporters. I expected this positive Obama Effect to be most pronounced
among sub-groups that were most supportive of Obama, in other words, that women,
younger respondents, non-white respondents, those with relatively low levels of income,
and those with relatively high levels of formal education became more loyal to the
Democratic Party, while men, older respondents, white respondents, those with relatively
high incomes, and those with relatively little formal education became more loyal to the
Republican Party. As with the political interest and political efficacy variables, I also
tested for interaction effects for the 10 interaction terms that multiply the vote choice
value by a given resource variable. My hypothesis would be rejected if I found a negative
Obama Effect on partisanship. The null hypothesis would find support if vote choice was
found to have had no statistically significant impact on partisanship during the 2008-2010
cycle.
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       Generally speaking, do

you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an inde

     

The response set consists of a 7-point scale ranging from Strong Democrat (1) to Strong
Republican (7). A positive effect on partisanship, for purposes of my analysis, is an
increase in partisanship. (In certain other political contexts, increased partisanship may be
considered a negative outcome; but because presidential candidates are explicitly seeking
to become the leaders of their respective parties, increased partisanship is considered here
to be a positive campaign effect.)
Obama-McCain Findings on Partisanship.1 Table 40 reveals a highly significant and
positive effect on partisanship for both Obama supporters relative to non-supporters (.326) and McCain supporters (.301) relative to non-supporters. This result appears to
reflect  

                      

hypothesized Obama Effect) or only to winning candidates (i.e., a presidential effect).
The lagged continuity score of .743 reflects a very high degree of stability during this
cycle, with the low degree of movement taking the form of both Democrat and
Republican participants retreating even deeper into their partisan corners.
Each vote choice variable remained significant at the .01 level even after
demographics were introduced into the model. As Table 41 shows, the gender and
income variables had no significant impact in the demographics model. On the other

1

With regard to all my independent variables and the partisanship lag in particular, I considered the
possibility of a multicollinearity issue between independent variables. It seemed especially plausible that
candidate support might be correlated too strongly with party identification for OLS assumptions to hold. I
therefore tested for the VIF (variable inflation factor) statistic in each OLS model. In all models the VIF
statistic was below 4; it was 2.215 for the partisanship lag from Table 34. The danger zone for
multicollinearity would be a VIF statistic between 9 and 10; therefore I determined that multicollinearity
was not a major concern in my OLS regression models.
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hand, age, race/ethnicity, and education were all statistically significant. Each additional
year of age corresponded to a -.004 change toward the Democratic Party identification;
this result was the opposite of my hypothesis. Being non-white was associated with a
.203 movement in the hypothesized direction of Democratic Party identification. Finally,
each additional education bracket corresponded to a -.042 change in the hypothesized
direction of Democratic Party identification. The only significant interaction term was
McCain*Education (.083, see Table 42), indicating that higher-educated McCain
supporters increased their loyalty to the Republican Party more than lower-educated
McCain supporters. This interaction effect was significant at the .10 level, but the
corresponding interaction term for Obama supporters was not statistically significant.
Bush II-Gore Findings on Partisanship. Table 43 reveals a very similar pattern for the
2000-2002 cycle as that observed in the 2008-2010 cycle. Once again, supporters of the
winning candidate, Bush II, become much more Republican relative to non-supporters
during those two years (.427); and supporters of the losing candidate, Gore, became even
more loyal to the Democratic Party (-.546), relative to non-supporters, during that cycle.
The lagged continuity score of .719 was comparable to the 2008-2010 score, reflecting a
very high degree of stability in party identification during this cycle.
The demographics model presented in Table 44 did not have much impact on the
significance of the vote choice variables. Both support for Bush II and support for Gore
remained significant at the .01 level. The only demographic variable to achieve statistical
significance was the race/ethnicity variable, with non-white respondents becoming much
more Democratic (-.265) during this cycle. The interaction terms moderating education
by vote choice were not statistically significant.
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Clinton-Bush I Findings on Partisanship. The results shown in Table 45 for the 19921994 cycle are markedly similar to those from the other two cycles, with Clinton
supporters becoming much more loyal to the Democratic Party (-.928) and Bush I
supporters becoming much more loyal to the Republican Party (.588). The lagged
continuity score of .639 reflected a moderate level of stability in party identification
during this cycle, which translated into a greater change than was observable in the other
cycles.
The model incorporating demographic variables is presented in Table 46.
Controlling for demographics did not mitigate the highly significant impact of either vote
choice variable; both remained significant at the .01 level. The race/ethnicity variable was
once again significant (-.352), with non-white respondents becoming significantly more
Democratic during this cycle than their white counterparts. The income variable was also
highly significant in this model, with each move upward into a new income bracket
corresponding to a .023 increase in loyalty to the Republican Party. The race/ethnicity
variable was significant at the .05 level, and the income variable was significant at the .01
level.
The education variable was highly significant when moderated by vote choice, as
had been the case for McCain supporters. As shown in Tables 47 and 48, both the
Clinton*Education term and the Bush I*Education term revealed significant interaction
effects. Clinton supporters with higher levels of education increased their loyalty to the
Democratic Party significantly more than Clinton supporters with lower levels of
education (-.240); and Bush I supporters with higher levels of education became
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somewhat more loyal to the Republican Party than Bush I supporters with lower levels of
education (.159).
Summary and Discussion of Partisanship. Results across the three election cycles
revealed a far more consistent pattern for the partisanship variable than I had observed for
the political interest and political efficacy variables. Indeed, supporters of all candidates
under analysis

Obama and McCain, Bush II and Gore, and Clinton and Bush I

became much more partisan during the 2 years after the election, and at the highest .01
level of statistical significance in every case. The one consistent demographic trend was
that of non-white respondents increasing their loyalty to the Democratic Party to a greater
extent than white respondents did to the Republican Party; however, this outcome is not
surprising given that a substantial proportion of Democratic Party supporters were white,
while only a small percentage of Republican Party supporters were non-white.
Clearly this pattern of increasing partisanship after the election was not isolated
among a small subset of the population or among one or two particular demographic
groups. It was experienced by supporters of Democratic and Republican candidates, by
young and old, by male and female, and across income and education levels. Such
consistent and wide-ranging candidate effects point to a noteworthy observation in recent
presidential politics: that campaign supporters of the president tend to become much

                       
                  
election.
In the next chapter, I turn my attention to from political attitudes to the Obama
Effect on political participation.
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Table 13 Political Interest, 2008-2010, Baseline
Model
B
(Constant)
1.125
Voted for McCain
.191
Voted for Obama
- .041
Interest 2008
.639
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .385
c. *** p < .01

Std. Error
.091
.069
.069
.021

Table 14 Political Interest, 2008-2010, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
.734
.142
Voted for McCain
.120
.069
Voted for Obama
- .063
.069
Interest 2008
.603
.022
Gender
.172
.040
Age
.009
.001
Race/Ethnicity
- .049
.056
Income
.010
.016
Education
.007
.020
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .413
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .10

Sig.
.000
.006***
.553
.000***

Sig.
.000
.085*
.357
.000***
.000***
.000***
.375
.506
.715

Table 15 Political Interest, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for Obama*Gender
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
.700
.142
.000
Voted for McCain
.119
.069
.085*
Voted for Obama
.007
.076
.931
Interest 2008
.604
.021
.000***
Gender
.250
.054
.000***
Age
.009
.001
.000***
Race/Ethnicity
- .052
.056
.350
Income
.011
.016
.483
Education
.008
.020
.706
Obama*Gender
- .174
.079
.029**
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .412
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
e. * p < .1
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Table 16 Political Interest, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for Obama*Income
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
.659
.147
.000
Voted for McCain
.105
.070
.135
Voted for Obama
.103
.112
.360
Interest 2008
.604
.021
.000***
Gender
.172
.040
.000***
Age
.010
.001
.000***
Race/Ethnicity
- .056
.056
.317
Income
.036
.021
.084*
Education
.009
.020
.668
Obama*Income
- .055
.029
.061*
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .411
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .1

Table 17. Political Interest, 2000-2002, Baseline
Model
B
(Constant)
1.492
Voted for Bush II
.244
Voted for Gore
.197
Interest 2000
.431
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2002
b. Adjusted R2 = .235
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05

Std. Error
.092
.088
.088
.025

Table 18. Political Interest, 2000-2002, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.246
.233
Voted for Bush II
.224
.090
Voted for Gore
.140
.088
Interest 2000
.403
.025
Gender
.347
.068
Age
.014
.002
Race/Ethnicity
.294
.084
Income
- .042
.017
Education
.011
.034
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2002
b. Adjusted R2 = .292
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05

Sig.
.000
.006***
.025**
.000***

Sig.
.000
.013**
.112
.000***
.000***
.000***
.000***
.015**
.737
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Table 19 Political Interest, 1992-1994, Baseline
Model
B
(Constant)
1.443
Voted for Bush
.440
Voted for Clinton
.325
Interest 1992
.382
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 1994
b. R2 = .175
c. *** p < .01

Std. Error
.143
.122
.117
.036

Table 20 Political Interest, 1992-1994, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
.835
.346
Voted for Bush
.305
.132
Voted for Clinton
.272
.125
Interest 1992
.357
.040
Gender
.326
.101
Age
.011
.003
Race/Ethnicity
.186
.141
Income
.018
.009
Education
.108
.050
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 1994
b. Adjusted R2 = .222
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
Table 21 Political Efficacy A, 2008-2010, Baseline
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.190
.077
Voted for McCain
- .180
.066
Voted for Obama
.188
.066
Efficacy A 2008
.457
.022
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .281
c. *** p < .01

Sig.
.000
.006***
.004***
.000***

Sig.
.000
.000***
.006***
.000***

Sig.
.016
.021**
.030**
.000***
.001***
.000***
.187
.042**
.030**
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Table 22 Political Efficacy A, 2008-2010, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
.645
.138
.000
Voted for McCain
- .229
.067
.001***
Voted for Obama
.122
.067
.070*
Efficacy A 2008
.441
.022
.000***
Gender
- .006
.040
.884
Age
.003
.001
.035**
Race/Ethnicity
.108
.055
.048**
Income
.030
.015
.050**
Education
.075
.020
.000***
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .293
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
e. * p < .01
Table 23 Political Efficacy A, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for Obama*Income
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
.719
.143
.000
Voted for McCain
- .214
.068
.002***
Voted for Obama
- .048
.110
.666
Efficacy A 2008
.442
.022
.000***
Gender
- .006
.039
.870
Age
.003
.001
.041**
Race/Ethnicity
.114
.055
.037**
Income
.004
.020
.832
Education
.074
.020
.000***
Obama*Income
.056
.029
.052*
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .294
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
e. * p < .1
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Table 24 Political Efficacy A, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for McCain*Income
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
.577
.143
.000
Voted for McCain
- .051
.114
.654
Voted for Obama
.113
.067
.093*
Efficacy A 2008
.443
.022
.000***
Gender
- .006
.039
.876
Age
.003
.001
.048**
Race/Ethnicity
.113
.055
.039**
Income
.054
.020
.006***
Education
.075
.020
.000***
JM*Income
- .056
.029
.052*
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .294
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
e. * p < .10
Table 25 Political Efficacy A, 2000-2002, Baseline
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.816
.154
Voted for Bush II
.577
.142
Voted for Gore
.254
.141
Efficacy A 2000
.460
.043
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2002
b. Adjusted R2 = .127
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .1

Sig.
.000
.000***
.073*
.000***
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Table 26 Political Efficacy A, 2000-2002, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
1.451
.390
.000
Voted for Bush II
.464
.152
.002***
Voted for Gore
.189
.149
.206
Efficacy A 2000
.428
.044
.000***
Gender
.208
.109
.057*
Age
.001
.004
.861
Race/Ethnicity
- .286
.138
.039**
Income
.028
.028
.320
Education
.123
.054
.023**
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2002
b. Adjusted R2 = .136
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
e. * p < .10
Table 27 Political Efficacy A, 2000-2002, Interaction Effect for Bush II*Income
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
1.613
.397
.000
Voted for Bush II
- .015
.276
.957
Voted for Gore
.200
.149
.180
Efficacy A 2000
.425
.044
.000***
Gender
.207
.109
.057*
Age
.001
.004
.801
Race/Ethnicity
- .306
.138
.027**
Income
- .011
.033
.750
Education
.123
.054
.022**
Bush II*Income
.108
.052
.038**
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A, 2002
b. Adjusted R2 = .139
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
e. * p < .10
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Table 28 Political Efficacy A, 1992-1994, Baseline
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.644
.101
Voted for Bush I
.005
.099
Voted for Clinton
.099
.095
Efficacy A 1992
.260
.031
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 1994
b. Adjusted R2 = .092
c. *** p < .01

Sig.
.000
.956
.297
.000***

Table 29 Political Efficacy A, 1992-1994, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
1.145
.281
.000
Voted for Bush I
- .150
.108
.166
Voted for Clinton
.039
.102
.703
Efficacy A
.245
.033
.000***
Gender
- .045
.083
.590
Age
- .002
.003
.352
Race/Ethnicity
.107
.116
.355
Income
.014
.007
.067*
Education
.169
.040
.000***
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 1994
b. Adjusted R2 = .145
c. ***p < .01
d. * p < .10
Table 30 Political Efficacy B, 2008-2010, Baseline
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.154
.081
Voted for McCain
.142
.071
Voted for Obama
.071
.071
Efficacy B 2008
.511
.021
a. Dependent Variable: EfficacyB 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .202
c. *** P < .01
d. ** p < .05

Sig.
.000
.047**
.321
.000***
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Table 31 Political Efficacy B, 2008-2010, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
.795
.149
.000
Voted for McCain
.118
.073
.109
Voted for Obama
.039
.073
.599
Efficacy B 2008
.506
.022
.000***
Gender
.032
.043
.457
Age
.003
.002
.047**
Race/Ethnicity
.092
.060
.128
Income
.003
.017
.877
Education
.032
.021
.140
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .276
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
Table 32 Political Efficacy B, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for Obama*Race
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
1.136
.177
.000
Voted for McCain
.070
.074
.347
Voted for Obama
- .498
.169
.003***
Efficacy B 2008
.505
.022
.000***
Gender
.031
.043
.469
Age
.003
.002
.053*
Race/Ethnicity
- .201
.102
.050**
Income
.004
.017
.792
Education
.037
.021
.087
Obama*Race
.438
.124
.000***
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .282
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
e. * p < .10
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Table 33 Political Efficacy B, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for McCain*Race
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
.646
.153
.000
Voted for McCain
.782
.178
.000***
Voted for Obama
.036
.073
.618
Efficacy B 2008
.505
.022
.000***
Gender
.034
.043
.421
Age
.003
.002
.060*
Race/Ethnicity
.206
.066
.002***
Income
.005
.017
.774
Education
.036
.021
.093*
McCain*Race
- .611
.150
.000***
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .284
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .10
Table 34 Political Efficacy B, 2000-2002, Baseline
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.664
.150
Voted for Bush II
.636
.136
Voted for Gore
.290
.135
Efficacy B 2000
.529
.038
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 2002
b. Adjusted R2 = .196
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .5

Sig.
.000
.000***
.032**
.000***

Table 35 Political Efficacy B, 2000-2002, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
1.568
.373
.000
Voted for Bush II
.648
.145
.000***
Voted for Gore
.310
.142
.030**
Efficacy B 2000
.501
.041
.000***
Gender
.110
.104
.288
Age
- .005
.003
.132
Race/Ethnicity
- .102
.132
.437
Income
.004
.027
.867
Education
.113
.052
.030**
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 2002
b. Adjusted R2 = .136
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
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Table 36 Political Efficacy B, 1992-1994, Baseline
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.737
.123
Voted for Bush I
.179
.108
Voted for Clinton
.060
.104
Efficacy B 1992
.262
.032
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 1994
b. Adjusted R2 = .090
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .10

Sig.
.000
.099*
.565
.000***

Table 37 Political Efficacy B, 1992-1994, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
1.861
.316
.000
Voted for Bush I
.013
.119
.911
Voted for Clinton
- .056
.112
.614
Efficacy B 1992
.218
.034
.000***
Gender
- .157
.091
.084*
Age
- .004
.003
.117
Race/Ethnicity
- .053
.127
.679
Income
.005
.008
.562
Education
.202
.045
.000***
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 1994
b. Adjusted R2 = .136
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .10
Table 38 Political Efficacy B, 1992-1994, Interaction Effect for Clinton I*Race
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
1.613
.343
.000
Voted for Bush I
.035
.119
.770
Voted for Clinton
.488
.318
.125
Efficacy B 1992
.214
.034
.000
Gender
- .165
.091
.069
Age
- .004
.003
.127
Race/Ethnicity
.176
.178
.324
Income
.005
.008
.508
Education
.199
.044
.000
Clinton*Race
- .453
.248
.068
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 1994
b. Adjusted R2 = .139
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .10
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Table 39 Political Efficacy B, 1992-1994, Interaction Effect for Bush I*Race
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
1.968
.321
.000
Voted for Bush I
- .681
.392
.083*
Voted for Clinton
- .050
.112
.654
Efficacy B 1992
.222
.034
.000***
Gender
- .155
.091
.089*
Age
- .004
.003
.125
Race/Ethnicity
- .152
.137
.271
Income
.004
.008
.623
Education
.200
.044
.000***
Bush I*Race
.642
.346
.064*
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 1994
b. Adjusted R2 = .139
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .10

Table 40 Partisanship, 2008-2010, Baseline
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.051
.093
Voted for McCain
.301
.084
Voted for Obama
- .326
.084
Party ID 2008
.743
.015
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .818
c. *** p < .01

Table 41 Partisanship, 2008-2010, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.612
.176
Voted for McCain
.326
.086
Voted for Obama
- .285
.086
Party ID 2008
.738
.015
Gender
.018
.048
Age
- .004
.002
Race/Ethnicity
- .203
.067
Income
.004
.019
Education
- .042
.024
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .819
c. *** p < .01
d. ** = p < .05
e. * = p < .10

Sig.
.000
.000***
.000***
.000***

Sig.
.000
.000***
.001***
.000***
.708
.024**
.002***
.849
.077*
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Table 42 Partisanship, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for McCain*Education
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
1.729
.188
.000
Voted for McCain
.052
.174
.764
Voted for Obama
- .269
.086
.002***
Party ID 2008
.736
.015
.000***
Gender
.018
.048
.715
Age
- .004
.002
.026**
Race/Ethnicity
- .210
.067
.002***
Income
.004
.019
.852
Education
- .076
.030
.012**
McCain*Education
.083
.046
.070*
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .820
c. *** p < .01
d. ** = p < .05
e. * = p < .10
Table 43 Partisanship, 2000-2002, Baseline
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.272
.101
Voted for Bush II
.427
.093
Voted for Gore
- .546
.088
Party ID 2000
.719
.022
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 2002
b. Adjusted R2 = .736
c. *** p < .01
Table 44 Partisanship, 2000-2002, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.433
.249
Voted for Bush II
.407
.097
Voted for Gore
- .609
.094
Party ID 2000
.701
.023
Gender
.107
.067
Age
- .001
.002
Race/Ethnicity
- .265
.084
Income
.003
.017
Education
.046
.033
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 2002
b. Adjusted R2 = .740
c. *** p < .01

Sig.
.000
.000***
.000***
.000***

Sig.
.000
.000***
.000***
.000***
.111
.612
.002***
.866
.162

114
Table 45 Partisanship, 1992-1994, Baseline
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.636
.142
Voted for Bush I
.588
.126
Voted for Clinton
- .928
.120
Party ID 1992
.639
.030
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 1994
b. Adjusted R2 = .650
c. *** p < .001
Table 46 Partisanship, 1992-1994, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
2.130
.354
Voted for Bush I
.538
.134
Voted for Clinton
- .918
.129
Party ID 1992
.623
.032
Gender
- .101
.098
Age
- .004
.003
Race/Ethnicity
- .352
.138
Income
.023
.009
Education
- .010
.047
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 1994
b. Adjusted R2 = .676
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05

Sig.
.000
.000***
.000***
.000***

Sig.
.000
.000***
.000***
.000***
.301
.150
.011**
.008***
.823

Table 47 Partisanship, 1992-1994, Interaction Effect for Clinton*Education
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
1.947
.358
.000
Voted for Bush I
.473
.135
.000***
Voted for Clinton
- .264
.266
.322
Party ID 1992
.618
.031
.000***
Gender
- .095
.097
.330
Age
- .005
.003
.111
Race/Ethnicity
- .371
.138
.007***
Income
.023
.009
.007***
Education
.084
.058
.143
Clinton*Education
- .240
.085
.005***
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 1994
b. Adjusted R2 = .679
c. *** p < .01
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Table 48 Partisanship, 1992-1994, Interaction Effect for Bush*Education
Model
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
2.269
.362
.000
Voted for Bush I
.071
.302
.814
Voted for Clinton
- .892
.130
.000***
Party ID 1992
.622
.031
.000***
Gender
- .100
.097
.307
Age
- .005
.003
.126
Race/Ethnicity
- .364
.138
.009***
Income
.023
.009
.008***
Education
- .058
.054
.286
Bush I * Education
.159
.092
.085*
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 1994
b. Adjusted R2 = .677
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .10
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CHAPTER 5: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE OBAMA EFFECT

A New York Times article from April 2014 chronicles the campaign experience of
Eric Lesser, a candidate in a Massachusetts Senate race who traces his inspiration for
seeking public office directly to the 2008 Obama campaign. Mr. Lesser, then age 29,
   



    ge for Obama campaign staff and for

reporters covering that campaign. He accepted a low-level job in the White House after
         

  

      

reminisced (Horowitz 2014).
As I discussed in Chapter 1, Obama built his 2008 campaign largely upon a theme
   

              

       

 

            

young supporters such as Mr. Lesser to become more politically and civically engaged.
However according to Jason Horowitz, the author of that article, Mr. Lesser seems to be
            !    

"   # $  

Inspiring Few to Seek Of
Theory
As I discussed in Chapter 2, the nature of the democratic and electoral processes
in the United States stipulates that candidates must mobilize their supporters in order to
be successful in the next election. However if a presidential candidate is able to
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truly engage, inspire, and mobilize supporters for the upcoming election, then his actions
can have a positive impact for the candidate/party not just for that election, but in
subsequent election cycles as well. Such spillover effects can have major positive
implications for the political parties and for the larger democratic system. A positive
  



      

            

civic life in other ways in the future. Although support for an individual candidate in one
election cycle guarantees neither future party loyalty nor future participation in politics, a
   

                    

participate in politics. Indeed, it was an explicit goal of the 2008 Obama campaign to
create positive spillover effects by emphasizing the importance of long-term engagement
and participation in political processes and civic life. In this chapter I test the degree to
which that campaign accomplished this objective, in other words, I investigate the
possibility of a positive, unique, and lasting Obama Effect on various types of political
participation.
Given my findings of a strong candidate effect on partisanship in the previous
chapter                    
years after the electiona candidate effect on participation would likely manifest in ways
that reflected this increased partisanship. A negative candidate effect on participation
would harm the party in the future, while a positive candidate effect on participation
             

   

relationship between political interest and External Efficacy B, the measure of political
efficacy regarding how much people feel they can affect what government does. Obama
supporters registered relative decreases in interest and relative decreases in this form of
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efficacy in tandem, even as they increased their External Efficacy A (i.e., they felt
government cared more about what people like them think). I suggested these findings
may be related to increased complacency, burnout or fatigue after the exciting campaign,
personal satisfaction with Obama but dissatisfaction with the larger government, and/or
to unrealistically high expectations for the Obama presidency. Thus although I framed
my formal hypotheses at the onset of this project to expect a positive Obama Effect on
participation, I knew it was at least possible that these negative outcomes on attitudes
discussed in the previous chapter may correspond to negative outcomes on participation.
In this chapter, I focus on three specific manifestations of political participation
that represent individual engagement with the democratic process: voter turnout,
attending local government meetings, and attending political protests. Voter turnout
        

 

 

  

       

following the presidential election cycle in question. Attending local government
meetings demonstrates a higher level of political participation and a deeper engagement
with the democratic process than voting alone. The same can be said for attending
political protests. I argue that the decision to participate in politics in these ways may be,
at least to some degree, a function of a positive or negative Obama Effect.
Hypothesizing an Obama Effect on Political Participation
My general hypothesis for this chapter is that the 2008 Obama campaign had a
significant, lasting, and positive (or even transformational) impact on the political
participation of its supporters over time. A positive Obama Effect would manifest as a
relative increase in voter turnout among Obama supporters, a relative increase in
attendance of local political meetings, and a relative increase in attendance of political
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protests. Conversely a negative Obama Effect would manifest as relative decreases in
these forms of participation among Obama supporters. Once again, in this chapter I
distinguish between an Obama Effect, a broader presidential effect, and a candidate effect
by comparing outcomes from the 2008-2010 election cycle to those from the 2000-2002
cycle and the 1992-1994 cycle.
My dependent variable for each hypothesis test is the value of the political
behavior in the midterm year (i.e., 2010, 2002, or 1994). The lag of this variable (i.e., the
value of the behavior in the corresponding presidential year) is always included as a
control variable in each model to avoid the problem of endogeneity (see Chapter 3).

                  
       ! I replicate my methodological approach
from the previous chapter so that everyone on the panel who voted for Obama is
compared on the value of the dependent variable to everyone on the panel who did not
vote for Obama (i.e. McCain voters + third-party voters + nonvoters). Likewise, everyone
who voted for McCain is compared to everyone who did not vote for McCain (i.e.,
Obama voters + third party voters + nonvoters). Since both dummy predictors are
included in each model, the regression coefficient indicates the difference between voters
for a particular candidate and everyone else who did not vote for that candidate.
I employ linear regression models for the voter turnout question and binary
logistic models for the questions regarding attendance of political meetings and
attendance of political protests. As in the previous chapter, my baseline models in this
chapter include only the vote choice variables and the lagged dependent variable as
predictors. After each baseline regression, I ran a second regression model to test for
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demographic effects as well. These broader models allowed me to test for positive
additive effects of resource variables as well as for interaction effects between
demographics and vote choice.
Voter Turnout
Major Hypothesis #1: Voter Turnout. My first major hypothesis is that from 2008-2010,
Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their voter turnout levels relative to
non-supporters. I expected this positive Obama Effect to be most pronounced among
those subgroups that were most supportive of Obama, namely, female respondents,
younger respondents, non-white respondents, lower income respondents, and highly
educated respondents. The hypothesis would be rejected if a negative Obama Effect (that
is, a decrease in voter turnout in supporters relative to non-supporters) was found. The
null hypothesis states that vote choice did not have any impact on the direction of voter
turnout between 2008

2010.

The measure of voter turnout during midterm years (2010, 2002, 1994) was:
   

    

corresponding question dur
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about the election for the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington DC? Did you
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serves as the lag, so that I am comparing House voting levels in the midterm years
directly to House voting levels in the presidential years (instead of to presidential voting
levels in those years).
Summary and Discussion Findings on Voter Turnout. My findings for the voter turnout
variable were more consistent across election cycles than my findings for any other

121
dependent variable under analysis in either this chapter or the previous chapter. There did
not appear to be any significant candidate effects in either 2008-2010 or 2000-2002; the
null hypothesis was confirmed for both election cycles. As Table 49 shows, neither
support for Obama (-.041) nor support for McCain (.223) had a statistically significant
    

 

  



, relative to nonsupporters, in the 2010 midterm

elections. Table 51 shows that the same was true for supporters of Bush II (.525) and
Gore (.478). Only in the 1992-1994 cycle did vote choice appear to have a significant
effect on voter turnout (see Table 53), with support for Bush 1 produced a coefficient of
.599 which was significant at the .05 level in the baseline model. Support for Clinton in
this cycle did not have a significant effect. The null being confirmed for 5 of 6 cases in
my analysis lends strong support for the notion of minimal candidate effects on voter
turnout.
The broader models reflected in Tables 50, 52, and 54 revealed various
demographic characteristics to be significant in various election cycles. Being male was
associated with an increase in turnout for both 2008-2010 (.155) and for 1992-1994
(.580). Relatively high income was associated with increased turnout from both 20082010 (.048) and 1992-1994 (.084). Both these results were the opposite of the direction I
hypothesized, meaning it was not those subgroups most supportive of Obama that were
associated with relative increases in turnout. On the other hand, in accordance with my
hypothesis relatively high education was associated with increased turnout from both
2008-2010 (.122) and 2000-2002 (.404). Only the age variable was consistent across all
three cycles, yet it ran contrary to my hypothesis; each year of age corresponding to an
increase of .016 from 2008-2010, .043 from 2000-2002, and .040 from 1992-1994. The
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race/ethnicity variable was the only variable not statistically significant in any of my
voter turnout models.
I now turn my discussion to the voter choice variable.
Attending Political Meetings
Major Hypothesis #2: Attending Political Meetings. My second major hypothesis is that
from 2008-2010, Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their attendance of
political meetings relative to non-supporters. I further expected positive additive effects
among the demographic subgroups most supportive of Obama. The hypothesis would be
rejected if a negative Obama Effect was found, in other words, if Obama supporters
registered a relative decline in attendance of political meetings from 2008-2010. The null
hypothesis would be confirmed if presidential vote choice did not have any significant
effect on levels of attendance of political meetings.

                 
months, have you attended a meeting to talk about political or social concerns, or have

            The presidential year version of this
variable is included as a lag in my logit models. This version asked during the

                      
    ! 

      parallels the midterm version

conceptually despite the unfortunateness of varied question wording.
Obama-McCain Findings on Attending Political Meetings. Contrary to my hypothesis,
results from Tables 55 suggested a broader candidate effect rather than a unique Obama
effect on attendance of political meetings. McCain supporters increased their attendance
significantly (.880) relative to nonsupporters. Obama supporters also increased their
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attendance (.555), but only at the .10 level of significance compared to the much higher
.01 level for McCain supporters.
As Table 56 shows, even after controlling for demographics McCain supporters
increased their attendance of meetings at almost the same rate (.878), still significant at
the .01 level. Yet in this broader model, support for Obama was not statistically
significant. In its stead, being male (.248) and being relatively highly educated (.175)
both were associated with increased attendance of meetings. This gender finding, which
ran contrary to my hypothesis, seemed to correspond to my finding in the previous
chapter regarding the decrease in political interest in women relative to men. (While this
gender dynamic was consistent across all 3 election cycles in terms of political interest,
the gender variable was typically not statistically significant on either measure of external
efficacy.) That higher levels of formal education would correspond to increased
attendance of political meetings was in line with my hypothesis. I had also expected that
being non-white, being relatively young, and relatively low income would significantly
affect attendance of political meetings positively, but none of these demographic
variables were statistically significant in the model. Likewise, none of the interaction
terms I tested in this model were statistically significant.
Bush II-Gore Findings on Attending Political Meetings. Results from my 2000-2002
baseline model (Table 57) showed increased relative attendance of political meetings
among Gore supporters (1.109) at the .05 level of significance. The relative increase
among Bush II supporters (.656) was not statistically significant.
When demographics were introduced into the model (Table 58), the relative
increase among Gore supporters (.935) was still significant but only at the .10 level. The
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only other statistically significant variable was gender. In this election cycle as well,
being male corresponded to a relative increase in attendance of political meetings (.589).
The age, race/ethnicity, income, and education were not significant in this model.
Clinton-Bush I Findings on Attending Political Meetings. Results from the 1992-1994
baseline model (Table 59) revealed increased attendance of political meetings among
Bush I supporters (1.149) relative to nonsupporters. This increase was statistically
significant at the .01 level. For Clinton supporters, there was a slight but not statistically
significant increase of attendance (.316) relative to nonsupporters.
The broader model shown in Table 60 indicated that support for Bush I was still
significant, but now only at the .10 level. The coefficient dropped to .888. The only
demographic variable that was significant was education (.537) at the .01 level. The
gender, age, race/ethnicity, and income variables were not significant in this model.
I will turn to the discussion of the Obama Effect and civic engagement after the
next section, in which I summarize my findings on attendance of political protests.
Attending Political Protests
Major Hypothesis #3: Attending Protests. My third major hypothesis is that from 20082010, Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their attendance of protests,
marches, rallies, and/or demonstrations relative to non-supporters. (I refer to these going
  

 rotests

for shorthand.) Despite the oppositional nature of protests

and demonstrations (if not marches and rallies), I still hypothesized a relative increase
among Obama supporters because they are important measures of civic engagement.
Presumably Obama supporters would not become protesters of Obama specifically but
may have been galvanized or otherwise influenced by the Obama campaign to take a
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more oppositional but active role in some other area of civic life. Such an outcome would
indeed, in my view, potentially reflect a positive Obama campaign effect. The hypothesis
would be rejected if a negative Obama Effect was found, that is, if Obama supporters
registered a relative decline in attendance of political protests, marches, rallies, and
demonstrations from 2008-2010. The null hypothesis would be confirmed if presidential
vote choice did not have any significant effect on levels of attendance of political
meetings.

    

             

months, have you joined in a protest march, rally, or demonstration, or have you not done

                  
                 ! 
mar

      "       

        



  

    

       " Unfortunately

this question was not asked on the 1994 panel survey; therefore the results discussed
below pertain only to the 2008-2010 cycle and the 2000-2002 cycle.
Obama-McCain Findings on Attending Protests. My findings from Table 61 showed that
Obama supporters increased their attendance of political protests (1.286) relative to
nonsupporters, but only at the .10 level of significance. Conversely, McCain supporters
increased their attendance of political protests (2.340) at the .01 level of significance. As
with attendance of political meetings, the relative increase in this form of political
participation among supporters of both candidates suggested the possibility of a broader
candidate effect, rather than the unique Obama Effect that I hypothesized. Furthermore,

126
while vote choice was statistically significant for both, the effect of support for McCain
appeared to be much stronger than the effect of support for Obama.
The demographics model shown in Table 62 revealed very little change in the
vote choice coefficients for either Obama supporters (1.228) or McCain supporters
(2.312). Both remained significant at the .10 and .01 levels, respectively. Gender had a
statistically significant effect on attending protests (.434), but again not in the direction I
hypothesized. It was men who increased their attendance relative to women, a result that
did not support my thesis of an Obama Effect but that did correspond to my findings on
political interest as well as political meetings. Income was significant (.136) but only at
the .10 level and not in the direction I hypothesized. It was higher income respondents
who increased their attendance of protests relative to lower income respondents. The age,
race/ethnicity, and education variables were not statistically significant in this model. I
tested each interaction term in this model but as with the model on political meetings,
none were statistically significant.
Bush II-Gore Findings on Attending Protests. Contrary to the Obama-McCain cycle,
results from the 2000-2002 baseline model (Table 63) showed a relative decrease in
attendance of political protests among both Bush II supporters (-1.375) and Gore
supporters (-.808). The relative decrease among Bush II supporters was at the .01 level,
while the level of relative decrease among Gore supporters was at the .10 level.
The broader model shown in Table 64 appeared to be an isolated finding in which
the vote choice effects actually became stronger after demographic variables were
included. The coefficients among Bush II supporters and Gore supporters became -1.788
and -1.284, respectively. Both vote choice variables were now significant at the.01 level.
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Both income level (.196) and education level (.429) appeared to have a positive effect on
attendance of protests. The age, gender, and race/ethnicity variables were not statistically
significant in this model.
Summary and Discussion of Civic Engagement. My general hypothesis of a unique,
positive, and lasting Obama Effect on civic engagement was not confirmed, either with
regard to attendance of political meetings or attendance of political protests. In fact, it
was McCain supporters, not Obama supporters, who experienced a relatively positive
increase in attending political meetings. Yet as I compared this result to those from the
earlier two cycles, I observed what appeared to be a negative presidential effect rather
than a uniquely negative Obama Effect. Indeed, in terms of attending political meetings,
the candidate effects

even after controlling for demographics

were concentrated

among the supporters of McCain, Gore, and Bush I, the losing candidates in my analysis.
Interestingly, this oppositional trend did not extend to attendance of political
protests. I observed what appeared to be a negative presidential effect on attendance of
political meetings, but with regard to political protests, there was a relative increase in
attendance among supporters of all four candidates under analysis (Obama, McCain,
Bush II, and Gore). Two caveats are important to note here, however. First, fewer than
5% of respondents participated in protests; thus these results may be skewed by just a few
respondents among a relatively small n. Second,          
shorthand but the question pertains to political demonstrations, marches, and rallies as
well as protests. Unfortunately for my purposes, the closed nature of the ANES survey
instrument is rather broad and did not allow me to determine the nature of this political
participation at a more detailed level.
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Initially I posited that the excitement surrounding the 2008 Obama campaign may
have had a transformative impact on the civic engagement of Obama supporters. After
all, Obama made many explicit appeals throughout his campaign for his supporters to
become more civically minded and civically engaged. Suffice to say, I did not observe
any kind of positive Obama Effect that would suggest that campaign was successful in
that regard. On the contrary, based on the data not only from 2008-2010 but from the
previous election cycles as well, it appears more likely that supporters of the losing
presidential candidates will become more participatory in these regards than supporters of
the winning candidates.
In Chapters 4-5, I conducted quantitative analyses on the Obama Effect in relation
to the political attitudes and participation of the broader American electorate. In the next
chapter I analyze the Obama Effect qualitatively in relation to the political attitudes and
participation of those who volunteered on the 2008 campaign. I compare and contrast
these two populations to determine the differences between these two populations,
namely, one that was more representative of the national population and one that was
representative of those most enthusiastic about the 2008 Obama campaign.

Table 49 Turnout, 2008-2010, Baseline
Model
B
(Constant)
2.617
Voted for McCain
.223
Voted for Obama
- .041
Turnout 2008
1.790
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .214
c. *** p < .01

Std. Error
.089
.177
.176
.192

Sig.
.000
.207
.814
.000***
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Table 50 Turnout, 2008-2010, with Demographics
Model
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
1.349
.179
Voted for McCain
.089
.170
Voted for Obama
- .135
.169
Turnout 2008
1.687
.184
Gender
.155
.052
Age
.016
.002
Race/Ethnicity
- .038
.071
Income
.048
.020
Education
.122
.026
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 2010
b. Adjusted R2 = .218
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05

Table 51 Turnout, 2000-2002, Baseline
Variables
B
Voted for Bush II
.525
Voted for Gore
.478
Turnout 2000
1.276
(Constant)
.138
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 2002
b. Pseudo R2 = .031
c. *** p < .01

S.E.
.442
.439
.254
.461

Table 52 Turnout, 2000-2002, with Demographics
Variables
B
S.E.
Voted for Bush II
.487
.492
Voted for Gore
.482
.495
Turnout 2000
1.035
.276
Gender
.345
.224
Age
.043
.008
Race/Ethnicity
.240
.287
Income
.080
.056
Education
.404
.115
(Constant)
- 3.758
.902
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 2002
b. Pseudo R2 = .089
c. *** p < .01

Sig.
.000
.602
.427
.000***
.003***
.000***
.595
.016**
.000***

Sig.
.235
.276
.000***
.764

Sig.
.322
.331
.000***
.123
.000***
.402
.156
.000***
.000

130
Table 53 Turnout, 1992-1994, Baseline
Variables
B
Voted for Bush I
.599
Voted for Clinton
.362
Turnout 1992
.829
(Constant)
.067
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 1994
b. Pseudo R2 = .028
c. *** p < .01
d. ** P < .05

S.E.
.269
.255
.268
.285

Table 54 Turnout, 1992-1994, with Demographics
Variables
B
S.E.
Voted for Bush I
.564
.313
Voted for Clinton
.647
.309
Turnout 1992
1.375
.299
Gender
.580
.239
Age
.040
.008
Race/Ethnicity
- .065
.320
Income
.084
.022
Education
.058
.118
(Constant)
- 3.705
.789
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 1994
b. Pseudo R2 = .147
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
e. * p < .10
Table 55 Meetings, 2008-2010, Baseline
Variables
B
Voted for McCain
.880
Voted for Obama
.555
Meeting 2008
1.629
(Constant)
- 3.144
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 2010
b. Pseudo R2 = .090
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .10

S.E.
.304
.304
.162
.305

Sig.
.026**
.155
.002***
.814

Sig.
.072*
.036**
.000***
.015**
.000***
.838
.000***
.622
.000

Sig.
.004***
.068*
.000***
.000
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Table 56 Meetings, 2008-2010, with Demographics
Variables
B
S.E.
Voted for McCain
.878
.310
Voted for Obama
.494
.310
Meeting 2008
1.572
.168
Gender
.248
.137
Age
- .002
.005
Race/Ethnicity
.290
.193
Income 2008
.036
.054
Education
.175
.070
(Constant)
- 4.167
.535
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 2010
b. Pseudo R2 = .099
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .10
Table 57 Meetings, 2000-2002, Baseline
Variables
B
Voted for Bush II
.656
Voted for Gore
1.109
Meeting 2000
2.221
(Constant)
- 6.179
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 2002
b. Pseudo R2 = .047
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05

S.E.
.520
.500
.324
.604

Table 58 Meetings, 2000-2002, with Demographics
Variables
B
S.E.
Voted for Bush II
.483
.542
Voted for Gore
.935
.516
Meetings 2000
2.178
.341
Gender
.589
.308
Age
.006
.011
Race/Ethnicity
.217
.369
Income
.077
.080
Education
.020
.148
(Constant)
- 7.289
1.082
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 2002
b. Pseudo R2 = .047
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05

Sig.
.005***
.111
.000***
.070*
.704
.133
.508
.013**
.000

Sig.
.207
.026**
.000***
.000

Sig.
.372
.070*
.000***
.056*
.583
.557
.334
.893
.000
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Table 59 Meetings, 1992-1994, Baseline
Variables
B
Voted for Bush I
1.149
Voted for Clinton
.316
Meetings 1992
2.479
(Constant)
- 3.747
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 1994
b. Pseudo R2 = .079
c. *** p < .01

S.E.
.419
.448
.332
.363

Table 60 Meetings, 1992-1994, with Demographics
Variables
B
S.E.
Voted for Bush I
.888
.466
Voted for Clinton
.136
.482
Meetings 1992
2.215
.350
Gender
.067
.334
Age
.001
.011
Race/Ethnicity
.072
.526
Income
- .012
.032
Education
.537
.168
(Constant)
- 5.175
1.079
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 1994
b. Pseudo R2 = .097
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .10
Table 61 Protests, 2008-2010, Baseline
Variables
B
Voted for McCain
2.340
Voted for Obama
1.286
Protests 2008
1.398
(Constant)
- 4.752
a. Dependent Variable: Protests 2010
b. Pseudo R2 = .049
c. *** p < .01
d. *p < .10

S.E.
.725
.733
.201
.718

Sig.
.006***
.481
.000***
.000

Sig.
.057*
.778
.000***
.842
.916
.891
.714
.001***
.000

Sig.
.001***
.079*
.000***
.000
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Table 62 Protests, 2008-2010, with Demographics
Variables
B
S.E.
Voted for McCain
2.312
.733
Voted for Obama
1.228
.740
Protests 2008
1.292
.206
Gender
.434
.201
Age
.008
.008
Race/Ethnicity
.553
.272
Income
.136
.082
Education
.066
.106
(Constant)
- 6.679
.990
a. Dependent Variable: Protests 2010
b. Pseudo R2 = .058
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
e. * p < .10
Table 63 Protests, 2000-2002, Baseline
Variables
B
Voted for Bush II
- 1.375
Voted for Gore
- .808
Protests 2000
2.977
(Constant)
- 2.937
a. Dependent Variable: Protests 2002
b. Pseudo R2 = .036
c. *** p < .01
d. * p < .10

S.E.
.505
.434
.472
.308

Sig.
.002***
.097*
.000***
.031**
.278
.042**
.097*
.529
.000

Sig.
.006***
.063*
.000***
.000
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Table 64 Protests, 2000-2002, with Demographics
Variables
B
S.E.
Voted for Bush II
- 1.788
.522
Voted for Gore
- 1.284
.472
Meetings 2000
2.668
.513
Gender
- .166
.394
Age
.013
.013
Race/Ethnicity
.179
.474
Income
.196
.103
Education
.429
.190
(Constant)
- 5.689
1.149
a. Dependent Variable: Protests 2002
b. Pseudo R2 = .047
c. *** p < .01
d. ** p < .05
e. * p < .10

Sig.
.001***
.007***
.000***
.673
.339
.705
.057*
.024**
.000
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CHAPTER 6: CAMPAIGN VOLUNTEERS AND THE OBAMA EFFECT

Are the political attitudes and behaviors of those who actually volunteered for the
2008 Obama campaign markedly different from the political attitudes and behaviors of

  

   

             

data from in-depth ethnographic interview transcripts with former 2008 Obama campaign
volunteers, in relation to my quantitative findings on political attitudes and behaviors
from the previous two chapters. My overarching goal is to determine whether or not there
was a unique, lasting, and positive Obama Effect on his volunteer base that was distinct
from the effects (or lack thereof) observable in the larger population of citizens
represented by the ANES panel and discussed in the previous 2 chapters.
Over 300 Purdue University students, including myself, volunteered on campus
for the Obama campaign during the fall of 2008. Volunteers were typically engaged in
one of the following activities: 1) Voter registration drives to encourage Purdue students
to register and vote locally; 2) Phone-banking drives to encourage students to support
Obama over McCain; 3) Data entry to help the campaign record and track the attitudes of
potential voters and volunteers; and 4) Get-Out-the-Vote (GOTV) drives to ensure that
registered Obama supporters would actually go out to cast their ballots.
One of my individual volunteer tasks, with respect to data entry, was to maintain a
spreadsheet of all volunteer names and contact information. Throughout that fall of 2008,

136
I coded and re-coded volunteers in that spreadsheet as 1 (highly active), 2 (moderately or
regularly active), 3 (volunteered more than once and worth asking again), or 4
(volunteered only once, do not invite again until GOTV time). This coding system helped
the campaign reach out to volunteers in a more efficient manner than if all who had
volunteered at least once were treated equally in the database, regardless of level of
enthusiasm or involvement.
That database had been dormant for the entire first Obama term before I
reactivated it to reach out to potential interviewees (via email or text message) for my
research in the summer of 2013. I randomly sampled the 1s, 2s, and 3s in the database
until I had identified 30 former volunteers who were willing to be interviewed about their
political attitudes, political participation, and civic engagement. Therefore while they
were randomly sampled within that limited universe of Purdue student volunteers, they
rep

      

    

  

(In other words, I sampled

from this limited universe of young volunteers instead of a national sample of Obama
campaign volunteers because these were the interviewees to which I had direct access.)
  

volunt

 



   

    

  

      

         

   !  



   

contact rate of 74 percent (32 of 43), with only 2 former volunteers declining my
interview request. Names used below are not the real names of the volunteers, so as to
protect their anonymity. Below is the breakdown of the 30 volunteers I interviewed, by
level of volunteer engagement achieved by the end of the campaign.
Level of Volunteer Engagement during 2008 Obama campaign:
"

#$    # %  

&
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time) in the interviewee sample. Therefore al 30 interviewees in the sample
volunteered at least twice for the 2008 Obama campaign.
Next I recount the demographic characteristics of all 30 volunteers in the sample.
Demographic Characteristics of Volunteer Sample:
Gender: 19 men, 11 women
Age: all were between 18-26 years old in November 2008
Race/Ethnicity: 18 white, 12 nonwhite
Income: unknown
Education: All 30 volunteers were Purdue University college students (27
undergraduates, 3 graduate students) in November 2008
Volunteer Responses to Interview Questions
Political Interest"  # $    % &   
 '       (  )   would follow up
% &    

   ( * +    #

consistent?
#  , + -  . /    0 others as
 . less than in 2008; and the remaining 3 as being far less interested in 2008.
Given the relative falloff in interest among Obama supporters that I discussed in Chapter
4, it is noteworthy if not surprising that these young Obama volunteers maintained their
high interest to this degree. Among the 70% of the sample who reported a continuing
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high level of interest, several appeared to be the direct product of a positive Obama
Effect. One volunteer, Cassie, summed up the views of several others in stating, I would
   
   

       

   

        



        nterest since then. Another

volunteer, Derek     

  

  ! 

 "   !  

State Democratic Party in Minnesota now. I would say I was a little interested in politics
even before 2008, but my interest has grown exponentially over time because of Barack
and what we did in 2008.
Others told me they had been interested even before the 2008 campaign, and so
their sustained or increased interest could not be attributed to an Obama Effect.
Samantha, for example, came fro       #    $  
very interested in local politics even in high school; and when she moved back to her
hometown after living in Indiana for four years, she picked up her interest in local
politics right where she had left it before college. During her four years in Indiana, she
did become more interested in national electoral politics, perhaps because of Obama, but
  
  

 

  

        %       & 

 llow the news on a daily basis, as I have since my parents started reading

the newspaper to me when I was a kid. And I just graduated in May, so I actually work
for a government relations firm in Washington now

'       ( 

would be my hobby. For volunteers like these two, it appeared that Obama was a
beneficiary of preexisting political interest.
Others offered rather nuanced views of how their interest had changed over time.
) 

  

         ve maybe been a little less interested
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PACs and nonprofits that work toward policy goals. Richard also reflected on his
changing political interest:
The sorts of politics and government          
the past decade. When I first became interested in high school I was drawn in by
opposition to the Iraq War so I became very interested in issues of foreign policy.
And also civil liberties issues relating to wire-tapping and some of the things that
came out of the Patriot Act as a response to 9/11. Then it became more related to
 

          



  



less about civil liberties and more about fiscal issues.
To be sure, a few volunteers did report a drop-off in interest after 2008. For
    



  



    

        !



      

 

in politics

up to date on what issues are

going on. And I encourage other people to be more involved than I am. Cameron
  

 

 

   



    



 





so obnoxious how nobody in Washington can accomplish anything without a
"          



  

 

e way I want. Too

          

External Efficacy. The second question I asked interviewees was: Do you think the
government cares what people like you think? On this measure of external efficacy the
interviewees reported in aggregation 7 yesses, 14 mixed responses, and 9 nos. I observed
perhaps more nuance in responses to this question than any other question I asked in the
interviews.
Representing the most externally efficacious viewpoints, #

$ 

Yes,

absolutely. I think that everyone who wants to can get representation. Sometimes I
wonder if people have access to information or know how to voice their opinion, but
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there are always ways.

 





 





  



  

to get a response from the government on a platform like Reddit. Picking up on this


  I

    

think individuals have the ability to put enough power behind

their voice when they become part of a big voting constituency or lobbying effort.
Conversely, Richard said he was efficacious at the individual level but not the societal
level, specifically 





 

      Yes

always felt that way. In high school and college

   

actually

 

    

 

pretty affluent white male and a business owner. On an identity basis the only thing that
makes me a minority is being an atheist. If our government is gonna be responsible to
   





be donor class people like me

Almost half of the sample, 14 of 30 interviewees, were best characterized as




    

 ! 

 

 "    

    I

think there are individuals within the government that certainly care, like Obama. One of
the problems we face is, as an institution that is more difficult to believe. #

   

appeared to be a direct causal result of the Obama Effect. While it did not give her a high
degree of external efficacy in general, it did increase her efficacy from where it was
before the Obama election. I observed the Obama Effect at work in another volunteer,
Josh, who I also recorded as mixed efficacy: 


   

 



 

   
 



     

  

 

    

   

 



%

!estion.

I think

$   "    


 % 

   

my opinion is. But I do think the executive branch does care about what I think. Aaron
said it just depended who we are talking about: I think it depends on if your name
carries weight. A community leader is different than just Jo Shmo calling into his
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         es based on the

dependability of the person voicing their issues.
Multiple volunteers distinguished between their external efficacy when it comes
               I think at the level of local

and state gove               
government, that our voices are heard. Jeff agreed:
Sometimes yeah with respect to certain issues, but with respect to other issues I
           For the most part I feel like
more local issues are where I have more of a voice, but for national issues like
               

       

a city council meeting like how to allocate library funds I feel like I have more of
a voice.
Seven of the 30 volunteers expressed more negative or cynical attitudes on
external efficacy. Speaking personally, Lucas offered an interesting contrast to !  
response above:
I think due to my income level, n             

influence people in power is relatively minor.     

"   

the White House impacted his views on that at all, which prompted him to express the
following:
I think the President is different. I think he actually thinks about people. I was
able to sign up for his healthcare plan at a really good premium with subsidies
from the federal government. I think his actions are very indicative of actually
caring and trying to get something done. He came into office to increase the
economic fortunes of the middle class, especially the lower middle class, and I
          

Thus while Lucas directly indicated low external efficacy, the follow-up question
appeared to reveal indirectly a significant Obama Effect on his efficacy toward Obama
himself, if not the larger federal government.
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Almost one-quarter of my sample, 7 of 30 interviewees, expressed
overwhelmingly negative external efficacy. Cassie answered the question thusly, in a
response fairly typical of this last group:

 

           

that voting is important. And I believe          other
people that just to get other people to come out and participate, otherwise they
                ut

                 
Republicans are there versus how many Dem      
the public, including myself, as much as they should.

Attitudes toward President Obama. Although my quantitative analyses in Chapters 4
centered on attitudes such as interest, efficacy, and partisanship, for this qualitative
chapter I wanted to gain a more nuanced and in-depth understanding of these former
young       

    below I included full

or partial responses from most volunteers to my third question:  ow do you feel about
Barack Obama these days? And how have your feelings about him changed (or not
changed) since his 2008 campaign?! Among the 30 interviewees, 21 were best
characterized as having overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward Obama; the other 9 had
mixed attitudes toward the president. It should not be surprising that none of the
interviewees had an overwhelmingly negative attitude toward Obama, given that all 30 of
them had volunteered to help elect him less than 5 years prior.
Although 70% of my interviewees expressed overwhelmingly positive attitudes
toward Obama in the summer of 2013, almost all responses contained some qualification
related to partisanship, gridlock,     "#

    

specific issues. Yet a few volunteers did express unqualified approval for the president,

    #      $ 

ove, love, love President
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Obama. I love to watch him on TV, I love to read about him and listen to him. I just think
 



      

    

   

Love him. Always have. Another volunteer, Bridget said:


             
                   
       
        
        
        
when he talks about how he wants to revamp student loan policies because that
affects me a lot.
Yet another, Olivia, indicated that her support had become even broader in recent
  

            this country. Overall I feel

       and good for America. Especially since his re-election,
 

 much more assertive which is good.
I prompted Lucas to elaborate after he initially offered the short response that he

   

  

          You

          
     

       

           

  !  

He replied, I really like his nominees to the federal bench, his economic stimulus, and
like I said his health care bill 

  

           

 

pleased with his appointment of Justice Elana Kagan. I knew what I was getting into
when I voted for him again. I was pleased with him during his first term a   
pleased right now.   
  #

         " 

     When he was considering getting us into the war in Syria, I

was very much against that. I was very pleased [Secretary of State] John Kerry ratcheted
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down the war rhetoric. That is probably the only negative thing that I would put on
President Obama, the rest has more to do with the Repu     





     My opinion is pretty much the same as it was in 2008. A lot of
people I know are disillusioned with Obama              
gotten from the president is what I expected when I was helping campaign for him. 
              
  

 

    y positive, but are there any
   I think on issues like gun

disappointed in him?

control and immigration he could use his powers from the executive branch a little more
strongly to try and force legislation through or to do things unilaterally with executive
 

          !            

on this issues where most of the American people would support him.
Victoria expressed similar attitudes in that she was very approving of the
         
    

  

 I do approve of the president 

.

       But            

could be doing. But on the things h          doing a bad job at all. 
followed up,  ounds like your feelings about President Obama are mostly positive but
not fully. Any particular issues where you think he could be doing more? She did then
offer some specifics critiques of the president:
Two issues where he could make a bigger stand are regarding national gay
marriage legalization, and also marijuana. He came out in support of same-sex
         
        
        enough. I definitely think we could be doing reforms in
the areas of both medical and recreational use of marijuana. I think
decriminalizing it would help out a lot. And in terms of border security, he says
he is friendly to immigrants but they are putting up a wall in certain parts of Texas
    !                
want to wall our country off from the rest of the world.
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Jeff, similarly, articulated overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward Obama, knowing
how constrained he would be as president. He stated,         


       

     

    

feasible. I wanted the infrastructure program in the American Recovery Act when he first
got elected to be much larger. And I wanted healthcare to be single payer but those
            



   Following this

       I definitely still support him. I mean you never agree with
 



!       

 

   "  current policies. But if I

had to scale my support 1-10 I would say a 9. When I asked if Johnathan had been
    
# 

 

     

    hings like Guantanamo, I

    $

     %      %  

  &           ' years later.

Chris also expressed deep sympathy for Obama entering office during an
economic crisis:
        

(

%  

      % 

circumstances in Congress. The economy, unemployment, job creation, creating a
strong middle class    important issues that the President has focused on.

"% %      
      )
                  * 
given what he inherited and given the situation, I         job.

One volunteer, Caroline began by articulating a very positive view of Obama, but
 %    +     %       


     

 &         

                  
    u 

 

 someone has

     

   Derek also felt this frustration, but
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thought such attitudes were the product of unrealistically high expectations given the
context of the negative economic and militaristic conditions under which Obama
assumed the office:
The president inherited a very difficult situation with the economy that no one
could fix overnight, and two very costly wars,   done a very good job
trying to fix all that. But because he came into office with such high
expectations 
  
         
                   un.

               
     
    
                

2008.
This last point made by Derek reflected the most common theme that arose when
I asked about attitudes toward Obama. Indeed, most volunteers offered some combination
of an expression of support for Obama and an expression of frustration with
congressional Republicans striving to block any agenda item supported by the president.
Saman          
         

   

    

  

  

   



  

                       hat
           

      but I

definitely wish he could get more through Congress. Another volunteer, Dominic, said


H         

   

   !   "  

  . With

               



job so far.# Abby agreed, elaborating on why she still had such positive attitudes toward
Obama:         $          t president does?
%            

       

with John Boehner and the Republicans.# &     
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her, she said, I was proud of his show of support for LGBT issues recently, especially
given the climate in Washington    

     

Republicans.
Speaking as one of those volunteers who had more tepid support or mixed
attitudes toward the president, Cliff said,
        
                 
                     

be effective, and that his hands are tied. There have been a few examples though
where I thought he should have been a little bolder, like not dropping the public
option or just letting the Bush tax cuts expire. But I think   the danger of our
system right now, how our Congress is supported by lobbyistsSo a lot of this

                       

turned out into what we thought it would. I think most of the blame is on who he
has to work with.
Tyler offered a somewhat different perspective by focusing more on the fact that
Democrats had large majo   

  

       

than on Republican obstruction.            
 

             

!!"

 My

       

really changed completely. I was disappointed with Democrats generally because they
had a supermajority and failed to deliver the kind of healthcare law I wanted. I think the
Affordable Care Act       

            

he put any of the blame directly on the president, or only upon Democrats in Congress,
 

   I think the President has been too conciliatory in light of all the

Republican obstructionism. But I do think he has restored some of our positive image
around the world, and I also like his Supreme Court pick, so a lot of my frustration is
with the Democratic leadership in Congress.
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Tonya, a self-described environmentalist, offered another interesting combination
       

 

 

 I still really like Obama  

 

I feel increasingly sorry for him as I watch his level of frustration grow with Congress.
But she qualified her support          

  :

A couple of years ago when the big [BP] oil spill happened, he had an opportunity
to really do something big related to climate change legislation. If there was ever
an opportunity that was squandered, that was it. I really felt like an environmental
disaster that nothing good could have come out of except for increased legislation
to prevent that kind of thing from happening in the     

 That was one of the reasons I supported Obama in the first place,
because he was all about science, but then he barely even fought Republicans on
that issue. I think most people in the country would have supported him, he sort of
squandered it which made me very frustrated. But except for the oil spill, when
    
    
              When
power h   !
 
   "  
     
  !           # I think he could do a better
job of fighting Republicans on issues like the environment.
Although all volunteers expressed at least mixed support for Obama, several
offered sharp criticisms of certain policy positions. For example, volunteers like Kent
  
  
 

 

 

s handling of the Affordable Care Act and the economy,

  $here have been some ar 


      



        




 !   

       but actually the opposite. Proba   ! 
really disappointing not much has changed th    
%

 &

  !    



     



  

  

 

      


   

referring to drone strikes, to letting interest groups write legislation, and to letting
lobbyists continue to have so much influence over government decisions. Another
volunteer, Jordan, agreed, saying that his attitudes toward Obama were

149
Generally positive but       
      
                to act on civil
liberties and civil rights issues. Things like how he handled Snowden, and not
fighting the bad state voting laws that are popping up everywhere, and joblessness
for minorities being mu              
m                 in terms of
           I support it personally but  
                     
rapidly I think he could be more proactive in that regard.
Only 3 of the 30 volunteers in my sample could appropriately be characterized as
having mixed, but more negative than positive feelings toward Obama. Obviously since
they had volunteered for his campaign, such attitudes were attributable to a deep
disappointment with the president after having high expectations for him. Daniel, for
  

   

  etter than the alternatives.! "     

was referring to McCain and Romney, or to other Democrats, he said
     #      #-light in most

economic issues anyway. For example      $  %
in as head of the Fed. That guy has been consistently wrong about how to help the
    &  
  
        
alone give him so much power over the economy. Foreign policy is the one part,
              '   estic issues,
he could do so much better When he passed Obamacare, it was by the skin of
his teeth. It was like          
  %  
really fault him for that. But on economic issues, issues of government
transparency, all that stuff, he sort of reneged on a lot of key promises. But during
          (    # ey be president.
So my support went up slightly then, but overall I would say a slight decline from
2008.
Another volunteer whose attitudes were on the relatively negative side was Greg, who
     

!           ) 

 ! 

said.
I support his social policies but any Democrat can be pro-choice. I wish he were
more liberal on tax equality, and I really wish he were more liberal on questions
of national security, NSA data collection. I wish he pursued financial regulations
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harder than he currently does. The Dodd-Frank bill was weak, does anybody
believe it fixed the problem of banks being too big to fail?      

  
 
  I still happily voted for him in 2012. We
could be doing a whole lot worse. I think expectations were unrealistically high
for him coming into office, given what he has to work with in Congress.
Thus while Greg and a few others did attribute much of their frustration to congressional
Republicans, they also laid a substantial portion of the blame for their disappointment at
the feet of Obama himself.
Finally, Cameron offered perhaps the most negative views of among all 30
volunteers:
same as when he was campaigning, obviously. I do have very mixed
feelings about him. Overall I stand by my vote because the Republican candidate
was too far away from my political views. But that being said, there are some
   



     

 

  



 



    

       

 

domestic spying.      upportive enough of Israel. Sometimes
he sounds like he is trying to move back in the right direction, like when he said
     

    

       

intrusive in the first place.
As I noted above, it was not surprising that all 30 of these volunteers from


 !""# 

    

 

   

  





2013, or that the overwhelming majority still have overwhelmingly positive attitudes
toward him. Yet I also observed a wide range in negative attitudes couched within the
positive overall assessments of the president, especially with respect to his handling of
specific issues (e.g., the Affordable Care Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, the NSA domestic
surveillance, tax policy, gun control, choice of appointees, the environment, etc.) Many
of these young volunteers were inclined to qualify their support by raising some objection
to his handling of said issues. I noticed most of the interviewees only criticized Obama
after fist expressing their general ongoing support for him. Without question, the vast
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majority of volunteers that I interviewed pinned the blame for their frustrations on
Republicans in Congress, rather than at Democrats or at Obama himself.
Attitudes on Direction of the Country. My final question in the attitudes section of the
    





    

        

  

about the way things are going for the U.S. these days? Are you more optimistic and
positive about the future, or are you more pessimistic and negative? Exactly half the
sample, 15 volunteers, were best characterized as optimistic. Nine of the 30 had mixed
attitudes, and the remaining 6 said they were more pessimistic on the whole.
Chris, picking up on the major theme from the previous section, said that he was


ery optimistic about our future  

overall I feel pretty optimistic. Daniel 
up. Economy is recoverin
  

!"#  



 

    

   

     Things

         

 

are looking

   

      $        

reasons. First, when I hear the job numbers, compared to where they were 2-3 years ago,
clearly the economy is getting better. And second, from an 
  % Looking

  

    

at the classes 1 or 2 years ahead of me, it

ma


easier to find jobs now. So I feel more optimistic about the economy. Aaron also felt the
economy provide solid ground for a positive outlook 

     &

initiatives:
I feel optimistic. The private sector is picking up a lot of slack where the public
sector has had some shortcoming. On the energy side of the economy, renewable
energies are g              '       
  




  

   

  

    

      

     (             

President has recently been promoting these manufacturing hubs, public-private
partnerships to bring together community businesses, schools, and research
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institutions to bring together ideas and concepts that are conceived at universities,
to bring them to market. And I think th    
 
 

    

    

      

 generally

positive feeling about the future. More startup companies are emerging, the Dow has
doubled since 2008 when everything fell apart, and        


       

      

 

     

the country is heading.
Caroline attributed her optimism more to personality than to Obama or any other
    

  

      


 



 

   

 There are probably a lot of areas

     

       

        but pessimists are not seeing the

       her to elaborate further on the reasons for her optimism,
   I just know so many young people on the front lines of doing great work
  



         

     

 

pushing things in the wrong direction, at the ground level I see lots of great work being
done in our country by young people.        
Certainly other interviewees were more tepid, reserved, or qualified in their
optimism. Cliff, for example, qualified his response by saying it depended on class:
That really depends who you are. For the middle class or for the average person,
probably not going in the right direction. If you look at unemployment, the job
 !             "990s anytime soon. But

                
     
                        
              #    re certain things

about this country that were tougher on us how than they were 15 or 20 years ago,
        $       
              

     
     d. I think

we should be thankful that we are not in a third world country where people can
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barely feed themselves. We still have it so much better than so many other places
in the world so we should be very thankful for that. But it really depends on who
you are.
Tonya and several others agreed with Cliff that class and income inequality were
paramount
Issues with respect to the future health of the United States:
It totally depends on who you are. When you think about inequality, the rich are
getting richer and the poor are getting poorer, well is that going to be acceptable,
    

            

      

 

      

    

 


the globe, all the people on the low end in the U.S., where do they fall globally?


                    

  

an Iphone in their pocket, and they want an Iphone 5 but they only have an Iphone
!"    -
! me people could stand to realize how lucky they
are to be Americans. From a global perspective, a lot of our problems in the U.S.
will seem very trivial but from a national perspective they seem very tough. So it
depends a lot on the perspective we take.
Kent said that he was
# 

  

    

   
 

 

 $     

  

 

 

   

      $         



direction in terms of how we relate to the rest of the world; building relationships
with other countries and working together on global challenges. I think the
economy        % &     #        
more inequality. That gap between people who have the most and people who
ha       '              
Lucas also gave a mixed assessment because of rising income inequality.
I thin  

he economics of the country are strong, I
(        e distributed correctly. And I think the biggest failure of
the Democratic Party is not addressing that. If we are going to continue on that the
 



  

    

 

 

     

      

 



democratic party, one that is willing to talk about the economy as a project that
we can control, as something where government has the levers to achieve that.
Only 6 volunteers in my sample reported an overwhelming pessimistic attitude.
Greg offered perhaps the most cynical or negative outlook of all, beginning by saying he
was ) 

    

!

A large part of that has to do with frustrations with money
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opposition party. One party is just trying to win the political game 









 

thought it was possible for things to get better or reverse course in this regard, and he said
    

it  



   

 

 

        



lot of optimism for any sort of legislation, which means the country will be held back
artificially  



   

Republicans exist. Josh 
gridlock in Washington

 



      





 

 "    #  

       "   

 

  

       

Mostly pessimistic!because of the
 

   



          #  

 

       



Dominic gave a particularly interesting response, invoking the income inequality
issue as grounds for his pessimism, but tying it to his observations from being employed
at a struggling retail outlet:
Unfortunately I feel more pessimistic about the future. I look at the widening
                   re getting
skewed higher for people who make more money, and lower for people who
 

        $ 

   

   

middle class, to provide a stable environment for their offspring. But if you just
look at something like retail, I work in retail at a mid-range department store, JC
Penney, and they have been really squeezed. But you look at Saks 5th Avenue and
%   

     

  &  '  & 





the low end are doing great as well. But stores right there in the middle, like JCP,
      
      

  ( 

         

       

   "  

harder. That makes it tough to be an    





   )

Voting Behavior. In the second segment of the interview, I asked the 30 volunteers
several questions about their political participation (or lack thereof) in the four and a half
years since the 2008 election. My first particip

  * 

Did you vote in the

 

midterm elections in November 2010 and/or the presidential election of 2012?   
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response would prompt the follow up question, Do you think of voting more as a duty or
responsibility, or is it something where you really need to be inspired by specific
candidates or parties to vote? All but 1 volunteer said he or she voted in 2012 to reelect
President Obama. (The lone nonvoter said she did not vote because she was hospitalized
at the time.) The vast majority, 25 of 30, said they also voted in the 2010 midterm
elections. About 77% of the sample, 23 of them, said they saw voting as a duty and/or
responsibility. The remaining 7 said that they viewed voting as more of a personal
decision and/or that their voting habits were conditional upon being inspired to turn out
for a particular election (as in 2008).
Caroline represented the views of many volunteers with her straightforward and
strong opinion on the importance of voting:   


   

       gig of

             

make sense not to participate in the process. Likewise, 
    

       

            responsibility that we

all need to take.  !"#$ %#&"' () " $*+ +,&$- ./ 0 +&$1 &% 2 $+&$13$+ 45 $ ./ 63036 7
motivation for a specific candidate. I guess I would classify it more as a civic duty. I think
&+*% &.5 !+#$+ + ,#03 # 0 &23 + +,3 38+3$+ +,#+ / 4 2#$ ,#03 # 0 &23' % ) " $*+ +,&$- &+*%

dependent on personality or how excited I am about a specific party or candidate.9 Daniel

told me he would vote even if he hated everyone on the ballot, and he wished all citizens
felt that way.  consider it a          I always think of it as a 2 

        :       

        

Johnathan also    

   

    ; 
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not that naïve. But               

about, and beyond that I just go by party.
Only a handful of volunteers admitted to not having voted in the 2010 midterm
elections; and only 7 said they did not see voting as a duty or responsibility. Most in these
groups did not care to elaborate on the subject, but simply indicated that the voting

                     
did elaborate on her views, Cassie, said she did not vote in the midterms, but felt the full
force of the Obama Effect in 2008 and 2012: What we say and what we learn in school

                       
               
       
                        
for him in the presidential election.
Political Volunteering Since 2008. My next participation question to interviewees was,

!              "##$     % f they
responded in the affirmative, I followed up by asking which campaign(s) they had
volunteered for and what their responsibilities were. I also asked if the 2008 Obama
campaign was the first campaign on which they had ever volunteered; a full 90% of the
sample, 27 of 30 volunteers, said that it was indeed their first campaign volunteer work.
My first 4 interviews included a related question regarding campaign mobilization
which I dropped in later interviews& ' 

         again
   "#("     %       ) after noting the stark
similarity between the first 4       I mean, I received emails from the
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campaign asking me to volunteer but       

     personally by

   appeared evident that the 2012 Obama campaign sought to reactive all former
2008 volunteers early in the campaign through mass email outreach, but that the approach
was not as personalized as in 2008. (This also represented my own experience as a former
volunteer: I was sent many mass emails by the 2012 campaign but was not contacted
directly.) This was not surprising, given that Obama was not a new candidate in 2012 and
already had some existing campaign infrastructure in place for his reelection bid. It was
also not surprising because many volunteers clearly were more qualified in their support
for Obama in 2012 than they had been in 2008. The campaign may have focused more on
recruiting a fresh group of young volunteers than on reactivating its former volunteer
base. Yet perhaps the main reason for the lack of direct campaign mobilization with these
former volunteers was that Indiana was treated by both campaigns as a swing state in
2008 but not in 2012. It is likely that the 2012 Obama campaign did in fact engage in
more personalized direct mobilization efforts, as opposed to mass email outreach only,
for former 2008 volunteers who were living in swing states in 2012. Those with Indiana
addresses may have been left off the recruitment list for that reason alone.
Notwithstanding the   

  

          

volunteer outreach in Indiana, about 57% of the sample had volunteered in some political
capacity in the four and a half years since the 2008 election. Among these 17, I coded 6
as having volunteered a lot, 8 as having volunteered a little, and 3 who had worked in
politics since leaving Purdue and also volunteered at some point. Of the remaining 13
interviewees, 2 had worked in politics since graduating but not volunteered; and 11 had
not done any political work or volunteering since the 2008 Obama campaign.
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was involved in a couple midterm campaigns back in

  In 2012 I was a field organizer for Obama on the ground in Las Vegas. 
credited his experience volunteering for the 2008 campaign with giving him the desire to
pursue a full time job on the 2012 campaign. Kent told a very similar story: he worked
full time as a field organizer on the 2012 Obama campaign in Ohio, and volunteered for
several local Democratic Party candidates on several 2010-2011 local races in West
Lafayette, Indiana.  

      

very active in the 2012 Obama

  I was an organizer over the summer, and I did some volunteer work like
doing data entry and voter registration as well. I went to Ohio to register voters. I was
also in charge or re-activating some volunteers from 2008.

       

organizer, and she said it was an unpaid internship requiring 20 hours of campaign work
each week.
On the other end of the spectrum were volunteers like Tonya, who volunteered 1
time for 1 candidate. She told me that she had volunteered to attend the Indiana State
Democratic Party convention in 2010 as a delegate for candidate Vop Osili, but that she

               !   

    "

volunteer for Obama in 2012 simply because Indiana (or the state they were living in)
was not competitive in the Electoral College.
Donovan, one  

     # "     !$    

he knew Obama was going to win his state of Maryland in 2012; but this did not fully
deter him from volunteering. Instead he canvassed down-ballot Democratic Party
candidates. However going out a few times, he lost the passion for political volunteer
work.

 %  "  &   !$ he said. ' "    
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I asked if he had considered working for the 2012 Obama

campaign so that he could be paid to do what he enjoyed so much as a volunteer back in
2008; he laughed, saying that woul        
 

  

    

      





   

In contrast,

Caroline, another o                  
    

   

             

          





  !   "We did a

lot of GOVT stuff, organizing people into canvassing and phone-banking events. I was
also part of a group that helped organize a debate between Howard Dean and Liz
Cheney. She and Donovan seemed to have very contrasting experiences, with one
experiencing a powerful but short term Obama Effect, and the other a lasting Obama
effect that made her want to do political volunteer work in the future.
Perhaps the most engaged volunteers since 2008 were Jordan and Richard 
volunteered on several races for state senate and state representative in Indianap 
Jordan told me, continuing, I also volunteered  #   $   



Indianapolis mayor. And I did a lot of field work for our statewide candidates, John
%      & 
  



    '  been a pretty active volunteer

'   (      

      

municipal races in 2010 and in 2012 at the gubernatorial level. And I was involved last
      ) 

 

    )   ) 




 

 involved in voter registration in the

 

      )  



  

  )

alling, door to
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In sum, a full 30% of the sample reported either working in politics or doing lots
of volunteer work; and another 27% had done at least some political volunteering since
2008. Based on what many of the interviewees told me, it would appear the 2008 Obama
campaign did produce a positive and lasting Obama Effect on political participation. In
many cases, it manifested very directly in the form of a spillover effect, in which former
Obama campaign volunteers from 2008 became engaged as volunteers for other
Democratic Party candidates in off-year and down-ballot races.
Other Forms of Political Participation. My third question in the participation section
 Can you think of any other way in which you participated in politics since the

2008 campaign, such as contributing money to a candidate, putting a campaign bumper
sticker on your car, contacting an elected official about an issue, or attending a political
protest? 

     

        



    

at least 4 distinct ways since the 2008 Obama campaign. Two others participated in
exactly 3 ways, and 10 more said the participated in 2 different ways. Another 5 said they
had participated in only 1 way, and 4 of the 30 reported not having participated in politics
at all since 2008 beyond voting (and volunteering, in the case of 2 of the 4).
Many of the former volunteers participated by displaying campaign memorabilia.
        My car is covered in Obama bumper stickers, and I wear
           

ways. !     " 
%& 

    

  

  # 

      ' (

 

Definitely bumper stickers and t-shirts, and  

2008. (

 

  

 

 

 

     her

    

   $ 

' Josh had gone a bit further:

  #     since

  contacted local congressmen in
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Indiana about stuff, especially about the gay marriage ban they were talking about, and
some gun control stuff.
Greg said that he often participated in politics both offline and through social
  

         

 

  When I say

informally I mean posting on Facebook and that sort of thing. I also donated to 3
campaigns, including Obama 2012 because he really needed my $15 or he would not
have won!           on behalf of candidates I support.
Chris, Kent, and Tyler were perhaps the most active in terms of non-volunteer
political participation since 2008. He also mentioned participating both online and
offline:
Yeah I have an Obama bumper sticker, and I try to make sure that people know
            current public affairs.     
be involved.                ould Tweet
at them, like last year with my Congressman Todd Rokita back in Indiana and his
vote against the debt ceiling increase. I felt that was very irresponsible of him.
People like that can become my worst enemy on Facebook. I remember I also
gave money to a couple of senate candidates like Joe Donnelly. And with friends,
colleagues, anyone I meet, I like to talk to them about all that political stuff.
Kent, who told me he came from a very politically active family, said
Kent                    t-    
    lobbied government officials as a constituent.       
number of state and national officials about a number of issues. Letters and emails
           bers of Congress with a student



                   

some state legislators about some state issues.
Finally, Tyler articulated the widest array of types of participation:
                

undecided legislators about the importance of supporting same-sex marriage. I
    
   

                
        or gay rights groups like Planned

Parenthood and the Human Rights Campaign. I have also attended Jefferson-

162
Jackson dinners and paid for tickets which go into the Democratic Party fund. I
also did some research for a candidate running for judge, because he needed to be
   

 



  
       

Chair for College Dems of Indiana I actually just sent letters to a bunch of

legislators last night. I went to law school after Purdue and part of the reason is
because I wanted to be able to participate in the process of crafting public policy.
Joining Organizations or Associations. In the third segment of my interviews, I asked
the volunteers about various types of civic engagement that are not explicitly political in
nature. I really wanted to get a sense here of whether the Obama Effect had any lasting
implications in terms of a nonpolitical spillover effect. My first question was, In the last 5
years, have you voluntarily joined any non-political organizations or associations? Five
of the 30 said that they had joined at least 1 professional and 1 nonprofessional
association/organization; 6 others said they had joined at least 1 nonprofessional
organization; and 5 others had joined at least 1 professional association. The remaining
14 volunteers said they had not joined any organizations or associations, meaning the
sample was almost evenly divided in half between joiners and non-joiners.
Professional organizations that were mentioned included Young Professionals of
Lafayette, the American Library Association, the American Geographical Union, Quad
Cities Chamber of Commerce, the American Counseling Association, The Verge (an
association for young professionals), the Black Law Student association, and National
Association of American Personnel Administrators.
Some of the nonprofessional organizations that were mentioned included the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Black Expo, the Lafayette Go Greener Commission,
and the Foreign Policy Association. Although I had asked for nonpolitical examples, I
thought the responses were still worth noting since they related to issues and not
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campaigns. I was surprised, however, at the dearth of examples that lacked any explicit
political connection. None of my volunteers reported linking up with the local book
group, or signing up with the cycling club, or even joining a bowling league.
One response, from Tyler, jumped out to me as particularly interesting. He told
me,
Immediately after undergrad I joined the Peace Corps. I served for about a year as
a community health and economic development volunteer in the country of

 



                

domestic violence get protective orders. I worked for a year as a fundraiser for an
international development firm called Oxfam, to raise money to combat severe
drought and famine in East Africa. And I was part of a clinical project at my law
school that helps provide legal research and assistance to the LGBT community in
Indiana.
I followed up with Tyler to ask if he was inspired to join the Peace Corps in part because

 

         ! 



    "



influence. Being part of that campaign made me want to be part of some of those other
things for sure, because I saw what people could accomplish when they join up for a
common cause like we did on that campaign
Attending Local Meetings #  $ 

         

the past 5 years, have you attended any kind of community meeting about social or
community issues? Almost two-thirds of the sample said yes they had attended at least 1
such meeting. The remaining 11 of 30 said no they had not attended any community or
social meetings since 2008.
Josh 

 %       &   $

   &

different community events and public debates. We did them on issues like freedom of
speech, or on whatever was going on in the country at the time. And I went to city

164
council mee   
  



 





 



   



  

   

I attended a symposium about the future and the economy of water. And




should go to those 








 

 

  



 

 

  



yet. 

      



  

,I

     



s Club in her neighborhood. Dominic said the

Black Expo sometimes held meetings that he would attend, to discuss things like
organizing community events to promote local and African American owned businesses.
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initiative. I did a compost workshop, and a rain barrel workshop. These were to promote
environmental

  





   



 



  

agenda. It was really a chance for the public to come out and ask questions about
sustainable and environmentally friendly living.
Nonpolitical Volunteering since 2008. The final question of my formal




   

  %

"##$  

   

 

  

 

 

I was surprised that the overwhelming majority, 23 of 30, said yes

they had done nonpolitical volunteer work, while only 7 had not. If someone reported
doing a particularly substantial amount of volunteer work, then I followed up by asking
them to articulate their motivations as best they could.
Three different interviewees had gone on to do some volunteer work through their
law program &

 

  

 )   *    +

'  

 

(





was involved in volunteer work through the

Black Law Student Association. There were various things we did, whether it was
adopting a highway, or visiting a soup kitchen, or donating law books to prisons. It was a
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way to get a good amount of community service work done in different areas and to raise
money for various organizations and other things.   



 

school organizations to help domestic violence victims get protective orders and help the
LGBT community with legal research and assistance.
One interviewee, Victoria, seemed particularly excited to answer this question.
Part of my position [at work] is to do service projects for community members. A recent
one is we participated in a local Toys for Tots group so children could have Christmas
  

                 

donated to our local soup kitchen and stuff lik   

      

local animal shelters.           

  

involvement are very important to you and a core part of your work as well. Do you feel
like being involved in that 2008 Obama campaign encouraged you toward more
       

        

  I do

think my                   


       political organizations like the Quad City Chamber of

Commerce or the Quad Cities Democratic Caucus. But as far as volunteering and getting
         

         



someone who was more likely drawn to the Obama campaign for the opportunity to
volunteer, than drawn to volunteering because of an Obama Effect.
Others mentioned donating blood, participating in clothing drives, donating to the
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, helping out the Defenders of
Wildlife, and working for a Jewish organization that feeds the poor. One worked with the
Trusted Mentors program, and three had been a Big Brother or a Big Sister at some point
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in the past 5 years. Caroline was the volunteer who seemed to have done most of these
things herself:
I am       
          
home visits, food drives, stuff like that. I also teach Sunday school. We also have
a high immigrant population here in Milwaukee, so I have done lots of tutoring
and organizing of other community events particularly for the Mung population.
              
  
and running.
Representing the other end of the spectrum and revealing a lack of a lasting
Obama Effect, I asked Donovan, one of the most active volunteers for Obama at Purdue,
               No,   
                r.
Final Thoughts from the Volunteers. I closed these interviews with what I described to
the volunteers as a very open-ended question that they could answer however they chose.
I asked, When you think back to volunteering on that 2008 Obama campaign almost 5
years later, is there anything in particular that is really memorable for you or that you
think of as having had a lasting impact on your life?       

 

to give the volunteers an opportunity to articulate any manifestations of a lasting Obama
Effect that may not have been captured in responses to the more pointed questions related
to the core of my research and analysis (i.e., those related directly to political attitudes or
participation).
I identified 4 main themes or points of recurring focus in the volunteer responses:
involvement, community, memorable events, and connection to family. Representing the
first major theme of involvement, Donovan recalled how being involved in the campaign
inspired him to become a more civically engaged even in his professional life:
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My experience on that campaign actually made me think more about what
government is supposed to do for the people, and made me change majors to civil
engineering, because it has the biggest effect on people day    
why I want to be involved in government still. I think it made people who
volunteered want to be leaders more, maybe not political leaders but people who

   
       
 
   had never
experienced that drive before.
Bridget was another who drew inspiration for her professional life from her involvement
in the Obama campaign:
Yeah, I have great memories about relationships that were fostered. Really, one of
tayed as involved as I want to be. But it


    
  
changed me in a way that will serve me well in the future. Working on the
campaign, learning to organize and persuade, I think it helps me a lot in my
professional life. So I would say the skills I gained during that time period are
really positive memories for me.
Abby talked about how being involved in the campaign inspired her early in her Purdue
career helped her realize her agency:
When I worked on the 2008 campaign, it was my freshman year in college. So
seeing how active and engaged people wanted to be in the process if they felt they
had a candidate that spoke to them, that gave me a good push toward what I
wanted to do in life. It made me think younger people do really care if candidates
talk to them abou

       

    


  

     



  

   





impressive.
Several others reminisced positively and proudly about their involvement in the
2008 campaign. Derek brought up the power of teamwork, telling me, 

  

that campaign is it showed me what people can accomplish when they come together and
work hard for a common goal. Just the way everyone seemed to have self-motivated to do
their part to get Presiden



 

 



I remember most! Jordan talked

about the excitement he felt from helping others to get involved as well: I had a lot of
good moments, especially when we were registering voters where it had been years and
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years since they voted. And it was pretty exciting to see that level of involvement and
     



  

       

refreshing experien Aaron relished in having been involved in 

s a very
:

  

Obviously it was really exciting when we won. I guess it was my first real-world



experience defending a candidate, so going door to door in a state like Indiana, I would
  

 

 

 

 

  

 



Tyler offered a particularly emotional response about the meaning of his
involvement in the 2008 Obama campaign. When I asked what was particularly
memorable for him, he responded:
For me, the extraordinary thing was that the year and a half before that campaign,
   
   

      


  

 

        
     

 



 

  



  

was basically symptoms of depression. So when that campaign started I basically
decided to force myself to go out and do something. And then during that




 

   





 

  

  

campaign on top of school stuff. I felt myself being more energized and more
productive and even got better grades that semester, I think just based off the
energy we had on the campaign. It was very fulfilling working toward something
that I believed in like that. That was very rewarding. Being able to work that
much on something that I care about, to completely throw myself into a
worthwhile project, and being around a whole bunch of people that were at least
somewhat like-                
miss that sometimes.
The second major theme I identified was community. Many volunteers deeply
appreciated the opportunity to work side by side in a community of peers on a project of
such great significance. Cliff, for example, responded to the final question like this:
For me what really stood out was, we all came from different backgrounds. There
were political science students but also engineering students. The diversity of our
group was pretty widespread. It was amazing just how focused everybody was
 

 





 

 ! 

    





problems electing Obama president but to work so hard as a team for a common
goal was just amazing.
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Greg also tapped directly into the theme of community, citing it as a source of future
inspiration:
Two big things I remember. One is it really demonstrated how important that type of
work can be. It felt like                 
thing that kept me coming back. The other thing is, it was really cool seeing my peers
being so dedicated not just mentally and emotionally, but also with their time. That
was the first time I had             
political volunteerism.
Lucas told me that for him, the campaign had evolved into a joint business venture with a

    [Richard] and I are still working together on our business venture. The
social network has also been very substantial in my life since then.
The third major theme I identified was memorable events. Several volunteers
spoke about a single experience from the campaign that was especially memorable for
them. Of the 12 nonwhite volunteers, only one, Dominic, talked about race in relation to
this final interview question. He told me about a particularly meaningful day for him on
an out-of-state campaign trip that really influenced his thinking about race relations:
I thin             
      
from an all African American community from Gary, and when I got to Purdue I

           

        

 

that campaign really challenged my thinking on race. Point in case is when we
were in Ohio, canvassing in this rich white neighborhood, me and my girlfriend,
these 2 young black kids, and I was just shocked at how many people invited us to
come into their homes and actually sit on their furniture and talk to them. Some

                        

remember thinking wow, this is really cool, some rich white people are actually
nice like this in real life! So that was a really big deal for me, because they
actually cared what we were saying and asked questions about what we were
studying in school and stuff, like they were really excited we came by. It was just
a very exciting experience.

Richard also focused his response on his most memorable experience campaigning for
Obama in another state:
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I remember going to Iowa to volunteer over winter break. I was gonna be moved
to Cedar Rapids but one of the staffers was sick so I was put in charge of the
entire Osage, Iowa office. I remember going out canvassing with this former
Department of Justice staffer who had this personal vendetta against the Clintons.
We went out in his little Prius and the wind chill was like -3 degrees. So his job
was to drive between houses as I went up to knock and make the pitch. Then the
day of the actual caucus, it was in the senior center and the Hillary people were
the older people and they had the keys to the center. So they went up and hung up
a bunch of Hillary signs all around the caucus area. So I remember showing up
and having to call the elections officials and waiting for the official to come down
before we went in to set up. But anyway, we won, we went out to a bar and
celebrated with the Edwards people. So it was between that, and when Obama
came to ca   
          
Daniel first told me about a particular memorable event from the campaign, and then
turned to the theme of involvement and how it helped his professional development:
I remember the day of Halloween I ran into Jade ( field organizer for the
Obama campaign) and we went down to the tailgating crowd for the football

                      
always remember. But overall I guess just the sense of working as a team. I
worked at a couple jobs before Groupon and I think it helped me out with that. I
also think it may have contributed to my job at Groupon. When we first started,
there were a ton of people I knew who applied at Groupon     
But my interviewer was really interested in what kind of campaign work I did,
and what kind of team work I had experienced. So I told her about the campaign,
how I did all this work, and I got the feeling that she really liked that part.

One volunteer, Josh, talked about how excited he was to be invited to a special event with
Obama as a reward for  

        

My buddy and I were

still in high school during the 2008 primaries, and we got to see Obama play basketball in
Kokomo because we got so many voter registrations. That was our reward from the
campaign. It was a great day!! Another, Cameron, mentioned a big local music festival in

      "

I also remember the Turn Indiana Blue musical festival on the

Lafayette Bridge. And in the end we actually turned Indiana Blue!! 



also

referenced election night itself as a particularly memorable moment for Purdue

171
volunteers like her:  



        



 t a few

thousand votes. So just knowing I had participated in that, I remember feeling that night
like it was a historical moment and I had been part of creating it. What a feeling.
The final theme that emerged in volunteer responses was connection to family.
Two volunteers touched upon this theme in very meaningful ways. Caroline told me:
That campaign was actually a pivotal moment in the history of my family. My
mom was a volunteer coordinator for the campaign, and my dad was making sure
that everyone w                   
brother and sister got into phone-banking for Obama. Then we all took a road trip
to his inauguration in January 2009!
Tonya               



   the 4 themes I

discussed in this section. She began by discussing a memorable event, but then quickly
pivoted to the larger meaningfulness of her involvement. She then drew an emotional
connection between her involvement in the 2008 Obama campaign and her family
history:
I    !  "     #   #     

personally connected to a campaign before. So I guess that turned me from being
          $ !        

definitive point in my life. Before that I still cared about politics, I mean I voted,
                     
                       % 

involved now. I may have been disconnected for a few months around when my
    #                  
    #                $   
people were going to be info  & #  
        

an informed citizen too. And the other thing, my dad was a journalist for PBS
radio in New York City so I kind of grew up in a household with politics, because
      #               
       #             

grew up in a household where the news was important to my dad but never really
translated into being important to us. And I lost my dad when I was 19, and now
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that I got involved in it.

            el proud
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The story I thought I might be telling, not long after I began this project, was one
of the Obama Effect gone awry. I situated my project in the literature on campaign effects
and individual-centered campaigns, hypothesizing a positive and lasting Obama Effect
for this seemingly unique candidate; but

   

his first year. W

       

  









    

    

already beginning to wonder if I had my general hypothesis backward. The 2008 Obama
campaign had set out to transform the electorate, but instead was welcomed by the rise of
the Tea Party Movement. Obama had sought to strengthen his Democratic Party, but
instead it was the other Party that he seemed to energize more after his 2008 election.
The Democrats suffered landslide losses in the 2010 midterms and found themselves
thereafter blocked at nearly every policy turn by their Republican counterparts. I
wondered if the Obama Effect might be a negative thing, a phenomenon experienced
most deeply by his harshest critics rather than by his strongest supporters.
Ultimately I decided to





 

 

 



 





would transform the electorate into a more engaged and participatory citizenry. I framed
my hypotheses accordingly to expect a positive and lasting Obama Effect on political
interest, external political efficacy, partisanship, voter turnout, attendance of political
meetings, and attendance of political protests. As it turns out, the picture that emerged
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was far too muddy to characterize so neatly or generally as an overarching  




   What is rather obvious from the data is that the 2008 Obama

campaign did not have the clearly transformational positive impact on the electorate in
these ways as it had hoped.
Within the chapter on political attitudes, I found a negative Obama Effect on
political interest, indicating that his supporters did not stay engaged in politics after the
election to the degree that his campaign hoped. I observed a positive Obama Effect on
one type of external efficacy (How much do government officials care what people like
you think?), although the negative sentiment among McCain supporters was stronger than
the positive sentiment among Obama supporters. And I observed a sort of oppositional
effect on my second measure of efficacy (How much can people like you affect what the
government does?) I observed a very broad candidate effect on partisanship, indicating
that supporters of any candidate prone to increased partisanship in the first two years after
a typical modern presidential election.
Within the chapter on political participation, I observed no statistically significant
candidate effect on voter turnout. I did, however, find a negative presidential effect on
attending local meetings to discuss political or social concerns. Although Obama
supporters did register a relative significant increase their attendance, the magnitude of
the increase was stronger among McCain supporters. Likewise, supporters of Gore and
Bush II, the other losing candidates, registered similar increases. This suggested a
possible oppositional thesis, in which the opponents rather than the supporters of the
winning candidate become more participatory after the election. I observed a similar
dynamic between Obama and McCain supporters with attending protests, with supporters
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of both candidates showing an increased attendance of protests, but with a significantly
larger increase among McCain supporters. Not surprisingly, comparative data from the
contested 2000 election showed a spike in protest activity among both Bush II and Gore
supporters. In sum, results on participation were mixed but revealed more of an
oppositional thesis, in other words, more of a negative Obama Effect on participation
than a positive one. It is important to keep in mind the relative nature of the analysis here,
given that even Obama supporters showed increases in these types of participation, just
not as large as those for supporters of McCain and other candidates from previous
election cycles.
It seems safe to say, based on my quantitative analyses, that there was not a
positive, unique, and lasting Obama Effect in any overarching sense regarding the
attitudes and behaviors of his supporters. Certainly the election was not transformative in
the sense that the Obama campaign hoped. If anything, his opponents appeared to be
emboldened more than his supporters when it came to thinking they could affect
government. He did not inspire heightened turnout among his supporters in the 2010

      

   

      

attending meetings and protests during those two years after the election.
Within the chapter on 2008 Obama campaign volunteers, I found that former
Obama volunteers tended maintain a high degree of political interest, but that just as

                    
category). Volunteers gave overwhelmingly positive assessments of President Obama in
that summer after his 2012 reelection, but the vast majority also qualified their praise by
expressing certain frustrations. The most common frustration expressed was with
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congressional Republicans who were viewed as universally obstructionist toward any
proposal by made by President Obama. While many expressed frustration with systems
of checks and balances and divided government that disallowed Obama from enacting
parts of his agenda, most also expressed some awareness of and sympathy for Obama



constraints. Many volunteers mentioned that he had been put in an impossible political
situation, citing circumstances such as the economic crisis and the two ongoing wars. Yet
quite a few volunteers did lay partial blame for their disappointment squarely on
 

shoulders. Some were displeased with his handling of the NSA or the

Affordable Care Act or other individual issues, while others thought he was right on the
issue(s) but too eager to compromise. This latter group wanted him to fight harder to
defend his positions instead of, as they perceived it, giving in to his political opponents.
Almost all volunteers I interviewed had voted in 2010 and 2012, with the vast
majority viewing voting as a duty or responsibility. Most of them participated in politics
in other ways, if not by volunteering for a campaign, then through social media, bumper
stickers, and the like. Several had even worked in politics. In terms of direct mobilization
efforts, it seemed the 2012 Obama campaign contacted many of these Indiana volunteers
only by mass email and not with personal outreach; nonetheless, several became involved
with the 2012 campaign as staffers or volunteers.
More broadly, in the area of participation I saw what appeared to be some clear
evidence of a positive and lasting Obama Effect on many of these young volunteers. Yet
when it came to the other type of participation I asked about, non-political civic
engagement, a lasting Obama Effect seemed to be largely absent. The group was not
nearly as civically engaged outside of politics as I might have expected, with only half
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the group having joined even 1 organization or association in the past 5 years. When
professional organizations were discounted, that figure dropped to about one-third. Most
of them had volunteered in some non-political capacity at some point in the past 5 years,
but only a few spoke about volunteering as a core part of their lives or identities.
  



to many specific questions, I did hear what

sounded like a positive and unique and lasting Obama Effect. Surely if the (anecdotal)
responses to my final survey question are indication, many or even most of them would
claim that the 2008 Obama campaign had some kind of transformational impact on their
lives. Yet at the aggregate level, for most questions under analysis I could not make this
argument even for my sample of interviewees, let alone for the national population that
was sampled for the ANES panels. The data was often mixed and sometimes even
pointed to a negative Obama Effect.
Very rarely did I find any clear evidence of a positive, lasting, and unique Obama
Effect. Only in a few instances were my original hypotheses of significant and positive
campaign effects confirmed empirically through systematic data analysis. As such, this
  



 





   

 

 

  



found that even for the historic Obama campaign, even with a candidate who won a
landslide victory, even with a campaign that broke all previous fundraising and
volunteerism records, it was not possible to produce that kind of transformative impact on
the American electorate.
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